A STACKELBERG GAME OF INNOVATION DIFFUSION: PRICING, ADVERTISING AND SUBSIDY STRATEGIES

2001 ◽  
Vol 03 (04) ◽  
pp. 325-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
LUIGI DE CESARE ◽  
ANDREA DI LIDDO
Keyword(s):  
Innovation Diffusion ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
New Product ◽  
Public Authority ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Advertising Strategy ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game ◽  
Set Up

We consider a firm that wishes to maximise the profits coming from the sale of a new product or technology by determining an optimal price and advertising strategy. A public authority wishes to accelerate and stimulate the adoption of the new product by using a budget to give price subsidies directly to the consumers. The problem is set up as a Stackelberg differential game.

scholarly journals ON A NEW PARADIGM OF OPTIMAL REINSURANCE: A STOCHASTIC STACKELBERG DIFFERENTIAL GAME BETWEEN AN INSURER AND A REINSURER

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (02) ◽  
pp. 905-960 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lv Chen ◽  
Yang Shen
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
General Setting ◽  
Random Coefficients ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Optimal Reinsurance ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game ◽  
Special Case

AbstractThis paper proposes a new continuous-time framework to analyze optimal reinsurance, in which an insurer and a reinsurer are two players of a stochastic Stackelberg differential game, i.e., a stochastic leader-follower differential game. This allows us to determine optimal reinsurance from joint interests of the insurer and the reinsurer, which is rarely considered in the continuous-time setting. In the Stackelberg game, the reinsurer moves first and the insurer does subsequently to achieve a Stackelberg equilibrium toward optimal reinsurance arrangement. Speaking more precisely, the reinsurer is the leader of the game and decides on an optimal reinsurance premium to charge, while the insurer is the follower of the game and chooses an optimal proportional reinsurance to purchase. Under utility maximization criteria, we study the game problem starting from the general setting with generic utilities and random coefficients to the special case with exponential utilities and constant coefficients. In the special case, we find that the reinsurer applies the variance premium principle to calculate the optimal reinsurance premium and the insurer's optimal ceding/retained proportion of insurance risk depends not only on the risk aversion of itself but also on that of the reinsurer.

Looking at Innovation through CCT Glasses: Consumer Culture Theory and Google Glass Innovation

2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Pace
Keyword(s):  
Innovation Diffusion ◽  
Consumer Culture ◽  
Preliminary Analysis ◽  
Consumer Behaviour ◽  
New Product ◽  
Google Glass ◽  
Culture Theory ◽  
Cultural Determinants ◽  
Functional Features ◽  
Consumer Culture Theory

Today innovation can be so radical and futuristic that common models of innovation diffusion might not be enough. The success of an innovation relies on the functional features of the new product, but also on how consumers shape the meaning of that innovation. Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) can help managers by focusing on the cultural determinants of consumer behaviour. The work provides a preliminary analysis of how consumers elaborate the cultural platform that will determine the degree of success of the upcoming innovation Google Glass.

scholarly journals A survey of stackelberg differential game models in supply and marketing channels

2008 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiuli He ◽  
Ashutosh Prasad ◽  
Suresh P. Sethi ◽  
Genaro J. Gutierrez
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Marketing Channels ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game

scholarly journals A stochastic differential game of low carbon technology sharing in collaborative innovation system of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises under uncertain environment

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 607-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shi Yin ◽  
Baizhou Li
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation System ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Low Carbon Economy ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Technology Level

AbstractConsidering the fact that the development of low carbon economy calls for the low carbon technology sharing between interested enterprises, this paper study a stochastic differential game of low carbon technology sharing in collaborative innovation system of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises. In the paper, we consider the random interference factors that include the uncertain external environment and the internal understanding limitations of decision maker. In the model, superior enterprises and inferior enterprises are separated entities, and they play Stacklberg master-slave game, Nash non-cooperative game, and cooperative game, respectively. We discuss the feedback equilibrium strategies of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises, and it is found that some random interference factors in sharing system can make the variance of improvement degree of low carbon technology level in the cooperation game higher than the variance in the Stackelberg game, and the result of Stackelberg game is similar to the result of Nash game. Additionally, a government subsidy incentive and a special subsidy that inferior enterprises give to superior enterprises are proposed.

scholarly journals Managing a 5G mobile phone supply chain under the impact of strategic consumers: A two-period game analysis and applications

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qin Zhang ◽  
Zijian He ◽  
Junhai Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Mobile Phone ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Great Influence ◽  
Purchasing Behavior ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Strategic Consumers ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Impact

Consumers' strategic purchasing behavior has a great influence on the pricing and sales of new products. In order to study the impact of strategic consumers on the sales of 5G mobile phones, we establish a two-period pricing model. The supply chain contains two manufacturers, a communications operator and a mobile phone retailer. Cases where two manufacturers have the same or different pricing rights are researched by using the Stackelberg game and the Nash game model. Our research results are as follows:(1) We obtain the optimal 5G communication fees in two periods and find out how they change with the proportion of consumers changing. (2) We figure out the profits of the supply chain in two periods and analyze them. We find that the communication operator earns more than the others most of the time. (3) We investigate how the proportion of strategic consumer impact on supply chain profits and conclude that the optimal price and demand in a period will decrease as the proportion of consumers who only purchase products in the other period increases.

scholarly journals Linear-Quadratic Stackelberg Game for Mean-Field Backward Stochastic Differential System and Application

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Du ◽  
Zhen Wu
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Differential System ◽  
Optimization Problems ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game ◽  
Lq Optimal Control

This paper is concerned with a new kind of Stackelberg differential game of mean-field backward stochastic differential equations (MF-BSDEs). By means of four Riccati equations (REs), the follower first solves a backward mean-field stochastic LQ optimal control problem and gets the corresponding open-loop optimal control with the feedback representation. Then the leader turns to solve an optimization problem for a 1×2 mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential system. In virtue of some high-dimensional and complicated REs, we obtain the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, and it admits a state feedback representation. Finally, as applications, a class of stochastic pension fund optimization problems which can be viewed as a special case of our formulation is studied and the open-loop Stackelberg strategy is obtained.

Innovation Diffusion and New Product Growth Models in Marketing

1979 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 55-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vijay Mahajan ◽  
Eitan Muller
Keyword(s):  
Innovation Diffusion ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Growth Models ◽  
New Product ◽  
Diffusion Models ◽  
The State ◽  
Development And Validation ◽  
Further Development

This paper assesses the state-of-the-art of the diffusion models of new product acceptance. A number of issues related to the further development and validation of these models are discussed.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document