Agricultural Trade in a North American Free Trade Agreement

World Economy ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Grennes ◽  
Barry Krissoff
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Agricultural Trade

The Effects of North American Free Trade Agreement and United States Farm Policies on Illegal Immigration and Agricultural Trade

2012 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Luckstead ◽  
Stephen Devadoss ◽  
Abelardo Rodriguez
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Illegal Immigration ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Agricultural Trade ◽  
Simultaneous Estimation

We analyze the effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and United States farm subsidies on U.S.-Mexican illegal immigration and agricultural trade. The theoretical analysis develops an integrated trade-migration model and shows that NAFTA and U.S. subsidies exacerbate the illegal labor flow and increase U.S. exports. The theoretical analysis is empirically implemented by simultaneous estimation and simulation analysis. The analysis shows that NAFTA increased the number of undocumented workers to U.S. agriculture and U.S. farm exports to Mexico by an average of 1573 and $6.82 billion, respectively. U.S. farm subsidy reduction decreases unauthorized entry marginally and U.S. farm exports by an average of $3.2 billion.

The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 324-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier ◽  
Laura W. Arnold ◽  
Christopher J. W. Zorn
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Critical Element ◽  
Vote Model ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
The North ◽  
Timing Model

A critical element of decision making is the timing of choices political actors make; often when a decision is made is as critical as the decision itself. We posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics. We suggest that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier. Those with conflicting signals will seek more information, delaying their announcement. We test several expectations by examining data on when members of the House of Representatives announced their positions on the North American Free Trade Agreement. We also contrast the timing model with a vote model, and find that there are meaningful differences between the factors influencing the timing of position announcements and vote choice. Our research allows analysts to interpret the process leading up to the House action and the end state of that process.

scholarly journals A Canadian Commentary on Constructive Expropriation Law Under NAFTA Article 1110

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond E. Young
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
The State ◽  
Regulatory Takings ◽  
Constitutional Protection ◽  
The Law

By virtue of the Constitution Act, 1982. Canada has established that some rights andfreedoms are beyond the reach ofgovernment. However, the protection of properly, especially with regard to the guaranteeing of compensation ifproperty is taken by the state, has not been elevated to this same level of constitutional protection. This article examines regulatory takings claims under Article 1110 ofthe North American Free Trade Agreement and provides an exposition of the law insofar as it has developed in the NAFTA context. It begins with a survey of constructive takings in international and domestic U.S. law and concludes by highlighting the obvious differences between the protection afforded to foreign NAFTA investors in Canada and domestic owners of properly when property is taken.

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