Alternate Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS)

Author(s):  
Stephen M. Parker ◽  
Nathan A. Palm ◽  
Xavier Pitoiset

Plants in the United States (U.S.) and many plants outside of the U.S. are required to meet the regulations of the Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Rule, 10 CFR 50.61. The Alternate Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Rule (10 CFR 50.61a) was approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and included in the Federal Register, with an effective date of February 3, 2010. This Alternate Rule provides a new metric and screening criteria for PTS. This metric, RTMAX-X, and the corresponding screening criteria are far less restrictive than the RTPTS metrics and screening criteria in the original PTS Rule (10 CFR 50.61). The Alternate PTS Rule was developed through probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) evaluations performed for selected U.S. pilot plants. A Generalization Study was also performed which determined that the plants used for these evaluations were representative of and applicable to the U.S. Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) nuclear power plant fleet. Plants outside of the U.S. may be interested in implementing the Alternate PTS Rule. However, direct implementation of the Alternate PTS Rule may not be possible due to differences in plant design, embrittlement prediction techniques, inservice inspection requirements, etc. The objective of this paper is to explore the use the Alternate PTS Rule by PWR plants outside of the U.S. by proposing methods to account for the potential differences mentioned above.

Author(s):  
Terry L. Dickson ◽  
Shah N. Malik ◽  
Mark T. Kirk ◽  
Deborah A. Jackson

The current federal regulations to ensure that nuclear reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) maintain their structural integrity when subjected to transients such as pressurized thermal shock (PTS) events were derived from computational models that were developed in the early to mid 1980s. Since that time, there have been advancements in relevant technologies associated with the physics of PTS events that impact RPV integrity assessment. Preliminary studies performed in 1999 suggested that application of the improved technology could reduce the conservatism in the current regulations while continuing to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety. A relaxation of PTS regulations could have profound implications for plant license extension considerations. Based on the above, in 1999, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) initiated a comprehensive project, with the nuclear power industry as a participant, to re-evaluate the current PTS regulations within the framework established by modern probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques. During the last three years, improved computational models have evolved through interactions between experts in the relevant disciplines of thermal hydraulics, PRA, human reliability analysis (HRA), materials embrittlement effects on fracture toughness (crack initiation and arrest), fracture mechanics methodology, and fabrication-induced flaw characterization. These experts were from the NRC staff, their contractors, and representatives from the nuclear industry. These improved models have now been implemented into the FAVOR (Fracture Analysis of Vessels: Oak Ridge) computer code, which is an applications tool for performing risk-informed structural integrity evaluations of embrittled RPVs subjected to transient thermal-hydraulic loading conditions. The baseline version of FAVOR (version 1.0) was released in October 2001. The updated risk-informed computational methodology in the FAVOR code is currently being applied to selected domestic commercial pressurized water reactors to evaluate the adequacy of the current regulations and to determine whether a technical basis can be established to support a relaxation of the current regulations. This paper provides a status report on the application of the updated computational methodology to a commercial pressurized water reactor (PWR) and discusses the results and interpretation of those results. It is anticipated that this re-evaluation effort will be completed in 2002.


Author(s):  
Terry Dickson ◽  
Shengjun Yin ◽  
Mark Kirk ◽  
Hsuing-Wei Chou

As a result of a multi-year, multi-disciplinary effort on the part of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), its contractors, and the nuclear industry, a technical basis has been established to support a risk-informed revision to pressurized thermal shock (PTS) regulations originally promulgated in the mid-1980s. The revised regulations provide alternative (optional) reference-temperature (RT)-based screening criteria, which is codified in 10 CFR 50.61(a). How the revised screening criteria were determined from the results of the probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analyses will be discussed in this paper.


Author(s):  
Terry L. Dickson ◽  
M. T. EricksonKirk

In 1999, a study sponsored by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) suggested that advances in the technologies associated with the physics of pressurized-thermal-shock (PTS) events developed since the derivation of the PTS regulations (established in the early-mid eighties) had the potential to establish a technical basis that could justify a relaxation in the current PTS-related regulations. A relaxation of these regulations could have profound implications for plant license extension considerations. Subsequently, the NRC initiated the interdisciplinary PTS Re-evaluation Project. During the five year project, an updated comprehensive computational methodology evolved, within the framework established by modern probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques, through interactions among experts in relevant disciplines from the NRC staff, their contractors, and representatives from the nuclear industry. During 2004, the updated computational methodology was applied to three domestic commercial pressurized water reactors (PWRs). The most recent results of the PTS Re-evaluation Project provide a technical basis to support a relaxation of the current PTS regulations while continuing to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety. The details of the updated computational methodology, the mathematical models, the analysis results, key findings, and supporting information have recently been drafted in several very detailed and lengthy formal reports. These reports are currently under review at the NRC. An objective of this paper is to provide a short overview of the improved computational methodology, analysis results, and key findings of the PTS re-evaluation project. To demonstrate that a technical basis has been established to support a relaxation of the current PTS regulations, it is helpful to understand the derivation of the current PTS regulations; therefore, another objective of this paper is to contrast the interpretation of the analysis results of the PTS re-evaluation to those performed in the eighties from which the current PTS regulations were derived.


1992 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 396-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. D. Cheverton ◽  
D. L. Selby

An integrated probabilistic approach for the evaluation of the pressurized-thermal-shock (PTS) issue was developed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) at the request of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The purpose was to provide a method for identifying dominant plant design and operating features, evaluating possible remedial measures and the validity of the NRC PTS screening criteria, and to provide an additional tool for estimating vessel life expectancy. The approach was to be integrated in the sense that it would include the postulation of transients; estimates of their frequencies of occurrence; systems analyses to obtain the corresponding primary-system pressure, downcomer coolant temperature, and fluid-film heat-transfer coefficient adjacent to the vessel wall; and a probabilistic fracture-mechanics analysis using the latter data as input. A summation of the products of frequency of transient and conditional probability of failure for all postulated transients provides an estimate of frequency of vessel failure. In the process of developing the integrated-pressurized-thermal-shock (IPTS) methodology, three specific-plant analyses were conducted. The results indicate that the NRC screening criteria may not be appropriate for all U.S. pressurized-water-reactor (PWR) plants; that is, for some PWRs, the calculated mean frequency of vessel failure corresponding to the screening criteria may be greater than the “primary-acceptance-criterion” value in Regulatory Guide 1.154. A recent review of the ORNL IPTS study, which was completed in 1985, indicates that there are a number of areas in which the methodology can and should be updated, but it is not clear whether the update will increase or decrease the calculated probabilities.


Author(s):  
T. L. Dickson ◽  
F. A. Simonen

The current regulations for pressurized thermal shock (PTS) were derived from computational models that were developed in the early-mid 1980s. The computational models utilized in the 1980s conservatively postulated that all fabrication flaws in reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) were inner-surface breaking flaws. It was recognized at that time that flaw-related data had the greatest level of uncertainty of the inputs required for the probabilistic-based PTS evaluations. To reduce this uncertainty, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) has in the past few years supported research at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to perform extensive nondestructive and destructive examination of actual RPV materials. Such measurements have been used to characterize the number, size, and location of flaws in various types of welds and the base metal used to fabricate RPVs. The USNRC initiated a comprehensive project in 1999 to re-evaluate the current PTS regulations. The objective of the PTS Re-evaluation program has been to incorporate advancements and refinements in relevant technologies (associated with the physics of PTS events) that have been developed since the current regulations were derived. There have been significant improvements in the computational models for thermal hydraulics, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), human reliability analysis (HRA), materials embrittlement effects on fracture toughness, and fracture mechanics methodology. However, the single largest advancement has been the development of a technical basis for the characterization of fabrication-induced flaws. The USNRC PTS-Revaluation program is ongoing and is expected to be completed in 2002. As part of the PTS Re-evaluation program, the updated risk-informed computational methodology as implemented into the FAVOR (Fracture Analysis of Vessels: Oak Ridge) computer code, including the improved PNNL flaw characterization, was recently applied to a domestic commercial pressurized water reactor (PWR). The objective of this paper is to apply the same updated computational methodology to the same PWR, except utilizing the 1980s flaw model, to isolate the impact of the improved PNNL flaw characterization on the PTS analysis results. For this particular PWR, the improved PNNL flaw characterization significantly reduced the frequency of RPV failure, i.e., by between one and two orders of magnitude.


Author(s):  
T. L. Dickson ◽  
F. A. Simonen

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) initiated a comprehensive project in 1999 to determine if improved technologies can provide a technical basis to reduce the conservatism in the current regulations for pressurized thermal shock (PTS) while continuing to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety. A relaxation of PTS regulations could have profound implications for plant license renewal considerations. During the PTS re-evaluation study, an improved risk-informed computational methodology was developed that provides a more realistic characterization of PTS risk. This updated methodology was recently applied to three commercial PWRs. The results of this study provide encouragement that a technical basis can be established to support a relaxation of current PTS regulations. One significant model improvement applied in the PTS re-evaluation study was the development of flaw databases derived from the non-destructive and destructive examinations of material from cancelled reactor pressure vessels (RPV). Empirically-based statistical distributions derived from these databases and expert illicitation were used to postulate the number, size, and location of flaws in welded and base metal (plate and forging) regions of an RPV during probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analyses of RPVs subjected to transient loading conditions such as PTS. However, limitations in the available flaw data have required assumptions to be made to complete the risk-based flaw models. Sensitivity analyses were performed to evaluate the impact of four flaw-related assumptions. Analyses addressed: 1) truncations of distributions to exclude flaws of extreme depth dimensions, 2) vessel-to-vessel differences in flaw data, 3) large flaws observed in weld repair regions, and 4) the basis for estimating the number of surface breaking flaws. None of the four alternate weld flaw models significantly impacted calculated vessel failure frequencies or invalidated the tentative conclusions derived from the USNRC PTS re-evaluation study.


Author(s):  
Hsoung-Wei Chou ◽  
Chin-Cheng Huang

The failure probability of the pressurized water reactor pressure vessel for a domestic nuclear power plant in Taiwan has been evaluated according to the technical basis of the USNRC’s new pressurized thermal shock (PTS) screening criteria. The ORNL’s FAVOR code and the PNNL’s flaw models are employed to perform the probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis based on the plant specific parameters of the domestic reactor pressure vessel. Meanwhile, the PTS thermal hydraulic and the probabilistic risk assessment data analyzed from a similar nuclear power plant in the United States for establishing the new PTS rule are applied as the loading condition. Besides, an RT-based regression formula derived by the USNRC is also utilized to verify the through-wall cracking frequencies. It is found that the through-wall cracking of the analyzed reactor pressure vessel only occurs during the PTS events resulted from the stuck-open primary safety relief valves that later reclose, but with only an insignificant failure risk. The results indicate that the Taiwan domestic PWR reactor pressure vessel has sufficient structural margin for the PTS attack until either the end-of-license or for the proposed extended operation.


Author(s):  
Tao Zhang ◽  
Frederick W. Brust ◽  
Gery Wilkowski ◽  
Heqin Xu ◽  
Alfredo A. Betervide ◽  
...  

The Atucha II nuclear power plant is a unique pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) being constructed in Argentina. The original plant design was by Kraftwerk Union (KWU) in the 1970’s using the German methodology of break preclusion. The plant construction was halted for several decades, but a recent need for power was the driver for restarting the construction. The US NRC developed leak-before-break (LBB) procedures in draft Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.6.3 for the purpose of eliminating the need to design for dynamic effects that allowed the elimination of pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shields. This SRP was originally written in 1987 with a modest revision in 2005. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) is currently developing a draft Regulatory Guide on what is called the Transition Break Size (TBS). However, modeling crack pipe response in large complex primary piping systems under seismic loading is a difficult analysis challenge due to many factors. The initial published work on the seismic evaluations for the Atucha II plant showed that even with a seismic event with the amplitudes corresponding to the amplitudes for an event with a probability of 1e−6 per year, that a Double-Ended Guillotine Break (DEGB) was pragmatically impossible due to the incredibly high leakage rates and total loss of make-up water inventory. The critical circumferential through-wall flaw size in that case was 94-percent of the circumference. This paper discusses further efforts to show how much higher the applied accelerations would have to be to cause a DEGB for an initial circumferential through-wall crack that was 33 percent around the circumference. This flaw length would also be easily detected by leakage and loss of make-up water inventory. These analyses showed that the applied seismic peak-ground accelerations had to exceed 25 g’s for the case of this through-wall-crack to become a DEGB during a single seismic loading event. This is a factor of 80 times higher than the 1e−6 seismic event accelerations, or 240 times higher than the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) accelerations.


Author(s):  
Ronald Gamble ◽  
William Server ◽  
Bruce Bishop ◽  
Nathan Palm ◽  
Carol Heinecke

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code [1], Section XI, Non mandatory Appendix E, “Evaluation of Unanticipated Operating Events”, provides a deterministic procedure for evaluating reactor pressure vessel (RPV) integrity following an unanticipated event that exceeds the operational limits defined in plant operating procedures. The recently developed risk-informed procedure for Appendix G to Section XI of the ASME Code [2, 3], and the development by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the alternate Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) rule [4, 5, 6] led to initiation of this study to determine if the Appendix E evaluation criteria are consistent with risk-informed acceptance criteria. The results of the work presented in this paper demonstrate that Appendix E is consistent with risk-informed criteria developed for PTS and Appendix G and ensures that evaluation of RPV integrity following an unanticipated event would not violate material or operational limits recently defined using risk-informed criteria. Currently, Appendix E does not have evaluation criteria for BWR vessels; however, as part of this study, risk-informed analyses were performed for unanticipated heat-up events and isothermal, overpressure events in BWR plant designs.


2013 ◽  
Vol 284-287 ◽  
pp. 1151-1155
Author(s):  
Che Hao Chen ◽  
Jong Rong Wang ◽  
Hao Tzu Lin ◽  
Chun Kuan Shih

The objective of this study is to utilize TRACE (TRAC/RELAP Advanced Computational Engine) code to analyze the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure transients under ATWS (Anticipated Transient Without Scram) for Maanshan PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) in various MTC (Moderator Temperature Coefficient) conditions. TRACE is an advanced thermal hydraulic code for nuclear power plant safety analysis, which is currently under development by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). A graphic user interface program named SNAP (Symbolic Nuclear Analysis Package), which processes inputs and outputs for TRACE is also under development. Maanshan nuclear power plant (NPP) is the only Westinghouse PWR in Taiwan. The rated core thermal power of Maanshan with MUR (Measurement Uncertainty Recapture) is 2822 MWt. In document SECY-83-293, all initializing events were classified as either turbine trip or non-turbine trip events and their ATWS risks were also evaluated according to these two events. Loss of condenser vacuum (LOCV) and Loss of normal feedwater (LONF) ATWS were identified as limiting transients of turbine trip and non-turbine trip events in this study. According to ASME Code Level C service limit criteria, the RCS pressure for Maanshan NPP must be under 22.06 MPa. Furthermore, we select the LOCV transient to analyze various MTC effects on RCS pressure variations.


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