scholarly journals Pricing and Coordination Strategy in a Green Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Liyan Wang ◽  
Minghai Ye ◽  
Shanshan Ma ◽  
Yipeng Sha
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Random Variable ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Coordination Strategy ◽  
Optimal Decisions

This paper addresses the pricing and coordination strategy in a green supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a green product and sells it to a risk-averse retailer. The product’s demand is a random variable influenced by the green level and the retail price. The problem is modeled in three different structures, a centralized and two decentralized models, in which the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer act as the channel leader, respectively. This paper presents the optimal decisions for all supply chain members, analyzes the effects of green degree and risk-averse coefficient on the supply chain members’ decision-making and their profits, and performs the numerical analysis. The results show that the green degree and the whole supply chain’s expected profits are highest in the centralized scenario, followed by the retailer-led scenario, and lowest under the manufacturer-led scenario; the green degree and the manufacturer’s expected profit increase with the risk-averse coefficient, no matter who dominates the channel; however, the risk-averse coefficient’s effects on the retailer’s expected utility and the retail price depends on who dominates the channel and on the greening investment parameter.

Numerical Simulation of Forward Green Supply Chain

2014 ◽  
Vol 722 ◽  
pp. 409-412
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Decision Making Model

The forward green supply chain consisting of the manufacturer and retailer is as the background. The Game Theory is used,and two kinds of green supply chain game models are set up: the Centralized decision-making model, and the Manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model.Then we carry out numerical simulation.We find that (1)With the increase of green level of green products, the market price of green product is increasing, the profit the manufacturer and the retailer are also increasing;(2)The manufacturer and the retailer will benefit from that consumers have strong environment consciousness.So we suggest the manufacturer and the retailer should cooperate to produce higher green level of products.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Game Model and Contract Design: Risk Neutrality vs. Risk Aversion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianhu Cai ◽  
Huazhen Lin ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu ◽  
Minyan Ping
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Tolerance ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Risk Neutral

Abstract This paper incorporates the players’ risk attitudes into a green supply chain (GSC) consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier conducts production and determines the green level and wholesale price as a game leader, the retailer sells green products to consumers and determines the retail price as a follower. Equilibrium solutions are derived, and the influence of risk aversion on the GSC is examined. Our results show that, for the centralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the green level and the retail price; while for the decentralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the wholesale price and the retail price, but it may induce the supplier to increase the green level given a large risk tolerance of the supplier. Meanwhile, the risk-averse decentralized GSC may obtain more expected profit than the risk-neutral decentralized GSC. Furthermore, this paper designs a revenue-and-cost-sharing joint contract to coordinate the risk-neutral GSC, and such a contract can improve the risk-averse GSC under specific conditions.

Decisions of Green Supply Chain under Fairness Concerns and Different Power Structures

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 28-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangdong Liu ◽  
Tianjian Yang ◽  
Yao Wei ◽  
Xuemei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

This article constructs a two-stage dynamic game model for green manufacturers, retailers, and consumers to address the issue that fairness preference in manufacturing can impact supply chain decision-making. This is done by discussing decision-making under the three power structures of green-manufacturer-dominated, retailer-dominated, and the Nash-equilibrium, and compares the balanced decision under the three power structures. The results show that in the manufacturer-dominated and Nash equilibrium games, product greenness, retailer profits, manufacturer profits, total supply chain profits, and a manufacturer's utility all decrease as the fairness preference increases, whereas the retail price and wholesale price are just the opposite of each other. In the retailer-dominated game, the retail price, product greenness, and total supply chain profits are not impacted by the fairness preference. The wholesale price, manufacturer's profits, and manufacturer's utility increases as the fairness preference increases, whereas the retailer profits decrease.

The Impact of Dual-Fairness Concerns Under Different Power

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Tianjian Yang ◽  
Guangdong Liu ◽  
Yao Wei ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Xinglin Dong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Equilibrium Structure ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
The Impact

By analyzing the impact of different fairness concerns on a green supply chain, this study determines the optimal decisions under different power structures and conducts a comparative analysis of them. The findings of this study are summarized as follows: 1) under the manufacturer-dominated structure, retail price, wholesale price, product greenness, the manufacturer's profit, the total profit of the supply chain, the manufacturer's utility, and the retailer's utility are all negatively correlated with fairness concerns, but positively correlated with the retailer's profit; 2) under the retailer-dominated structure, fairness concerns have no impact on retail price, product greenness, or the total profit of the supply chain, are positively correlated with wholesale price and the manufacturer's profit and utility, and are negatively correlated with the retailer's profit and utility; 3) under the Nash equilibrium structure, fairness concerns have no impact on the green supply chain.

scholarly journals Pricing, Green Degree and Coordination Decisions in a Green Supply Chain with Loss Aversion

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongwei Feng ◽  
Chunqiao Tan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Efficiency Coefficient ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

The consumer environmental awareness promotes green manufacturing and the behavioral preferences of members become prevailing in supply chain management. To promote further development of green supply chains, a two-echelon green supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer is considered, where the manufacturer is loss-averse and the retailer is risk-neutral. We use a Stackelberg game to investigate the impacts of loss aversion and green efficiency coefficient on retail price, wholesale price, green degree, profits of members, and profit of the green supply chain under the assumption that manufacturer’s reference point of loss aversion is equal to the subgame perfect equilibrium partition. It is shown that, in the centralized decision-making setting (CDS), green degree and profit of the green supply chain are higher than those in the decentralized decision-making setting (DDS), while in the decentralized decision-making setting with a loss-averse manufacturer (DDS-LAM) loss aversion of manufacturer further decreases green degree and profit of green supply chain. It is also found that profits of the manufacturer and the retailer decrease with levels of loss aversion of manufacturer. Furthermore, it is also shown that wholesale price and retail price in the three decision-making settings depend on the green efficiency coefficient. Wholesale price and retail price in DDS-LAM are always the lowest (highest) if the green efficiency coefficient is sufficiently high (low). Finally, executing a greening cost-sharing contract can improve chain members’ profits if the retailer shares an appropriate proportion with the loss-averse manufacturer.

scholarly journals Decision-making for Green Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concern Based on Trade Credit

IEEE Access ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Haoxiong Yang ◽  
Enlu Shao ◽  
Yuanyuan Gong ◽  
Xiaolin Guan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Fairness Concern

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals New Product Presale Strategies considering Consumers’ Loss Aversion in the E-Commerce Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Chongfeng Lan ◽  
Jianfeng Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Correlation Coefficient ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
New Products ◽  
New Product ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Optimal Decisions

New product presale is a strategic behavior of manufacturers to transfer inventory risks to consumers. The research purpose of this paper is to examine the presale discount, inventory, and service level decisions in an e-commerce supply chain, where the first period is the presale period and the second is the selling period for the new product. First, consumers were divided into two types—those who are risk averse and those who are not. Then, considering different presale discounts applied for new products, three presale strategy models were discussed: no-presale strategy, presale strategy with a moderate discount, and complete presale strategy, and the optimal decisions of e-commerce supply chain members were obtained under different valuations of the new product by consumers. Finally, the effects of the correlation coefficient between the numbers of the two types of consumers, the loss aversion degree of consumers, and the marginal profit in the sales period on the optimal discounted price and the maximum expected profit were analyzed. The conclusions of this article show that the presale strategy is not always optimal but depends on the parameters of the market and the type of consumers. For example, when the correlation coefficient between the two types of consumers is high, it is more profitable for the suppliers if they choose the presale strategy with a moderate discount, while e-commerce platforms tend to adopt the no-presale strategy. The optimal discounted price in the complete presale case is not necessarily lower than that in the moderately discounted presale case. If the marginal profit is high in the normal sales period or consumers are less averse to losses, suppliers are more likely to adopt the complete presale strategy. The research conclusions provide some theoretical reference for companies in the development of new product presale strategies in the e-commerce supply chain.

Information Fake in Supply Chains

2011 ◽  
Vol 267 ◽  
pp. 958-962
Author(s):  
Jiang Hong
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Information Management ◽  
Stable Distribution ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Stochastically Stable

In this paper, we set risk attitude into decision making research for the supply chain manage. We focus on the information management. We discuss the stable states and the stochastically stable distribution for the fake game in the supply chain. We find there always exist information fake behaviors of low-yield suppliers. And, the less risk averse suppliers are, the more information fake they use.

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