Bargaining Power, Political Transaction Costs and Institutional Change: Private and Public Dental Care in Denmark1

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lotte Bogh Andersen
2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 815-827 ◽  
Author(s):  
BENITO ARRUÑADA

AbstractInspired by comments made by Allen (2017), Lueck (2017), Ménard (2017) and Smith (2017), this response clarifies and deepens the analysis in Arruñada (2017a). Its main argument is that to deal with the complexity of property we must abstract secondary elements, such as the physical dimensions of some types of assets, and focus on the interaction between transactions. This sequential-exchange framework captures the main problem of property in the current environment of impersonal markets. It also provides criteria to compare private and public ordering, as well as to organize public solutions that enable new forms of private ordering. The analysis applies the lessons in Coase (1960) to property by not only comparing realities but also maintaining his separate definition of property rights and transaction costs. However, it replaces his contractual, single-exchange, framework for one in which contracts interact, causing exchange externalities.


2020 ◽  
pp. 019251212094073
Author(s):  
Gabriel Cepaluni ◽  
Ivan Filipe Fernandes

Coalition formation is considered an important tool to leverage bargaining power in GATT/WTO negotiations. While most of the literature has focused on developing countries, we show that sizable economies are the primary users of coalitions at the GATT/WTO. We also find evidence that middle powers do not exhibit distinctive collectivist behavior at the WTO. There is a linear and strong relationship between countries’ economic power—measured as real GDP—and coalition participation within the GATT/WTO system. We explain these results, presenting evidence that large economies—countries that have greater trade negotiations power—join coalitions more often because they are better equipped to absorb transaction costs and more prepared to deal with the uncertainty of WTO negotiations. We also found a relationship between coalition entry and trade openness, with countries more open to trade joining coalitions more often.


Medical Care ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene G. Geiser ◽  
Fredric C. Menz

2017 ◽  
Vol 08 (02) ◽  
pp. 1750011
Author(s):  
Satyendra Kumar Gupta ◽  
Ashima Goyal

We analyze prospects for the Chinese renminbi to become a major international currency, along with the US dollar, in a multiple reserve currency world. Analytical models on switching costs in networks and on currency choice under direct and indirect transaction costs are used to derive variables for empirical analysis. While network size and financial market depth (lower transaction costs) favor incumbents, changes in trade-related bargaining power and in currency volatility could favor newcomers. The models also point to political determinants affecting currency choice. We develop indices to quantify some of these. When the bargaining power index is used in estimation, it shows capital account openness and currency stability have to complement a rise in trade share for an aspiring reserve currency.


Ergonomics ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Jonker ◽  
B. Rolander ◽  
I. Balogh ◽  
L. Sandsjö ◽  
K. Ekberg ◽  
...  

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