Japanese Codes and Standards for Dual Purpose Metal Casks for Spent Nuclear Fuel

Author(s):  
Toshiari Saegusa ◽  
Makoto Hirose ◽  
Norikazu Irie ◽  
Masashi Shimizu

The first Japanese spent fuel interim storage facility away from a reactor site is about to be commissioned in Mutsu City, Aomori Prefecture. In designing, licensing and construction of the Dual Purpose Casks (DPCs, for transport and storage) for this facility, codes and standards established by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) and by the Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers (JSME) have been applied. The AESJ established the first standard for DPCs as “Standard for Safety Design and Inspection of Metal Casks for Spent Fuel Interim Storage Facilities” in 2002 (later revised in 2010). The standard provides the design requirements to maintain the basic safety functions of DPCs, namely containment, heat removal, shielding, criticality prevention and the structural integrity of the cask itself and of the spent fuel cladding during transport and storage. Inspection methods and criteria to ensure maintenance of the basic safety functions and structural integrity over every stage of operations involving DPCs including pre-shipment after storage are prescribed as well. The structural integrity criteria for major DPC components refer to the rules provided by the JSME. JSME completed the structural design and construction code (the Code) for DPCs as “Rules on Transport/Storage Packagings for Spent Nuclear Fuel” in 2001 (later revised in 2007). Currently, the scope of the rules cover the Containment Vessel, Basket, Trunnions and Intermediate Shell as major components of DPCs. Rules for these components are based on those for components of nuclear power plants (NPP) with similar safety functions, but special considerations based on their shapes, loading types and required functions are added. The Code has differences from that for NPP components with considerations to DPC characteristics; - The primary stress and the secondary stress generated in Containment Vessels shall be evaluated under Service Conditions A to D (from ASME Sec III, Div.1). - Stress generated in the seal region lid bolts of Containment Vessels shall not exceed yield strength under Service Conditions A to D in order to maintain the containment function. - Fatigue analysis on Baskets is not required, and Trunnions can be designed only for Service Conditions A and B with special stress limits consistent with conventional assessment methods for transport packages. - Stress limits for earthquakes during storage are specified. - Ductile cast iron with special fracture toughness requirements can be used as a material for Containment Vessels. DPC specific considerations in standards and rules will be focused on in this paper. Additionally, comparison with the ASME Code will be discussed.

Author(s):  
C. Baroux ◽  
M. Detrilleaux ◽  
G. Demazy

Abstract Spent nuclear fuel has been stored at the DOEL power station in Belgium in dual-purpose metal casks since 1995. The casks were procured from TRANSNUCLEAIRE by SYNATOM to meet the operational demands for on-site dry storage solutions for fuel arising from the four PWR reactors at DOEL. The TN 24 type of cask was chosen and a range of different cask types were developed. The initial requirement was for dual purpose cask to contain fuel from the DOEL units 3 and 4, these having similar fuel types but different lengths, and thus two new members of the TN 24 family were developed; the TN 24 D and TN 24 XL with capacities of 28 and 24 SFA’s. These casks were licensed as B(U) fissile packagings with approval certificates granted by the French and validated by the Belgium competent authorities for the transport configurations. Both cask designs were also analyzed by TRANSNUCLEAIRE in their storage configurations to ensure that the criteria for safe interim storage could be met. Since 1995, a total of 18 TN 24 D and TN 24 XL casks have been loaded with spent fuel assemblies with an average burn-up of 40,000 MWd/tU. SYNATOM subsequently decided to purchase further casks for DOEL 3 and 4 fuels with higher enrichments, higher burn-ups and shorter cooling times. TRANSNUCLEAIRE developed the TN 24 DH and TN 24 XLH casks within the similar envelope size and weight limits. The increase in performance was achieved by an in-depth optimization of each design in terms of radiation shielding, heat transfer and criticality safety. This paper shows how this optimization process was undertaken for the TN 24 DH and TN 24 XLH casks, 16 of which have been ordered by SYNATOM. DOEL 1 and 2 units use much shorter PWR fuel and it was decided to ship the fuel to unit 3 with an internal transfer cask because the handling limitations in the DOEL 1 and 2 pool prohibited the loading of a high capacity dual purpose transport/storage cask. The TN 24 SH cask was subsequently designed for DOEL 1 and 2 PWR fuel with a capacity of 37 assemblies and nine of there casks have been ordered by SYNATOM. The casks are fitted with monitoring devices to detect any change in the performance of the double metal O ring closure system and none of the casks has shown any deterioration in leaktightness. This paper examines the operation experience of loading and storing more than 30 TN 24 dual purpose casks and compares the performance with design expectations.


Author(s):  
Donald Wayne Lewis

In the United States (U.S.) the nuclear waste issue has plagued the nuclear industry for decades. Originally, spent fuel was to be reprocessed but with the threat of nuclear proliferation, spent fuel reprocessing has been eliminated, at least for now. In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 [1] was established, authorizing development of one or more spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste geological repositories and a consolidated national storage facility, called a “Monitored Retrievable Storage” facility, that could store the spent nuclear fuel until it could be placed into the geological repository. Plans were under way to build a geological repository, Yucca Mountain, but with the decision by President Obama to terminate the development of Yucca Mountain, a consolidated national storage facility that can store spent fuel for an interim period until a new repository is established has become very important. Since reactor sites have not been able to wait for the government to come up with a storage or disposal location, spent fuel remains in wet or dry storage at each nuclear plant. The purpose of this paper is to present a concept developed to address the DOE’s goals stated above. This concept was developed over the past few months by collaboration between the DOE and industry experts that have experience in designing spent nuclear fuel facilities. The paper examines the current spent fuel storage conditions at shutdown reactor sites, operating reactor sites, and the type of storage systems (transportable versus non-transportable, welded or bolted). The concept lays out the basis for a pilot storage facility to house spent fuel from shutdown reactor sites and then how the pilot facility can be enlarged to a larger full scale consolidated interim storage facility.


Author(s):  
Krista Nicholson ◽  
John McDonald ◽  
Shona Draper ◽  
Brian M. Ikeda ◽  
Igor Pioro

Currently in Canada, spent fuel produced from Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is in the interim storage all across the country. It is Canada’s long-term strategy to have a national geologic repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel for CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors. The initial problem is to identify a means to centralize Canada’s spent nuclear fuel. The objective of this paper is to present a solution for the transportation issues that surround centralizing the waste. This paper reviews three major components of managing and the transporting of high-level nuclear waste: 1) site selection, 2) containment and 3) the proposed transportation method. The site has been selected based upon several factors including proximity to railways and highways. These factors play an important role in the site-selection process since the location must be accessible and ideally to be far from communities. For the containment of the spent fuel during transportation, a copper-shell container with a steel structural infrastructure was selected based on good thermal, structural, and corrosion resistance properties has been designed. Rail has been selected as the method of transporting the container due to both the potential to accommodate several containers at once and the extensive railway system in Canada.


Author(s):  
Vladyslav Soloviov

In this paper accounting of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) burnup of RBMK-1000 only with actinides has been performed. The following characteristics were analyzed: initial fuel enrichment, burnup fraction, axial burnup profile in the fuel assembly (FA) and fuel weight. As the results show, in the first 400 hours after stopping the reactor, there is an increase in the effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) due to beta decay of 239Np into 239Pu. Further, from 5 to 50 years, there is a decrease in keff due to beta decay of 241Pu into 241Am. Beyond 50 years there is a slight change in the criticality of the system. Accounting for nuclear fuel burnup in the justification of nuclear safety of SNF systems will provide an opportunity to increase the volume of loaded fuel and thus significantly reduce technology costs of handling of SNF.


2019 ◽  
pp. 82-87
Author(s):  
Ya. Kostiushko ◽  
O. Dudka ◽  
Yu. Kovbasenko ◽  
A. Shepitchak

The introduction of new fuel for nuclear power plants in Ukraine is related to obtaining a relevant license from the regulatory authority for nuclear and radiation safety of Ukraine. The same approach is used for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management system. The dry spent fuel storage facility (DSFSF) is the first nuclear facility created for intermediate dry storage of SNF in Ukraine. According to the design based on dry ventilated container storage technology by Sierra Nuclear Corporation and Duke Engineering and Services, ventilated storage containers (VSC-VVER) filled with SNF of VVER-1000 are used, which are located on a special open concrete site. Containers VSC-VVER are modernized VSC-24 containers customized for hexagonal VVER-1000 spent fuel assemblies. The storage safety assessment methodology was created and improved directly during the licensing process. In addition, in accordance with the Energy Strategy of Ukraine up to 2035, one of the key task is the further diversification of nuclear fuel suppliers. Within the framework of the Executive Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the U.S. Government, activities have been underway since 2000 on the introduction of Westinghouse fuel. The purpose of this project is to develop, supply and qualify alternative nuclear fuel compatible with fuel produced in Russia for Ukrainian NPPs. In addition, a supplementary approach to safety analysis report is being developed to justify feasibility of loading new fuel into the DSFSF containers. The stated results should demonstrate the fulfillment of design criteria under normal operating conditions, abnormal conditions and design-basis accidents of DSFSF components.  Thus, the paper highlights both the main problems of DSFSF licensing and obtaining permission for placing new fuel types in DSFSF.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Shadwan M. M. Esmail ◽  
Jae Hak Cheong

In the planning and management of the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel, the technical and economic parameters that are involved have a significant role in increasing the efficiency of the storage system. Optimal parameters will reduce the total economic costs for countries embarking on nuclear energy, such as the UAE. This study evaluated the design performance and economic feasibility of various structures and schedules, to determine an optimal combination of parameters for the management of spent nuclear fuel. With the introduction of various storage technology arrangements and expected costs per unit for the storage system design, we evaluated eight major scenarios, each with a cost analysis based on technological and economic issues. We executed a number of calculations based on the use of these storage technologies, and considered their investment costs. These calculations, which were aligned with the net present value approach and conducted using MS Project and MATLAB software programs, considered the capacities of the spent fuel pools and the amount of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that will be transferred to dry storage facilities. As soon as they sufficiently cool, the spent nuclear fuel is to be stored in a pool storage facility. The results show that applying a centralized dry storage (CDS) system strategy is not an economically feasible solution, compared with using a permanent disposal facility (PDF) (unless the variable investment cost is reduced or changed). The optimal strategy involves operating a spent fuel pool island (SFPI) storage after the first 20 years of the start of the permanent shutdown of the reactor. After 20 years, the spent fuel is then transferred to a PDF. This strategy also results in a 20.9% to 26.1% reduction in the total cost compared with those of the other strategies. The total cost of the proposed strategy is approximately 4,307 million USD. The duration of the fuel storage and the investment cost, particularly the variable investment cost, directly affect the choice of facility storage.


Author(s):  
D. Keith Morton ◽  
Spencer D. Snow ◽  
Tom E. Rahl ◽  
Tom J. Hill ◽  
Richard P. Morissette

The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed a set of containers for the handling, interim storage, transportation, and disposal in the national repository of DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This container design, referred to as the standardized DOE SNF canister or standardized canister, was developed by the Department’s National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) working in conjunction with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) and the DOE spent fuel sites. This canister had to have a standardized design yet be capable of accepting virtually all of the DOE SNF, be placed in a variety of storage and transportation systems, and still be acceptable to the repository. Since specific design details regarding the storage, transportation, and repository disposal of DOE SNF were not finalized, the NSNFP recognized the necessity to specify a complete DOE SNF canister design. This allowed other evaluations of canister performance and design to proceed as well as providing standardized canister users adequate information to proceed with their work. This paper is an update of a paper [1] presented to the 1999 American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Pressure Vessels and Piping (PVP) Conference. It discusses recent progress achieved in various areas to enhance acceptance of this canister not only by the DOE complex but also fabricators and regulatory agencies.


Author(s):  
Tadahiro Katsuta

Political and technical advantages to introduce spent nuclear fuel interim storage into Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle are examined. Once Rokkasho reprocessing plant starts operation, 80,000 tHM of spent Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel must be stored in an Away From Reactor (AFR) interim storage site until 2100. If a succeeding reprocessing plant starts operating, the spent LEU will reach its peak of 30,000 tHM before 2050, and then will decrease until the end of the second reprocessing plant operation. Throughput of the second reprocessing plant is assumed as twice of that of Rokassho reprocessing plant, indeed 1,600tHM/year. On the other hand, tripled number of final disposal sites for High Level Nuclear Waste (HLW) will be necessary with this condition. Besides, large amount of plutonium surplus will occur, even if First Breeder Reactors (FBR)s consume the plutonium. At maximum, plutonium surplus will reach almost 500 tons. These results indicate that current nuclear policy does not solve the spent fuel problems but rather complicates them. Thus, reprocessing policy could put off the problems in spent fuel interim storage capacity and other issues could appear such as difficulties in large amount of HLW final disposal management or separated plutonium management. If there is no reprocessing or MOX use, the amount of spent fuel will reach over 115,000 tones at the year of 2100. However, the spent fuel management could be simplified and also the cost and the security would be improved by using an interim storage primarily.


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