The Irreconcilable Conflict between Islam and Liberalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-265
Author(s):  
Muhammad Zahid Siddique
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Pluralistic Society ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

John Rawls used an apparently neutral apparatus to derive the principles of justice that all “rational” people ought to agree with because they provide the basis of coexistence in a pluralistic society. He believes that religious faith is consistent with the commitment to liberalism. The paper shows that the Rawlsian liberal “self” modelled in the original position is not consistent with the original position recognized by religion in general and Islam in particular. According to Islam, the human self is mukallaf (subject of God) while Rawls treats it non-mukallaf. This is so because Rawlsian original position presumes an atheist self behind the veil of ignorance. This conceptualization of self is not only inconsistent with but also hostile to religion. The claims about liberalism’s tolerance towards religion are superficial. The liberal self can express itself in various religious forms provided these are aligned with the system of rights acknowledged by the liberal atheist self.

How to Justify Principles of Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 163-192
Author(s):  
Zhang Guoqing
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
The Core ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

AbstractJohn Rawls assumes that in the original position, under the veil of ignorance, after bargaining amongst each other, free, equal, moral and rational persons would make a rational decision to accept the principles of justice as fairness and thus the principles are established. Critics, however, question the authenticity and validity of this justification strategy. When rational individuals take the principles of justice as an original agreement, it is not a real contract. Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness is just a personal notion, some individuals may accept it, but it is impossible to be accepted by all human beings in a real world. Therefore there is a justification/acceptance paradox of those principles which are the core of his political philosophy. So how should we justify those principles? Its answers may be provided not in the light of a philosophical justification but of a scientific one.

scholarly journals The “Original Position” as Public Performance: Liberalism, Pluralism, and Asceticism

Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 462
Author(s):  
Joseph Rivera
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Religious Practice ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Public Performance ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Late Works

John Rawls’ well-known device of representation (his terminology) that he names the “original position” is put into play by the veil of ignorance. This imaginative device, found in both his early and late works, is often dismissed because it is misunderstood as an exercise in moral geometry. This essay discusses in more detail the subjective mechanics of the original position; while sympathetic of Rawls’ application of the veil of ignorance, I distinguish between a thick and thin veil, whereby I promote the latter. The final section makes a connection between the simulation of the original position and the religious practice of asceticism.

Sprawiedliwość jako racjonalność

Etyka ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 111-132
Author(s):  
Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

The article deals with John Rawls’ theory of justice. The principal categories of Rawls’ book are analysed; especially the “veil of ignorance” and the principles of justice. Author’s attention is focused on some philosophical aspects of the concept of justice. The question of grounding of the idea of justice is analysed. Rawls’ theory is criticized for its lack of explanation in which way the idea of justice is given: is it a primordial experience or a result of the rational calculus?

E Pluribus Unum

1977 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 49-70
Author(s):  
D. A. Lloyd Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
Recent Version ◽  
Liberal Thought

One tradition of liberal thought is committed to showing on the basis of an individualistic conception of what is good that it is reasonable for all persons to accept certain common principles. The most recent version of this enterprise is to be found in Professor John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. Rawls has to show that persons in the ‘original position’, with plans of life which will turn out to be different, though equally rational, when the ‘veil of ignorance’ has been lifted, nevertheless have reason to accept common principles of justice. One might have expected divergent views about the best principles of justice to adopt, considering that the rationality of choices is related to desires, and that parties in the original position may have different desires. Rawls meets this problem by introducing the ‘primary goods’: those things it is rational to want whatever else one wants. By employing this ‘thin’ theory of the good in the original position, Rawls attempts to show that the choices of all parties will converge upon his two principles of justice. Each individual's ‘full’ conception of the good may then be developed within the constraints imposed by the principles of justice.

scholarly journals The Political Meaning of the Right and the Privatization of the Good

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-25
Author(s):  
Piotr Andryszczak
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
The Political ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrine ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
The Public ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Just Society ◽  
The Veil ◽  
The Right

The Political Meaning of the Right and the Privatization of the Good In today's philosophical and political world we come across an influential current within liberalism called procedural. It faces the problem of building a just society by proposing a formula: the priority of the right over the good. It can be easily found in Rawls's A Theory of Justice which starts from the original position which means that individuals, behind the veil of ignorance, do not know anything about their social location, talents and their own conceptions of the good. Because of such ignorance they would constitute the just society. It would be regulated by two principles of justice, chosen behind the veil of ignorance and reflecting the priority of the right over the good. Nevertheless Rawls understood that this conception could be accepted only by Liberals because it represents an example of a comprehensive doctrine. Therefore he reinterpreted his conception and presented it as political in his Political Liberalism. It has three features: it is worked out for the basic structure of a constitutional democratic regime; it does not depend for its justification on any particular comprehensive doctrine; and, it is formulated in terms of two fundamental ideas implicit in the public culture of a democratic society (the ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation, and of persons viewed as free and equal). Due to this reinterpretation, the justification of his principles of justice proceeds from what is held in common and leads to an agreement based on "an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines". In this way the good becomes something strictly private and completely absent in the public sphere. Such position is obviously very controversial but a critical approach to it will be a subject of another paper.

What is Arbitrary about Moral Arbitrariness?

2021 ◽  
pp. 202-233
Author(s):  
Gerald Lang
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Central Source ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Brute Luck ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Refined Version

John Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ is often cited as a central source of inspiration for luck egalitarianism, which is, correlatively, often characterized as a more refined version of justice as fairness. Rawls’s distributive hostility to morally arbitrary endowments is standardly interpreted as betraying hostility to distributions that are skewed by brute luck. This chapter argues otherwise. It has two main aims. First, it replaces the standard ‘Neutralization Interpretation’ of Rawls’s main arguments with the ‘Irrelevance Interpretation’. According to the Irrelevance Interpretation, morally arbitrary person endowments ought to play no role in the selection of principles of justice in the original position. According to the Neutralization Interpretation, by contrast, principles of justice ought to expunge the influence of any inequalities that are due to luck. The Irrelevance Interpretation is more permissive of inequalities, just as long as they serve some other purpose, such as improving the position of the worst-off. The Irrelevance Interpretation is also more congenial to Rawls’s investment in the contractarian machinery of the original position and the veil of ignorance.

scholarly journals Comprender la pobreza: debate entre John Rawls y Amartya Sen

2011 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eguzki Urteaga
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Amartya Sen ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Veil

RESUMENReconstrucción teórica de nuestras intuiciones a propósito de la justicia social, la Teoría de la justicia de John Rawls debía tomar en consideración a los más desfavorecidos a través del principio de diferencia que reparte los bienes de manera equitativa. Para Rawls, la objetividad moral está garantizada por la experiencia del posicionamiento original, caracterizada por el velo de ignorancia. Amartya Sen cuestiona ese planteamiento criticando el índice de los bienes básicos. Este artículo explicita lo que está en juego en este debate y desarrolla las aportaciones de la teoría de las capacidades a la reflexión contemporánea sobre las desigualdades socioeconómicas.PALABRAS CLAVERawls – Sen – teoría – pobreza – capacidadABSTRACTIn his theoretical reconstruction of our intuitions about social justice, John Rawls’s Theory of justice intended to take into consideration the worst-off due to the difference principle that distributes the goods in an equal way. For Rawls, the moral objectivity is guaranteed by the experience of the original position, characterized by the veil of ignorance that conceals particular interests. But, Amartya Sen has criticized this theory and specially the index of basic goods. This article states explicitly what is at stake in this debate and develops the contributions of the theory of capabilities to the contemporary reflection on the economic and social inequalities.KEYWORDSRawls - Sen - theory - poverty - capability

Habermas on Rawls and the normative foundations of democracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 136843102098541
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Kędziora
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Normative Foundation ◽  
Internal Relations ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Politics And Law ◽  
Normative Foundations

The debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls concerns the question of how to do political philosophy under conditions of cultural pluralism, if the aim of political philosophy is to uncover the normative foundation of a modern liberal democracy. Rawls’s political liberalism tries to bypass the problem of pluralism, using the intellectual device of the veil of ignorance, and yet paradoxically at the same time it treats it as something given and as an arbiter of justification within the political conception of justice. Habermas argues that Rawls not only incorrectly operationalizes the moral point of view from which we discern what is just but also fails to capture the specificity of democracy which is given by internal relations between politics and law. This deprives Rawls’s political philosophy of the conceptual tools needed to articulate the normative foundation of democracy.

Justice in a Market Economy

2006 ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.

scholarly journals Ambiguity aversion behind the veil of ignorance

Synthese ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Orri Stefánsson
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Ambiguity Aversion ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Intermediate Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Absolute Priority ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Veil

AbstractThe veil of ignorance argument was used by John C. Harsanyi to defend Utilitarianism and by John Rawls to defend the absolute priority of the worst off. In a recent paper, Lara Buchak revives the veil of ignorance argument, and uses it to defend an intermediate position between Harsanyi’s and Rawls’ that she calls Relative Prioritarianism. None of these authors explore the implications of allowing that agent’s behind the veil are sensitive to ambiguity. Allowing for aversion to ambiguity—which is both the most commonly observed and a seemingly reasonable attitude to ambiguity—however supports a version of Egalitarianism, whose logical form is quite different from the theories defended by the aforementioned authors. Moreover, it turns out that the veil of ignorance argument neither supports standard Utilitarianism nor Prioritarianism unless we assume that rational people are insensitive to ambiguity.

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