scholarly journals Dual-Process Theory as a Theory of the Classification of Information Processing Acts

Diametros ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vitaliy Nadurak

The article proposes a consideration of the dual-process theory of higher cognition as a theory of the classification of acts of information processing. One of the reasons why the dual-process approach has been criticized is the fact that the information processing process can sometimes have characteristics that undermine a clear-cut attribution to one of the two traditionally defined opposite types. To avoid this criticism, it is proposed that the object of classification should not be the processes of information processing, but separate acts of combining two units of information. Unlike a process, a particular act of information processing at a particular moment in time cannot simultaneously have opposite characteristics, nor can it simultaneously have and not have some characteristic. In order to show the qualitative difference between various information processing acts as falling individually into either Type 1 or Type 2 processing, it is proposed to classify them by a feature that is present in one type and absent in another. It is suggested to take conscious control as such a feature. As a result, in the information processing acts corresponding to Type 2 category, units of information are combined in a consciously controlled way, whereas in the acts to be considered as Type 1, those units either already are combined or combine autonomously due to the existence of indirect associative connections.

2021 ◽  
pp. 105971232110173
Author(s):  
Zachariah A Neemeh

Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand ( Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.


2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (1110) ◽  
pp. 216-219
Author(s):  
John Kinnear ◽  
Nick Wilson ◽  
Anthony O’Dwyer

BackgroundThe complexity of modern clinical practice has highlighted the fallibility of individual clinicians’ decision-making, with effective teamwork emerging as a key to patient safety. Dual process theory is widely accepted as a framework for individual decision-making, with type 1 processes responsible for fast, intuitive and automatic decisions and type 2 processes for slow, analytical decisions. However, dual process theory does not explain cognition at the group level, when individuals act in teams. Team cognition resulting from dynamic interaction of individuals is said to be more resilient to decision-making error and greater than simply aggregated cognition.MethodsClinicians were paired as teams and asked to solve a cognitive puzzle constructed as a drug calculation. The frequency at which the teams made incorrect decisions was compared with that of individual clinicians answering the same question.ResultsWhen clinicians acted in pairs, 63% answered the cognitive puzzle correctly, compared with 33% of clinicians as individuals, showing a statistically significant difference in performance (χ2(1, n=116)=24.329, P<0.001). Based on the predicted performance of teams made up of the random pairing of individuals who had the same propensity to answer as previously, there was no statistical difference in the actual and predicted teams’ performance.ConclusionsTeams are less prone to making errors of decision-making than individuals. However, the improved performance is likely to be owing to the effect of aggregated cognition rather than any improved decision-making as a result of the interaction. There is no evidence of team cognition as an emergent and distinct entity.


Author(s):  
Chienkuo Mi ◽  
Shane Ryan

In this paper, we defend the claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge. We begin by examining a recent account of extended knowledge provided by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). We note a weakness with that account and a challenge facing theorists of extended knowledge. The challenge that we identify is to articulate the extended cognition condition necessary for extended knowledge in such a way as to avoid counterexample from the revamped Careless Math Student and Truetemp cases. We consider but reject Pritchard’s (2012b) epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for doing so. Instead, we set out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory. We make the case that reflective knowledge offers a way of overcoming the challenge identified. We show why such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while building on Sosa’s (2012) account of meta-competence.


Diagnosis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mairi Pucci ◽  
Marco Benati ◽  
Claudia Lo Cascio ◽  
Martina Montagnana ◽  
Giuseppe Lippi

AbstractDiabetes is one of the most prevalent diseases worldwide, whereby type 1 diabetes mellitus (T1DM) alone involves nearly 15 million patients. Although T1DM and type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM) are the most common types, there are other forms of diabetes which may remain often under-diagnosed, or that can be misdiagnosed as being T1DM or T2DM. After an initial diagnostic step, the differential diagnosis among T1DM, T2DM, Maturity-Onset Diabetes of the Young (MODY) and others forms has important implication for both therapeutic and behavioral decisions. Although the criteria used for diagnosing diabetes mellitus are well defined by the guidelines of the American Diabetes Association (ADA), no clear indications are provided on the optimal approach to be followed for classifying diabetes, especially in children. In this circumstance, both routine and genetic blood test may play a pivotal role. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to provide, through a narrative literature review, some elements that may aid accurate diagnosis and classification of diabetes in children and young people.


2015 ◽  
Vol 180 (suppl_4) ◽  
pp. 92-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ting Dong ◽  
Steven J. Durning ◽  
Anthony R. Artino ◽  
Cees van der Vleuten ◽  
Eric Holmboe ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT Background: Clinical reasoning is essential for the practice of medicine. Dual process theory conceptualizes reasoning as falling into two general categories: nonanalytic reasoning (pattern recognition) and analytic reasoning (active comparing and contrasting of alternatives). The debate continues regarding how expert performance develops and how individuals make the best use of analytic and nonanalytic processes. Several investigators have identified the unexpected finding that intermediates tend to perform better on licensing examination items than experts, which has been termed the “intermediate effect.” Purpose: We explored differences between faculty and residents on multiple-choice questions (MCQs) using dual process measures (both reading and answering times) to inform this ongoing debate. Method: Faculty (board-certified internists; experts) and residents (internal medicine interns; intermediates) answered live licensing examination MCQs (U.S. Medical Licensing Examination Step 2 Clinical Knowledge and American Board of Internal Medicine Certifying Examination) while being timed. We conducted repeated analysis of variance to compare the 2 groups on average reading time, answering time, and accuracy on various types of items. Results: Faculty and residents did not differ significantly in reading time [F (1, 35) = 0.01, p = 0.93], answering time [F (1, 35) = 0.60, p = 0.44], or accuracy [F (1, 35) = 0.24, p = 0.63] regardless of easy or hard items. Discussion: Dual process theory was not evidenced in this study. However, this lack of difference between faculty and residents may have been affected by the small sample size of participants and MCQs may not reflect how physicians made decisions in actual practice setting.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document