scholarly journals Evaluating team decision-making as an emergent phenomenon

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (1110) ◽  
pp. 216-219
Author(s):  
John Kinnear ◽  
Nick Wilson ◽  
Anthony O’Dwyer
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Team Cognition ◽  
Random Pairing ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Team Decision ◽  
Improved Performance

BackgroundThe complexity of modern clinical practice has highlighted the fallibility of individual clinicians’ decision-making, with effective teamwork emerging as a key to patient safety. Dual process theory is widely accepted as a framework for individual decision-making, with type 1 processes responsible for fast, intuitive and automatic decisions and type 2 processes for slow, analytical decisions. However, dual process theory does not explain cognition at the group level, when individuals act in teams. Team cognition resulting from dynamic interaction of individuals is said to be more resilient to decision-making error and greater than simply aggregated cognition.MethodsClinicians were paired as teams and asked to solve a cognitive puzzle constructed as a drug calculation. The frequency at which the teams made incorrect decisions was compared with that of individual clinicians answering the same question.ResultsWhen clinicians acted in pairs, 63% answered the cognitive puzzle correctly, compared with 33% of clinicians as individuals, showing a statistically significant difference in performance (χ2(1, n=116)=24.329, P<0.001). Based on the predicted performance of teams made up of the random pairing of individuals who had the same propensity to answer as previously, there was no statistical difference in the actual and predicted teams’ performance.ConclusionsTeams are less prone to making errors of decision-making than individuals. However, the improved performance is likely to be owing to the effect of aggregated cognition rather than any improved decision-making as a result of the interaction. There is no evidence of team cognition as an emergent and distinct entity.

scholarly journals The complex phenomenon of dysrational antibiotics prescribing decisions in German primary healthcare: a qualitative interview study using dual process theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Regina Poss-Doering ◽  
Martina Kamradt ◽  
Anna Stuermlinger ◽  
Katharina Glassen ◽  
Petra Kaufmann-Kolle ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Primary Care ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Primary Care Physicians ◽  
Educational Interventions ◽  
Care Patient ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Qualitative Interview Study ◽  
Prescription Rates

Abstract Background Antibiotic prescription rates in primary care in Germany are moderate, but still considered too high. The ARena study (Sustainable reduction of antibiotic-induced antimicrobial resistance) was initiated to foster awareness and understanding of the growing challenge and promotes rational antibiotics use for acute, non-complicated and self-limiting infections. Methods The present study was performed as part of the process evaluation of the ARena study. Interviews were conducted with a purposive sample of physicians participating in the ARena study to identify factors relevant to primary care physicians’ decision-making when prescribing antibiotics for acute non-complicated infections. Generated data were audio-recorded. Pseudonymized verbatim transcripts were coded using a pre-defined framework. The Dual Process Theory was applied to provide understanding of individual health professional factors that induce dysrational prescribing decisions. Results Based on medical as well as non-medical considerations, physicians developed habits in decision making on antibiotics prescribing. They acknowledged inadequate antibiotics prescribing for acute, non-complicated infections in situations involving uncertainty regarding diagnosis, prognosis, continuity of care, patient expectations and when not knowing the patient. Educative efforts empowered physicians to override habitual prescribing. A theory-driven model provides transparency as to how dysrational prescribing decisions occur and suggests remedy by providing new experiences and new recognizable patterns through educative efforts. Conclusions Educational interventions may only change prescribing behaviours if they result in active rational rather than routine-based decision-making on antibiotics prescribing. Trial registration ISRCTN, ISRCTN58150046.

scholarly journals Dual Process Theories in Behavioral Economics and Neuroeconomics: a Critical Review

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Grayot
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Standard View ◽  
Realistic Description ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Abstract Despite their popularity, dual process accounts of human reasoning and decision-making have come under intense scrutiny in recent years. Cognitive scientists and philosophers alike have come to question the theoretical foundations of the ‘standard view’ of dual process theory and have challenged the validity and relevance of evidence in support of it. Moreover, attempts to modify and refine dual process theory in light of these challenges have generated additional concerns about its applicability and refutability as a scientific theory. With these concerns in mind, this paper provides a critical review of dual process theory in economics, focusing on its role as a psychological framework for decision modeling in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. I argue that the influx of criticisms against dual process theory challenge the descriptive accuracy of dualistic decision models in economics. In fact, the case can be made that the popularity of dual process theory in economics has less to do with the empirical success of dualistic decision models, and more to do with the convenience that the dual process narrative provides economists looking to explain-away decision anomalies. This leaves behavioral economists and neuroeconomists with something of a dilemma: either they stick to their purported ambitions to give a realistic description of human decision-making and give up the narrative, or they revise and restate their scientific ambitions.

Quality or Quantity? The Power of Expert Reviews in the Presence of Conflicting Aggregated Ratings

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-129
Author(s):  
Anna Naujoks
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Information Sources ◽  
Online Reviews ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Online Review ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Simultaneous Presence ◽  
Multiple Cues

Many consumers consult online reviews to evaluate services. Online review platforms present them with multiple cues by which to assess whether a review message is useful in their decision-making process. However, consumers are often faced with conflicting opinions from different information sources. By using the theoretical framework of dual-process theory and signaling theory, this paper examines the effect of majority and minority influences.It further investigates how expert reviewers are perceived, and the role played by the total number of available reviews. A 2 x 2 x 2 (review valence x expertise of conflicting review x number of reviews) scenario-based experiment is conducted. The results demonstrate that expert sources weaken the prominent influence of the majority, especially when majority size is small. The research contributes to existing literature by explaining how the simultaneous presence of majority and minority influences affects consumers’ decision-making process. Moreover, it examines the power of online expert reviewers.

scholarly journals Assessing the association between thinking dispositions and clinical error

2017 ◽  
Vol 94 (1107) ◽  
pp. 3-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Kinnear ◽  
Nick Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Limited Information ◽  
Predictive Capability ◽  
Thinking Dispositions ◽  
Incorrect Answer ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Clinical Error

BackgroundDual-process theory suggests that type 1 thinking results in a propensity to make ‘intuitive’ decisions based on limited information. Type 2 processes, on the other hand, are able to analyse these initial responses and replace them with rationalised decisions. Individuals may have a preference for different modes of rationalisation, on a continuum from careful to cursory. These ‘dispositions’ of thinking reside in type 2 processes and may result in error when the preference is for ‘quick and casual’ decision-making.MethodsWe asked clinicians to answer a cognitive puzzle to which there was an obvious, but incorrect, answer, to measure their propensity for ‘quick and casual’ decision-making. The same clinicians were also asked to report the number of clinical errors they had committed in the previous two weeks. We hypothesised an association between committing error and settling for an incorrect answer, and that the cognitive puzzle would have predictive capability.Results90 of 153 (59%) clinicians reported that they had committed error, while 103 (67%) gave the incorrect ‘intuitive’ answer to the cognitive puzzle. There was no statistically significant difference between clinicians who committed error and answered incorrectly, and those who did not and answered correctly (χ2(1, n=1153)=0.021, p=0.885).ConclusionsThe prevalence of clinical error in our study was higher than previously reported in the literature, and the propensity for accepting intuitive solutions was high. Although the cognitive puzzle was unable to predict who was more likely to commit error, the study offers insights into developing other predictive models for error.

scholarly journals Smooth coping: an embodied, Heideggerian approach to dual-process theory

2021 ◽  
pp. 105971232110173
Author(s):  
Zachariah A Neemeh
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Process Model ◽  
High Capacity ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Reflective Thought ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand ( Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.

scholarly journals Dual-Process Theory as a Theory of the Classification of Information Processing Acts

Diametros ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vitaliy Nadurak
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Qualitative Difference ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Conscious Control

The article proposes a consideration of the dual-process theory of higher cognition as a theory of the classification of acts of information processing. One of the reasons why the dual-process approach has been criticized is the fact that the information processing process can sometimes have characteristics that undermine a clear-cut attribution to one of the two traditionally defined opposite types. To avoid this criticism, it is proposed that the object of classification should not be the processes of information processing, but separate acts of combining two units of information. Unlike a process, a particular act of information processing at a particular moment in time cannot simultaneously have opposite characteristics, nor can it simultaneously have and not have some characteristic. In order to show the qualitative difference between various information processing acts as falling individually into either Type 1 or Type 2 processing, it is proposed to classify them by a feature that is present in one type and absent in another. It is suggested to take conscious control as such a feature. As a result, in the information processing acts corresponding to Type 2 category, units of information are combined in a consciously controlled way, whereas in the acts to be considered as Type 1, those units either already are combined or combine autonomously due to the existence of indirect associative connections.

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