scholarly journals Epistemic Possibility and the Necessity of Origin

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (5) ◽  
pp. 685-701
Author(s):  
Hane Htut Maung
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Necessity Of Origin

A diachronic corpus-driven study of the expression of possibility in Luganda (Bantu, JE15)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deo Kawalya ◽  
Koen Bostoen ◽  
Gilles-Maurice de Schryver
Keyword(s):  
Corpus Linguistics ◽  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Written Language ◽  
Language Data

Abstract This article employs a 4-million-word diachronic corpus to examine how the expression of possibility has evolved in Luganda since the 1890s to the present, by focusing on the language’s three main potential markers -yînz-, -sóból- and -andi-, and their historical interaction. It is shown that while the auxiliary -yînz- originally covered the whole modal subdomain of possibility, the auxiliary -sóból- has steadily taken over the more objective categories of dynamic possibility. Currently, -yînz- first and foremost conveys deontic and epistemic possibility. It still prevails in these more subjective modal categories even though the prefix -andi-, a conditional marker in origin, has started to express epistemic possibility since the 1940s, and -sóból- deontic possibility since the 1970s. More generally, this article demonstrates the potential of corpus linguistics for the study of diachronic semantics beyond language comparison. This is an important achievement in Bantu linguistics, where written language data tend to be young.

The proper object of non-doxastic religion: why traditional religion should be preferred over Schellenberg's simple ultimism

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 559-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
CARL-JOHAN PALMQVIST
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Traditional Religion

AbstractTaking for granted the view that belief-less, ‘non-doxastic’, engagement with religion is possible, this article discusses the proper object of such religiosity. Its focus is the claim of J. L. Schellenberg that non-doxastic religion should be directed at ’simple ultimism’. I argue that ‘simple ultimism’ is too abstract to allow for alignment with religious reality. Traditional religion is a better choice since it commonly contains religious experience. As long as the veridicality of such experience remains an epistemic possibility, it should guide our non-doxastic commitment. Objections commonly raised against reliance on religious experience become irrelevant on a non-doxastic approach.

Dedicated non-epistemic possibility oppositions and Ossetic modal constructions

2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-116
Author(s):  
Arseniy Vydrin
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Possibility

Sharp Edges from Hedges: Fatalism, Vagueness and Epistemic Possibility

2006 ◽  
Vol 131 (3) ◽  
pp. 607-626 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Sorensen
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Sharp Edges

Constitutional Necessity and Epistemic Possibility

1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-590 ◽  
Author(s):  
W.R. Carter ◽  
Richard I. Nagel
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Declarative Sentence

By an incomplete sentence we shall understand a declarative sentence that can be used, without variation in its meaning, to make different statements in different contexts. Although the point deserves supporting argument, which we will not provide, sentences whose grammatical subjects are indexical expressions or demonstratives are obvious, plausible examples of incomplete sentences. Uttered in one context the sentence ‘He is ill’ may be used to make one statement, for example, that George is ill, while in another context the very same sentence may be used to make a quite different statement, for example, that Paul is ill.

scholarly journals Epistemic Resistance Moves

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Bledin ◽  
Kyle Rawlins
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Response Type

This paper introduces and analyzes a new kind of non-acceptance, non-disagreeing move: resistance. We focus in particular on attention-targeted resistance facilitated by epistemic possibility claims. In this response type, we suggest, an agent draws attention to some subsidiary issue that they think might cause an interlocutor to withdraw a previous commitment. We develop a granularity model of attention where drawing attention in discourse can refine the space of possibilities under consideration and consequently lead to changes in view.

scholarly journals Evidentiality and other types readjusted: interpersonal modality revisited

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiangping Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Systemic Functional Linguistics ◽  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
The Other ◽  
Semantic Map ◽  
Functional Linguistics ◽  
Traditional Sense

Abstract Interpersonal modality, bifurcating modalization and modulation, is an important construct of interpersonal meaning in the architecture of Systemic Functional Linguistics. By meticulously reviewing relevant researches from the perspectives of traditional modality and modality’s semantic map, three respects with respect to the system of interpersonal modality have been supplemented. Firstly, modalization, being subcategorized into possibility and usuality, is suggested to entertain evidentiality from the traditional sense. Secondly, considering the delicacy of the system of interpersonal modality, possibility in modalization should be further categorized into epistemic and root possibility; necessity as one subtype of modulation, superseding the original obligation in modulation, is subclassified into obligation and permission; inclination, being the other subtype of modulation, should be specified as the superordinate of volition and ability. Thirdly, the shifting of modal meanings from root possibility to epistemic possibility in modalization and from inclination to necessity in modulation should be clearly specified as far as language evolvement is concerned.

scholarly journals Reasoning with Partial Orders: Restrictions on Ignorance Inferences of Superlative Modifiers

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 489
Author(s):  
Jon Ander Mendia
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Ordered Set ◽  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Partial Orders ◽  
Partially Ordered ◽  
Totally Ordered Set ◽  
Exhaustive Interpretation

The present study is concerned with Ignorance Inferences associated with Superlative Modifiers (SMs) like at least and at most. Experimental evidence will be presented showing that the Ignorance Inferences associated with SMs depend on their associate: when the associate of an SM is a totally ordered set (e.g. a numeral), the exhaustive interpretation of the prejacent must necessarily constitute an epistemic possibility for the speaker. However, when the associate of the SM is partially ordered, the exhaustive interpretation of the prejacent can, but need not constitute an epistemic possibility for the speaker.

Competing views

2021 ◽  
pp. 170-188
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Present Account ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
The Third ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Rule Out

The present account, which construes justification as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing, or of being in a position to know, competes with three recently advanced theories of justification. Of these competitors, the first two construe doxastic justification as the metaphysical possibility of knowing. While they differ in some details, these views share certain problematic features: they fail to yield a corresponding account of propositional justification, have trouble vindicating an intuitive principle of closure for justified belief, and fail to comply with the independently plausible principle that if one has a justified belief, one is in no position to rule out that one has knowledge. The present account does not have these problematic features. According to the third competitor, |φ‎| is propositionally justified in one’s situation just in case it would be abnormal—and so require explanation—if |φ‎| were to be false in the presence of the evidence that one possesses in that situation. This normic theory of justification validates the principle that propositional justification agglomerates over conjunction, and in so doing, violates the constraint that propositions of the form ⌜φ‎ & ¬Kφ‎⌝ never be justified. It likewise contradicts the independently plausible principle that whenever |φ‎| is propositionally justified all things considered, |¬Kφ‎| is not. The present account does not face these problems, since it rejects the relevant agglomeration principle and treats the condition encoded by ⌜¬K¬Kφ‎⌝ as luminous.

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