scholarly journals Abortion and the veil of ignorance: a response to Minehan

2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2021-107615
Author(s):  
Joona Räsänen
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Unconscious ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Equal Chance ◽  
The Veil

In a recent JME paper, Matthew John Minehan applies John Rawls’ veil of ignorance against Judith Thomson’s famous violinist argument for the permissibility of abortion. Minehan asks readers to ‘imagine that one morning you are back to back in bed with another person. One of you is conscious and the other unconscious. You do not know which one you are’. Since from this position of ignorance, you have an equal chance of being the unconscious violinist and the conscious person attached to him, it would be rational to oppose a right for detachment. Likewise, behind the veil of ignorance, it is rational to oppose abortions since you could be the fetus, Minehan claims. This paper provides a plausible reply to this argument.

Habermas on Rawls and the normative foundations of democracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 136843102098541
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Kędziora
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Normative Foundation ◽  
Internal Relations ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Politics And Law ◽  
Normative Foundations

The debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls concerns the question of how to do political philosophy under conditions of cultural pluralism, if the aim of political philosophy is to uncover the normative foundation of a modern liberal democracy. Rawls’s political liberalism tries to bypass the problem of pluralism, using the intellectual device of the veil of ignorance, and yet paradoxically at the same time it treats it as something given and as an arbiter of justification within the political conception of justice. Habermas argues that Rawls not only incorrectly operationalizes the moral point of view from which we discern what is just but also fails to capture the specificity of democracy which is given by internal relations between politics and law. This deprives Rawls’s political philosophy of the conceptual tools needed to articulate the normative foundation of democracy.

The Irreconcilable Conflict between Islam and Liberalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-265
Author(s):  
Muhammad Zahid Siddique
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Pluralistic Society ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

John Rawls used an apparently neutral apparatus to derive the principles of justice that all “rational” people ought to agree with because they provide the basis of coexistence in a pluralistic society. He believes that religious faith is consistent with the commitment to liberalism. The paper shows that the Rawlsian liberal “self” modelled in the original position is not consistent with the original position recognized by religion in general and Islam in particular. According to Islam, the human self is mukallaf (subject of God) while Rawls treats it non-mukallaf. This is so because Rawlsian original position presumes an atheist self behind the veil of ignorance. This conceptualization of self is not only inconsistent with but also hostile to religion. The claims about liberalism’s tolerance towards religion are superficial. The liberal self can express itself in various religious forms provided these are aligned with the system of rights acknowledged by the liberal atheist self.

scholarly journals The “Original Position” as Public Performance: Liberalism, Pluralism, and Asceticism

Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 462
Author(s):  
Joseph Rivera
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Religious Practice ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Public Performance ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Late Works

John Rawls’ well-known device of representation (his terminology) that he names the “original position” is put into play by the veil of ignorance. This imaginative device, found in both his early and late works, is often dismissed because it is misunderstood as an exercise in moral geometry. This essay discusses in more detail the subjective mechanics of the original position; while sympathetic of Rawls’ application of the veil of ignorance, I distinguish between a thick and thin veil, whereby I promote the latter. The final section makes a connection between the simulation of the original position and the religious practice of asceticism.

What Does Nozick's Minimal State Do?

1987 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene E. Mumy
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Political Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Minimal State ◽  
Entitlement Theory ◽  
Moral Boundaries ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Legitimate State

In the first half of the 1970s, two books appeared which have subsequently been regarded as major works in political philosophy: John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971), and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). Economists have devoted a considerable amount of ink to commentary, pro and con, on A Theory of Justice; and it is getting to be a rare public finance textbook that does not, in its discussion of governmental redistribution, describe the Kantian contract made behind the veil of ignorance. On the other hand, while Nozick has not exactly been ignored, economists have not joined the debate over Anarchy, State, and Utopia with the same gusto. When economists have joined the debate, their concern has been, more often than not, with Nozick's entitlement theory of distributive justice, as is the case with Varian (1975) and Sen (1977). What is largely missing, then, is any economic analysis of the processes that give rise to Nozick's morally legitimate state, which he calls the minimal state, and the characteristics and likely activities of the minimal state within the moral boundaries set by Nozick, his assertions to the contrary notwithstanding.

scholarly journals Ambiguity aversion behind the veil of ignorance

Synthese ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Orri Stefánsson
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Ambiguity Aversion ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Intermediate Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Absolute Priority ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Veil

AbstractThe veil of ignorance argument was used by John C. Harsanyi to defend Utilitarianism and by John Rawls to defend the absolute priority of the worst off. In a recent paper, Lara Buchak revives the veil of ignorance argument, and uses it to defend an intermediate position between Harsanyi’s and Rawls’ that she calls Relative Prioritarianism. None of these authors explore the implications of allowing that agent’s behind the veil are sensitive to ambiguity. Allowing for aversion to ambiguity—which is both the most commonly observed and a seemingly reasonable attitude to ambiguity—however supports a version of Egalitarianism, whose logical form is quite different from the theories defended by the aforementioned authors. Moreover, it turns out that the veil of ignorance argument neither supports standard Utilitarianism nor Prioritarianism unless we assume that rational people are insensitive to ambiguity.

scholarly journals Freerolls and binds: making policy when information is missing

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
ANNIE DUKE ◽  
CASS R. SUNSTEIN
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Regulatory Policy ◽  
Mirror Image ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Difficult Cases

Abstract When policymakers focus on costs and benefits, they often find that hard questions become easy – as, for example, when the benefits clearly exceed the costs, or when the costs clearly exceed the benefits. In some cases, however, benefits or costs are difficult to quantify, perhaps because of limitations in scientific knowledge. In extreme cases, policymakers are proceeding in circumstances of uncertainty rather than risk, in the sense that they cannot assign probabilities to various outcomes. We suggest that in difficult cases in which important information is absent, it is useful for policymakers to consider a concept from poker: ‘freerolls.’ A freeroll exists when choosers can lose nothing from selecting an option but stand to gain something (whose magnitude may itself be unknown). In some cases, people display ‘freeroll neglect.’ In terms of social justice, John Rawls’ defense of the difference principle is grounded in the idea that, behind the veil of ignorance, choosers have a freeroll. In terms of regulatory policy, one of the most promising defenses of the Precautionary Principle sees it as a kind of freeroll. Some responses to climate change, pandemics and financial crises can be seen as near-freerolls. Freerolls and near-freerolls must be distinguished from cases involving cumulatively high costs and also from faux freerolls, which can be found when the costs of an option are real and significant, but not visible. ‘Binds’ are the mirror-image of freerolls; they involve options from which people are guaranteed to lose something (of uncertain magnitude). Some regulatory options are binds, and there are faux binds as well.

Sprawiedliwość jako racjonalność

Etyka ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 111-132
Author(s):  
Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

The article deals with John Rawls’ theory of justice. The principal categories of Rawls’ book are analysed; especially the “veil of ignorance” and the principles of justice. Author’s attention is focused on some philosophical aspects of the concept of justice. The question of grounding of the idea of justice is analysed. Rawls’ theory is criticized for its lack of explanation in which way the idea of justice is given: is it a primordial experience or a result of the rational calculus?

Stakeholder Fairness Under an Induced ‘Veil of Ignorance'

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Sarkar ◽  
Soumyakanti Chakraborty
Keyword(s):  
Discrete Choice ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Maximin Principle ◽  
Nash Demand Game ◽  
The Veil ◽  
John Harsanyi ◽  
Simultaneous Move

John Rawls introduced the ‘veil of ignorance' in social contract theory to bring about a common conception of justice, and hypothesized that it will enable rational individuals to choose distributive shares on basis of ‘maximin' principle. R. E. Freeman conceptualised stakeholder fairness using the Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance'. In contrast to Rawls' theory, John Harsanyi postulated that rational individuals behind the ‘veil of ignorance' will choose allocation to maximise expected utility. This article investigates how subjects choose allocations behind the ‘veil of ignorance,' in a laboratory experiment, and interprets the findings in light of stakeholder fairness. The ‘veil of ignorance' was induced on randomly paired and mutually anonymous subjects, who were asked to choose allocations in a simultaneous move discrete choice Nash demand game. Both ‘maximin' principle and expected utility maximisation was found to be used by the subjects. Choice of allocations where no one is worse off vis-à-vis status quo was salient. This is consistent with Freeman's Principle of Governance.

Fair Contracts and Beautiful Intuitions

1977 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 137-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. E. Pence
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Modern Medicine ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Crucial Aspect ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Moral Methodology ◽  
The Social ◽  
Fair Principles ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Political Liberal

John Rawls, the twentieth century political liberal and arch-foe of utilitarianism, has resurrected the moral methodology of contractualism on the battleground of normative ethics. Rawls’ theory illuminates both the power and the weaknesses of all theories of contractualism in normative ethics.In this paper, I examine what Rawls believes contractualism can accomplish in ethics. Then I examine one crucial aspect of Rawls’ contractualism — the notion of fairness. Next, I argue that Rawls begs the question of the choice of principles against utilitarianism. One way in which question-begging occurs is by forsaking any real conception of bargaining agents, substituting instead many abstract instantiations of one non-envious, mildly self-interested, impartial agent. Rawls claims that it is of “great importance” (141-142) that agents in the social contract achieve unanimity. In reality, the contract stipulates unamimity among its agents, instead of the opposite, where unanimity follows from consensus over fair principles. The veil of ignorance does not guarantee impartiality, but instead, it precludes choosing utilitarian principles. Finally, I test the adequacy of Rawlsian contractualism by applying it to an important problem in modern medicine involving justice, viz., the just allocation of scarce medical resources.

scholarly journals SOCIAL JUSTICE, GENOMIC JUSTICE AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE: HARSANYI MEETS MENDEL

2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Okasha
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Mendelian Genetics ◽  
Division Process ◽  
Impartial Observer ◽  
The Veil ◽  
John Harsanyi ◽  
Shed Light

John Harsanyi and John Rawls both used the veil of ignorance thought experiment to study the problem of choosing between alternative social arrangements. With his ‘impartial observer theorem’, Harsanyi tried to show that the veil of ignorance argument leads inevitably to utilitarianism, an argument criticized by Sen, Weymark and others. A quite different use of the veil-of-ignorance concept is found in evolutionary biology. In the cell-division process called meiosis, in which sexually reproducing organisms produce gametes, the chromosome number is halved; when meiosis is fair, each gene has only a fifty percent chance of making it into any gamete. This creates a Mendelian veil of ignorance, which has the effect of aligning the interests of all the genes in an organism. This paper shows how Harsanyi's version of the veil-of-ignorance argument can shed light on Mendelian genetics. There turns out to be an intriguing biological analogue of the impartial observer theorem that is immune from the Sen/Weymark objections to Harsanyi's original.

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