Locke and Nozick on Property

1982 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. B. Drury

In this paper I hope to show that the differences between the Lockian and Nozickian ideas regarding the foundation of private property are far greater than is generally assumed. My purpose is not to criticize Nozick, but to show that the accepted interpretation of Locke on which he relies is mistaken. In particular, I hope to show (1) that the theory of appropriation by labour is not applicable after the invention of money; and is meant to show that the right to property is based on the right to life and self-preservation, and (2) that property arrangements after the introduction of money are justified primarily by utility rather than natural right, and (3) that the conditions created by the invention of money make the ‘regulation’ of private property necessary for the preservation of mankind which is required by the law of nature.

2021 ◽  
pp. 435-457
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett

This chapter explores how three Convention rights operate in practice: the right to life (Article 2), the right to a private and family life (Article 8), and freedom of religious belief (Article 9). Article 2 provides that everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of one’s life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following one’s conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. Article 8 provides that everyone has the right to respect for one’s private and family life, home, and correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law. Meanwhile, Article 9 provides that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change and manifest one’s religion or belief.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-74
Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor

In this short essay I argue that the main insight of Murphy and Nagel’s book, The Myth of Ownership, that people have no right to their pre-tax income, is not supported by their claim that the right to private property is not a natural right. The non-naturalness of the right to private property, I argue, is irrelevant to their moral argument. The plausibility of their moral conclusion derives from the thesis (which they also seem to endorse) that people have a right to the fruits of their labor, maintaining, however, that there is no possible conception, morally speaking, of what the fruits of one's labor are, independent of a system of legal and social norms that constitute the terms of fair bargaining, pricing, etc. People can only have a right to a fair assessment of the added value of their labor, and the latter cannot make any sense independent of the entire system of norms prevailing in the relevant society. I argue that this last conclusion is not affected by the nature of the right to private property.


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Tamir

The phenomenon of social exclusion in Israel is a vivid demonstration of the Basic Laws' failure to fulfil their integrative role. Despite the ‘constitutional revolution’ and the Supreme Court's ongoing endeavour over the last two decades to instil a bill of rights through its jurisprudence, Israeli society has failed to fully internalise values of equality. In terms of legal jargon, individuals continue to claim and exercise ‘sole and despotic dominion’ over their private property in order to avoid contact with individuals belonging to certain minority groups. In many cases, such behaviour in the private sphere results in exclusion from the public sphere.This phenomenon is especially astonishing considering the fact that many laws in Israel apply the right of equality to the private sphere. Furthermore, the Israeli Supreme Court has developed comprehensive human rights jurisprudence applicable to the private sphere. The gap between the law in the books and the law in action illustrates that effective implementation of human rights in the private sphere cannot be achieved solely by specific legislation or by jurisprudence that is sensitive to human rights. This argument is backed by several recent bills which preserve and enforce the exclusion of minorities, particularly of Arabs, from the public sphere. These bills illustrate that exclusion is indeed a growing phenomenon in Israeli society that cannot be overlooked. Moreover, they underscore the urgent need to entrench a direct obligation to apply human rights to the private sphere at the constitutional level. This will be achieved only when Israel adopts a full constitution.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-23
Author(s):  
Ni Nyoman Oktaviani ◽  
Ketut Sukadana ◽  
Ni Made Puspasutari Ujianti

Children born out of wedlock are children born to a woman who does not have a legal marriage relationship with a man who has made her give birth to the child. The child does not have a perfect position in the standpoint of the law like a legitimate child in general. The birth of a child is crucial in every family. In terms of family life, children are descendants of the next generation so a child has the right to life and identity as an effort to protect the law. The problem how the adoption of a child born beyond official marriage by his grandfather in Desa Batukaang, the Sub-district of Kintamani, Bangli Regency is executed and what is the inheritance system for such an adopted child in Batukaang Village, Kintamani District, Bangli Regency? The child was appointed by his own grandfather and the reason for the appointment was that the adoptive grandfather did not have a son. The type of research used in this research is an empirical study with a juridical-sociological approach. Types of data are primary data and secondary data, collected through interview and literature review. The procedure for the adoption of the child execution is through customary or noetic way, which is to carry out extortion ceremonies where offerings are religiously and legally made and the child is legally made as a legitimate child in general. Ultimately, the child is legitimate to be the child of the adopting grandfather both in a customary and inheritance legal system, the child inherits all inheritance from the grandfather. 


Author(s):  
Charlotte E. Blattner

AbstractAgency is central to humans’ individual rights and their organization as a community. Human agency is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights through guaranteed rights, such as the right to life, basic education, freedom of expression, and the freedom to form personal relationships, which all protect humans from tyranny and oppression. Though studies of animal agency consistently suggest that we grossly underestimate the capacity of animals to make decisions, determine and take action, and to organize themselves individually and as groups, few have concerned themselves with whether and how animal agency is relevant for the law and vice versa. Currently, most laws offer no guarantee that animals’ agency will be respected, and fail to respond when animals resist the human systems that govern them. This failure emerges from profound prejudices and deep-seated anthropocentric biases that shape the law, including law-making processes. Law and law-making operating exclusively as self-judging systems is widely decried and denounced—except in animal law. This chapter identifies standpoint acknowledgement as a means to dismantle these tendencies, and provides instructions on how to ask the right questions. It concludes by calling for an “animal agency turn” across disciplines, to challenge our assumptions about how we ought to organize human-animal relationships politically and personally, and to increase our civic competence and courage, empathy, participation, common engagement, and respect for animal alterity.


Author(s):  
Anton Du Plessis

Can you use lethal force to protect your property, and if so, when? South Africans are confused about how much force they can use in defending themselves from crime, and mistakes in this area could have disastrous consequences. While the law remains unclear, the constitutional right to life is likely to be given precedence over the right to protect property.


2009 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Casini

Il contributo propone all’attenzione il II Rapporto sull’applicazione della legge italiana in materia di “procreazione medicalmente assistita” (PMA) (Legge 40/2004), elaborato nell’aprile 2009 all’indomani della quarta relazione ministeriale del 25 marzo 2009 sullo stesso tema. La particolarità del presente Rapporto consiste nell’indagare su uno dei due obiettivi della legge 40/2004: tutelare il diritto alla vita del concepito. Infatti, mentre è alta la concentrazione sull’obiettivo di “superare la sterilità e la infertilità”, lo scopo di difendere il diritto alla vita del concepito considerato dalla stessa legge “soggetto” al pari degli altri soggetti coinvolti nelle procedure di PMA, è troppo spesso dimenticato. Il Rapporto vuole proprio rimediare a tale dimenticanza e si chiede: di quanti nuovi esseri umani è stata evitata la distruzione per effetto della legge? Poiché, come si legge nel contributo, è chiaro che le tecniche di PMA per il fatto stesso di procreare “in vitro” espongono alla morte gli embrioni anche quando vengono trasferiti nelle vie genitali della donna (ed è questa, infatti, una delle principali riserve etiche nei confronti delle tecniche di PMA), l’indagine si occupa solo di vedere come è stato tutelato il diritto alla vita degli embrioni non trasferiti, cioè non destinati alla nascita, dalla Legge 40/2004. Emerge che l’effetto più benefico della legge è quello di aver evitato nel solo triennio 2005-2006-2007 la possibile formazione soprannumeraria di embrioni e la conseguente possibile distruzione, diretta o dovuta alla crioconservazione, di oltre 120.000 embrioni. La seconda parte della ricerca è condotta confrontando anche i dati di altri Paesi europei e dimostra che il rispetto dei limiti posti a tutela del diritto alla vita hanno anche garantito meglio la salute della donna e non hanno diminuito la percentuale del “successo”. Come è noto la recente sentenza n. 151/2009 della Corte Costituzionale ha gravemente compromesso la legge proprio nel punto di maggiore sensibilità nei confronti della tutela concreta del diritto alla vita del concepito. L’auspicio è che i dati raccolti in questo II rapporto vengano comunque presi in seria considerazione. ---------- The contribution proposes the II Report of April 2009 on the application of the Italian Law on “medically assisted reproduction” (PMA) (Law 40/2004). The peculiarity of the present Report consists of investigating one of the two purposes of the Law 40/2004: to protect the right to life of newborns. In fact, if, on one hand, attention to the purpose of “overcoming sterility and infertility” the Law considers, on the other hand the purpose of defending the right to life of newborn, that is considered as “subject” just like the others subjects involved in PMA procedures from the same law, is too often forgotten. The Report intends to remedy for this forgetfulness and it asks: how many new human beings have been saved thanks to the Law? It makes clear that the most beneficent effect of the Law is that, in the period 2005-2007, it has avoided the possible production of excess embryos and the consequent possible suppression – direct or due to the cryoconservation – of over 120.000 embryos. The second part of the search is conducted also comparing data of other European Countries and it shows that the respect of the imposed limits for protecting the right to life has also guaranteed the woman’s health and it has not reduced the outcome percentage.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-454
Author(s):  
Sarah M. Field

International law’s affirmation of everyone’s right to have rights came into being through a peacemaking process. Its deprivation continues to typify the emergent context that brings peace processes into being – and for some cohorts of the people, namely children, the process itself. The right is intuitively seductive. It resonates as self-evident: an inexorable abstraction of having rights. Yet it is also enigmatic and challenging to concretise. What is its content? What substantive rights are expressive of this right? What is their scope in peacemaking? And why is it – above for example more corporeal rights – so fundamental? Guided by these questions, the paper begins by reflecting on the right as crystallised by Hannah Arendt: it then shifts to reflecting on, first, its expression in international law and, second, its interrelations with the law of peace. In doing so, it yields legal and political opportunities for ensuring the right in peacemaking, and imagines a framework of evolving measures for bringing the right to life in the staged process. The paper concludes by arguing renewing engagement with this understated right offers a beacon for guiding responses to the complex child rights challenges yielded by peacemaking – and our interdependent and fragile twenty-first century world more generally.


Author(s):  
Nicole Anderson

In The Death Penalty I, Derrida elucidates Kant’s support of the death penalty as that which “marks the access to what is proper to man and to the dignity of reason or of human logos and nomos.” “Man” is distinguished from animals/the beast, precisely because “man … is a subject of the law who raises himself above natural life.” This law is based on rationality, reason, ethics, right to life, and thus to forgiveness and the right to burial. In modern times the animal is not subject to the same law, and therefore the death penalty not only marks what is “proper to man,” but also frames human and animal life in particular ways. This essay examines the medieval practice of animal trials in order to push back against anthropocentric conceptions of the death penalty and to explore its implications for both human and animal lives.


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