Unwitting Architect

Author(s):  
Julian Germann

The global rise of neoliberalism since the 1970s is widely seen as a dynamic originating in the United States and the United Kingdom, and only belatedly and partially repeated by Germany. From this Anglocentric perspective, Germany's emergence at the forefront of neoliberal reforms in the eurozone is perplexing, and tends to be attributed to the same forces conventionally associated with the Anglo-American pioneers. This book challenges this ruling narrative. It recasts the genesis of neoliberalism as a process driven by a plenitude of actors, ideas, and interests. And it lays bare the pragmatic reasoning and counterintuitive choices of German crisis managers obscured by this master story. This book argues that German officials did not intentionally set out to promote neoliberal change. Instead they were more intent on preserving Germany's export markets and competitiveness in order to stabilize the domestic compact between capital and labor. Nevertheless, the series of measures German policy elites took to manage the end of golden-age capitalism promoted neoliberal transformation in crucial respects: it destabilized the Bretton Woods system; it undermined socialist and social democratic responses to the crisis in Europe; it frustrated an internationally coordinated Keynesian reflation of the world economy; and ultimately it helped push the US into the Volcker interest-rate shock that inaugurated the attack on welfare and labor under Reagan and Thatcher. From this vantage point, the book illuminates the very different rationale behind the painful reforms German state managers have demanded of their indebted eurozone partners.

2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-702
Author(s):  
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet

In 1946, the entertainer and activist Paul Robeson pondered America's intentions in Iran. In what was to become one of the first major crises of the Cold War, Iran was fighting a Soviet aggressor that did not want to leave. Robeson posed the question, “Is our State Department concerned with protecting the rights of Iran and the welfare of the Iranian people, or is it concerned with protecting Anglo-American oil in that country and the Middle East in general?” This was a loaded question. The US was pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops after its occupation of the country during World War II. Robeson wondered why America cared so much about Soviet forces in Iranian territory, when it made no mention of Anglo-American troops “in countries far removed from the United States or Great Britain.” An editorial writer for a Black journal in St. Louis posed a different variant of the question: Why did the American secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, concern himself with elections in Iran, Arabia or Azerbaijan and yet not “interfere in his home state, South Carolina, which has not had a free election since Reconstruction?”


1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 602-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
NOBUHIRO HIWATARI

This article explains why the stagflation and neoliberal reforms that reinforced party polarization in the United Kingdom and the United States instead led to party convergence in Japan. In Japan, industry-centered adjustment and bureaucratic coordination distributed the costs of policy changes across societal groups and facilitated party convergence, whereas the lack of such societal and state institutions in the United Kingdom and the United States led to policy changes with polarizing consequences. Focusing on industry-centered adjustment brings the unions back into Japanese politics and provides an alternative to the pluralism-neocorporatism dichotomy of organizing societal interests. Bureaucratic coordination not only includes the opposition in the framework but also provides a more nuanced view than is assumed in the debate over whether the ruling party of the bureaucracy dominates the Japanese state. When combined, these conceptualizations of market and state go a long way toward explaining the dynamics of party competition.


2006 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Muirhead

Abstract The articulated foreign economic policy of the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker following its election in June 1957 was to redirect trade away from the United States and toward the United Kingdom. This policy reflected Diefenbaker's almost religious attachment to the Commonwealth and to Britain, as well as his abiding suspicion of continentalism. However, from these brave beginnings, Conservative trade policy ended up pretty much where the Liberals had been before their 1957 defeat-increasingly reliant on the US market for Canada's domestic prosperity. This was a result partly of the normal development of trade between the two North American countries, but it also reflected Diefenbaker's growing realisation of the market differences between Canada and the United Kingdom, and the impossibility of enhancing the flow of Canadian exports to Britain.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M Walt

This article uses realism to explain past US grand strategy and prescribe what it should be today. Throughout its history, the United States has generally acted as realism depicts. The end of the Cold War reduced the structural constraints that states normally face in anarchy, and a bipartisan coalition of foreign policy elites attempted to use this favorable position to expand the US-led ‘liberal world order’. Their efforts mostly failed, however, and the United States should now return to a more realistic strategy – offshore balancing – that served it well in the past. Washington should rely on local allies to uphold the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East and focus on leading a balancing coalition in Asia. Unfortunately, President Donald Trump lacks the knowledge, competence, and character to pursue this sensible course, and his cavalier approach to foreign policy is likely to damage America’s international position significantly.


Author(s):  
D.V. Shram ◽  

The article is devoted to the antimonopoly regulation of IT giants` activities. The author presents an overview of the main trends in foreign and Russian legislation in this area. The problems the antimonopoly regulation of digital markets faces are the following: the complexity of determining the criteria for the dominant position of economic entities in the digital economy and the criteria for assessing the economic concentration in the commodity digital markets; the identification and suppression of cartels; the relationship between competition law and intellectual property rights in the digital age. Some aspects of these problems are considered through the prism of the main trends in the antimonopoly policy in the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom and Russia. The investigation findings of the USA House of Representatives Antitrust Subcommittee against Apple, Google, Amazon and Facebook are presented. The author justifies the need to separate them, which requires the adoption of appropriate amendments to the antimonopoly legislation. The article analyzes the draft law of the European Commission on the regulation of digital markets – Digital Markets Act, reveals the criteria for classifying IT companies as «gatekeepers», and notes the specific approaches to antimonopoly regulation in the UK and the US. The article describes the concepts «digital platform» and «network effects», presented in the «fifth antimonopoly package of amendments», developed in 2018 by the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation, and gives an overview of the comments of the Ministry of Economic Development regarding these concepts wording in the text of the draft law, which formed the basis for the negative conclusion of the regulator. It is concluded that in the context of the digital markets’ globalization, there is a need for the international legal nature antitrust norms formation, since regional legislation obviously cannot cope with the monopolistic activities of IT giants.


Author(s):  
David W Schopfer ◽  
Nirupama Krishnamurthi ◽  
Hui Shen ◽  
Mary A Whooley

Objective: Referral to cardiac rehabilitation (CR) is one of nine performance measures for patients with ischemic heart disease (IHD), but fewer than 20% of eligible patients participate in the United States. Home-based CR programs (available in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada) have similar effects on morbidity and mortality as traditional (facility-based) CR, but they are not currently available or reimbursed in the US. We sought to determine whether implementing home-based programs could increase CR participation among patients with IHD. Methods: Using electronic health records from 134 VA medical centers, we identified 106,277 veterans hospitalized for acute myocardial infarction, percutaneous coronary intervention or coronary artery bypass grafting between 2010 and 2015. We compared the proportion of eligible patients who participated in CR at 13 VA hospitals that offered referral to either home-based CR or facility-based CR vs. 121 VA hospitals that offered referral to only facility-based CR (usual care). Results: The number of VA medical centers offering home-based CR increased from 2 in 2010 to 13 in 2015. Among the 20,949 eligible patients hospitalized at VA medical centers that implemented home-based CR between 2010 and 2015, CR participation increased from 11% to 26% (Figure). Among the 85,328 eligible patients hospitalized at VA medical centers that did not offer home-based CR, CR participation increased from only 8% to 11%. Conclusion: Among eligible patients with IHD, participation in CR more than doubled at VA medical centers that implemented home-based CR programs between 2010 and 2015, whereas participation increased by only 3% at VA medical centers that did not implement home-based CR programs. Home-based CR is an effective way of engaging patients who may otherwise decline to participate in CR.


Author(s):  
David Cannadine

Sir John Plumb was a commanding figure, both within academe and also far beyond. He was as much read in the United States as in the United Kingdom; he was a great enabler, patron, fixer and entrepreneur; he belonged to the smart social set both in Mayfair and Manhattan; a race horse was named after him in England and the stars and the stripes were once flown above the US Capitol in his honour; and he appeared, thinly disguised but inadequately depicted, in the fiction of Angus Wilson, William Cooper and C. P. Snow. Yet one important aspect of Plumb's career has been repeatedly ignored and overlooked: for while his life was an unusually long one, his productive period as a significant historian was surprisingly, almost indecently, brief.


Author(s):  
Julian Germann

This chapter reviews the most prominent explanations of the global rise of neoliberalism provided within critical International Political Economy: (1) a state-centered argument, which holds that neoliberalism was imposed by the United States in a bid to reassert its global dominance; (2) a class-based argument, which sees neoliberalism as the project of globalizing elites who sought to restore their corporate profits and power; and (3) an ideational argument, which describes the rise of neoliberalism as a paradigmatic shift in economic ideas. The chapter argues that these accounts share a common bias: they pivot unduly on the Anglo-American world and are unable to capture the peculiar German contribution to the origins of neoliberalism. As a result, they misread the rise of Germany to the apex of a neoliberal Europe as a belated repetition of the same global movement spearheaded by the US and the UK.


2021 ◽  
pp. 116-138
Author(s):  
B. Guy Peters

The Anglo-American tradition is perhaps the most difficult to characterize. Although there are common roots, there has been a divergence between the United Kingdom and other Westminster systems and the United States. There are common roots among these cases, including a contractarian conception of the state, an emphasis on the separation of politics and administration, an emphasis on management rather than law in the role definition of public administrators, and less commitment to uniformity. But these common values are interpreted and implemented differently in the different countries. For example, the United States has a more developed system of administrative law than do most of the Westminster systems. All these administrative systems, however, have been more receptive to the ideas of New Public Management (NPM) than have other governments, although the United States and Canada had implemented many of those ideas long before NPM was developed.


1985 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Newton

Most commentators on the 1949 sterling crisis have viewed it as an episode with implications merely for the management of the British economy. This paper, based on the public records now available, discusses the impact of the crisis on British economic foreign policy. In particular it suggests that the crisis revealed deep Anglo-American differences, centring on the nature of the Marshall Plan, on the international value of the sterling area, and on the proper relationship between the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Ultimately the British succeeded in resolving these disagreements: but this triumph ironically implied both the defeat of British aims in post-war European reconstruction and a long term delusion that great power status could be maintained on the basis of a special relationship-with the United States.


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