How Taiwan Weathered the Asian Financial Crisis

2000 ◽  
Vol 03 (04) ◽  
pp. 491-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erh-Cheng Hwa

This paper attempts to explain why Taiwan was able to cope with the East Asian financial crisis more successfully than other economies in East Asia. It pinpoints Taiwan's competitive industrial sector as the most likely relevant underlying factor. It also shows that while sound macroeconomic policy and prudent financial policy all contributed to allowing Taiwan to avert the crisis, an effective industrial policy that fostered industrial restructuring, strengthened industrial competitiveness, as well as helped to restore macroeconomic equilibrium, was the most instrumental factor.

Author(s):  
Andrew Yeo

Chapter 4 describes the rising phenomena of East Asian regionalism in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and demonstrates how debates between inclusive and exclusive variations of Asian regionalism played out in the development of the regional architecture. The chapter traces the establishment of the ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit, and the Six-Party Talks. Taken together, these three institutions signified greater political will behind regional multilateralism but also revealed the contentious nature of institution building. The discussion of multilateral developments is juxtaposed to an analysis of the US–South Korea and US-Thailand alliances, and their resilience in an era of greater multilateralism and expanding regionalism.


Author(s):  
William N Kring ◽  
William W Grimes

Abstract In the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, East Asia’s efforts to enhance regional financial cooperation raised the possibility of East Asia playing a more assertive role in global financial governance. However, despite the region’s increased voice in governance and economic weight, East Asian financial systems and markets have mostly adapted to global norms developed in New York, London, and Washington, DC. We argue that the failure of East Asia to push an alternative vision of financial governance reflects both the lack of regional political unity and, more crucially, the divisions of interests both between and within key East Asian economies. Despite nearly universal regional dissatisfaction with global standards and institutions in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, these two factors have combined to prevent the development of a distinctive regional model that could be promoted at the global level.


1998 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-10
Author(s):  
C Rangarajan

A year has passed since the onset of the Asian financial crisis. We are not sure that we have seen the final act of the drama. The East Asian experience shows that if there is an open capital account, the recipient country must have a stricter system of monitoring the inflows. A supervisory control over the financial system must also be very stringent. A loose domestic financial system and large capital inflows are the worst combination. It invites danger. According to Rangarajan⁄ the lesson to draw from the East Asian crisis is that the capital account liberalization and reform of the financial system should move in tandem.


2007 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID MARTIN JONES ◽  
MICHAEL L. R. SMITH

The prevailing scholarly orthodoxy regarding recent diplomatic initiatives in the Asia-Pacific assumes that East Asia is evolving into a distinctive regional community. The orthodoxy attributes this development to the growing influence of the diplomatic practices espoused by the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) and its related institutions. However, a paradox remains, namely: despite the failure of ASEAN’s distinctive practice to fulfil its rhetorical promise in Southeast Asia both immediately prior to and in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, it is nevertheless considered sufficient to validate the projection of ASEAN defined norms onto a wider Pacific canvas. This study analyses how an academic preference for constructivism has misinterpreted the growth in official rhetoric extolling East Asian regionalism since 1997 in a way that has helped produce and reinforce this paradox. By contrast, we contend that government declarations of a developing East Asian identity actually serve to obscure the continuation of traditional interstate relations and do not herald any wider, let alone inexorable, movement towards an integrated regional community.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-51
Author(s):  
Kee Hoon Chung

Theories on institutional change assert that exogenous shocks are critical in transforming path-dependent institutions. There is not much empiric research, however, that has investigated whether that is indeed the case. To fill this gap, this study investigates the effects of institutional quality on economic growth with a focus on East Asia before and after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, which delivered a critical shock in economic activities and institutions in East Asia. Using panel data analysis from 1981 and 2007, I investigate whether the effect of institutional quality on economic growth differed in East Asia compared to rest of the world before the crisis and whether such relationship changed after the crisis. Using two-way fixed effects model, the estimation shows that the effect of institutional quality on economic growth was positive on average for the rest of the world after the crisis but negative for East Asia. The negative coefficient was particularly strong for the three countries—South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand—that suffered the most during the crisis. However, in the long term, there was no significant change of this negative effect.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document