Design of the 3G Spectrum Auctions in the UK and Germany: An Experimental Investigation

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Seifert ◽  
Karl-Martin Ehrhart

Abstract This paper analyses the auction designs chosen for awarding 3G licences in the UK and Germany and compares them with respect to revenues and bidders’ surplus using a laboratory experiment. In our study with a given number of bidders, the German design leads to higher revenues. However, bidder surplus in the German design is lower and bidders face a severe exposure problem. Because this might discourage participation, it will probably lead to less competitive bidding in real applications.

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy F. Ackert ◽  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
Xi (Jason) Kuang ◽  
Li Qi

ABSTRACT:Individuals often lie for psychological rewards (e.g., preserving self image and/or protecting others), absent economic rewards. We conducted a laboratory experiment, using a modified dictator game, to identify conditions that entice individuals to lie solely for psychological rewards. We argue that such lies can provide a ready means for individuals to manage others’ impression of them. We investigated the effect of social distance (the perceived familiarity, intimacy, or psychological proximity between two parties) and knowledge of circumstances (whether parties have common or asymmetric information) on the frequency of lying. We found that lying occurs more frequently when social distance is near and that the effect is exacerbated when information is asymmetric. Our theoretical development suggests that, under these conditions, individuals’ need to manage others’ impression is magnified. We discuss the implications of our findings.


Author(s):  
Blanca L. Delgado-Márquez ◽  
Nuria E. Hurtado-Torres ◽  
J. Alberto Aragón-Correa

One of the major debates currently in the literature about trust and management relies on the perspective of trust-building in organizations. In this chapter we draw on graph-based structures in order to investigate the role of individuals’ social networks as tools for enhancing potential trust-building processes at interpersonal level. The chapter relies on two main aspects. First, we propose a theoretical approach establishing a linkage between agents’ social networks and trust-building processes among unknown agents. Second, we carry out an experimental investigation focused on a laboratory experiment developed with students of Management and Economics bachelor degrees. Furthermore, we outline some implications for managers.


Author(s):  
Francesco Aletta ◽  
Jian Kang

Soundscape research needs to develop predictive tools for environmental design. A number of descriptor-indicator(s) models have been proposed so far, particularly for the “tranquility” dimension to manage “quiet areas” in urban contexts. However, there is a current lack of models addressing environments offering actively engaging soundscapes, i.e., the “vibrancy” dimension. The main aim of this study was to establish a predictive model for a vibrancy descriptor based on physical parameters, which could be used by designers and practitioners. A group interview was carried out to formulate a hypothesis on what elements would be influential for vibrancy perception. Afterwards, data on vibrancy perception were collected for different locations in the UK and China through a laboratory experiment and their physical parameters were used as indicators to establish a predictive model. Such indicators included both aural and visual parameters. The model, based on Roughness, Presence of People, Fluctuation Strength, Loudness and Presence of Music as predictors, explained 76% of the variance in the mean individual vibrancy scores. A statistically significant correlation was found between vibrancy scores and eventfulness scores, but not between vibrancy scores and pleasantness scores. Overall results showed that vibrancy is contextual and depends both on the soundscape and on the visual scenery.


1999 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Brooksbank ◽  
Michael Connolly ◽  
Bob Morgan

Author(s):  
C. Bram Cadsby ◽  
Fei Song ◽  
Francis Tapon

Abstract We compare, through a laboratory experiment using salient financial incentives, misrepresentations of performance under target-based compensation with those under both a linear piece-rate and a tournament-based bonus system. An anagram game was employed as the experimental task. Results show that productivity was similar and statistically indistinguishable under the three schemes. In contrast, whether one considers the number of overclaimed words, the number of work/pay periods in which overclaims occur, or the number of participants making an overclaim at least once, target-based compensation produced significantly more cheating than either of the other two systems. While earlier research has compared cheating under target-based compensation with cheating under non-performance-based compensation, which offers no financial incentive to cheat, this is the first study that compares cheating under target-based schemes to cheating under other performance-based schemes. The results suggest that cheating as a response to incentives can be mitigated without giving up performance pay altogether.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Drydakis ◽  
Peter MacDonald ◽  
Vangelis Chiotis ◽  
Laurence Somers

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1907 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramji Balakrishnan ◽  
Geoffrey B. Sprinkle ◽  
Michael G. Williamson

ABSTRACT We use a laboratory experiment to examine whether corporate giving to charity motivates employees. We find a strong altruism effect. Even when employees cannot be remunerated for their actions, employee contributions to employers significantly increase as the level of corporate giving increases. We also find a signaling effect. When employees can be remunerated for their actions, employee contributions initially increase as the level of corporate giving increases. Thus, even though corporate giving to charity decreases the amount that can be shared between employees and employers, employees behave as if more charitable employers will return proportionally more to employees. It is not until relatively high levels of corporate giving that employee contributions to employers eventually decrease. Collectively, our results suggest that corporate giving is an effective lever for motivating employee effort and contributions to organizational endeavors. Corporate giving can increase the efficacy of implicit (relational) contracts and reduce the need for formal accounting-based reward systems and controls.


2000 ◽  
Vol 111 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. R. M. Hay ◽  
T. P. Baglin ◽  
P. W. Collins ◽  
F. G. H. Hill ◽  
D. M. Keeling

2006 ◽  
Vol 175 (4S) ◽  
pp. 476-477
Author(s):  
Freddie C. Hamdy ◽  
Joanne Howson ◽  
Athene Lane ◽  
Jenny L. Donovan ◽  
David E. Neal

2006 ◽  
Vol 175 (4S) ◽  
pp. 210-210
Author(s):  
◽  
Freddie C. Hamdy ◽  
Athene Lane ◽  
David E. Neal ◽  
Malcolm Mason ◽  
...  
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