Managing a 5G mobile phone supply chain under the impact of strategic consumers: A two-period game analysis and applications

Consumers' strategic purchasing behavior has a great influence on the pricing and sales of new products. In order to study the impact of strategic consumers on the sales of 5G mobile phones, we establish a two-period pricing model. The supply chain contains two manufacturers, a communications operator and a mobile phone retailer. Cases where two manufacturers have the same or different pricing rights are researched by using the Stackelberg game and the Nash game model. Our research results are as follows:(1) We obtain the optimal 5G communication fees in two periods and find out how they change with the proportion of consumers changing. (2) We figure out the profits of the supply chain in two periods and analyze them. We find that the communication operator earns more than the others most of the time. (3) We investigate how the proportion of strategic consumer impact on supply chain profits and conclude that the optimal price and demand in a period will decrease as the proportion of consumers who only purchase products in the other period increases.

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Rebate Decisions and Leadership Strategy in Competing Supply Chain with Heterogeneous Consumers

Mathematical Problems in Engineering ◽

10.1155/2018/2598415 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 2018 ◽

pp. 1-20

Author(s):

Ziling Wang ◽

Jackson Jinhong Mi ◽

Bin Liu

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Fixed Cost ◽

Nash Game ◽

Substitutable Products ◽

Leadership Strategy ◽

Horizontal Competition ◽

Prisoners Dilemma ◽

Heterogeneous Consumers ◽

The Impact

Rebate is a traditional type of promotion, and it can benefit manufacturers and retailers with expanded demands. However, the impact of leadership strategy in rebate competition on supply chain members and rebate decision is still somewhat unclear. Our paper focuses on a horizontal competition with respect to both rebate and leadership between two manufacturers selling substitutable products through a common retailer to consumers who are heterogeneous in their price sensitivity. Furthermore, we investigate the impacts of leadership strategy on profits and study rebate decision under different strategies. Our research indicates that Bertrand-Nash game benefits the retailer, but hurts manufacturers, while Stackelberg game benefits manufacturers but hurts the retailer, which shows no difference from previous studies. In addition, the sequential-move Stackelberg game could eliminate the classic prisoners’ dilemma in rebate decision, which is also influenced by fixed cost control.

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Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su13116425 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (11) ◽

pp. 6425

Author(s):

Quanxi Li ◽

Haowei Zhang ◽

Kailing Liu

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Closed Loop ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Recycling Rate ◽

Transfer Payment ◽

Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽

Asymmetry Of Information ◽

Optimal Decisions ◽

The Government ◽

The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

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Thin Business Networks and Supply-Chain Frictions: The Impact of a Mobile Phone Networking Application on Small Businesses in Tanzania

AEA Randomized Controlled Trials ◽

10.1257/rct.4430-1.0 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Jessica Rudder

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Mobile Phone ◽

Small Businesses ◽

Business Networks ◽

The Impact

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The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Returns Policies and Supply Chain Coordination

International Journal of Operations Research and Information Systems ◽

10.4018/ijoris.2018100101 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 9 (4) ◽

pp. 1-20 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Gulay Samatli-Pac ◽

Wenjing Shen ◽

Xinxin Hu

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Loss Aversion ◽

Supply Chain Coordination ◽

Expected Profit ◽

Lower Price ◽

Optimal Pricing ◽

Optimal Price ◽

Product Return ◽

Returns Policy ◽

The Impact

Product return is a common after-sale service. Existing literature has assumed loss neutral consumers, while in practice consumers are often more sensitive to utility losses than gains, i.e., customers are often loss averse. In this paper, we study the impact of such loss aversion on the retailer's optimal pricing and returns policies. We analyze three scenarios where the seller offers no refund, full refund and partial refund for the returned products. Under each scenario, the seller determines the optimal price, quantity, and refund amount (under partial refund case) in order to maximize the expected profit. Our results demonstrate that consumer loss aversion leads a no-refund retailer to charge lower price and order smaller quantity, has no impact on a full-refund retailer, and results in a more lenient returns policy for a partial-refund retailer. We also find contracts that coordinate supply chains selling to loss averse consumers. Therefore, this article sheds some lights on how the management of returns policies should be adapted when consumers are loss averse.

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Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

Mathematical Problems in Engineering ◽

10.1155/2016/6053510 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 2016 ◽

pp. 1-13 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Jie Gao ◽

Xiong Wang ◽

Qiuling Yang ◽

Qin Zhong

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Closed Loop ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Uncertain Demand ◽

Direct Channel ◽

Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽

Pricing Decisions ◽

Dual Channel ◽

Decentralized Decision Making ◽

The Impact

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.

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Study on Emission Reduction Strategies of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Green Finance

Frontiers in Environmental Science ◽

10.3389/fenvs.2021.687468 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 9 ◽

Author(s):

Cheng Che ◽

Yi Chen ◽

Xiaoguang Zhang ◽

Liangyan Zhao ◽

Peng Guo ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Emission Reduction ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Chain Model ◽

Carbon Trading ◽

Dual Channel ◽

Green Finance ◽

Emission Reduction Strategies ◽

Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽

The Impact

As a weapon for economic development, green finance plays an important supporting and promoting role in the economic recovery and transformation of enterprises in the post-epidemic era. By constructing a dual-channel supply chain model, this paper considers two situations in which manufacturers participate in carbon trading and green finance loans, and uses Stackelberg game to study the impact of different situations on participants’ profits and emission reduction decisions. The results show that: under the carbon trading mechanism, the carbon emission reduction level of the manufacturer is inversely proportional to the relevant price, and the demand and profit of the two channels increase with the increase in emission reduction; when carbon trading and green financial loans are carried out at the same time, participants have lower profits, but with the increase in emission reductions, it is still a growing trend.

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Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

Complexity ◽

10.1155/2019/1484372 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 2019 ◽

pp. 1-23 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Lufeng Dai ◽

Xifu Wang ◽

Xiaoguang Liu ◽

Lai Wei

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Pricing Strategy ◽

Pricing Strategies ◽

Equilibrium Solutions ◽

Channel Competition ◽

Dual Channel ◽

Fairness Concerns ◽

Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽

The Impact

Manufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordination. In contrast to previous research on pricing strategies based on the full rationality of members, we focus on the impact of retailers' fairness concerns on pricing strategies. In this study, the hybrid dual-channel supply chain consists of one manufacturer with a direct channel who acts as the leader and a retailer who acts as the follower. First, we use the Stackelberg game approach to determine the equilibrium pricing strategy for a fair caring retailer. Simultaneously, we consider a centralized dual-channel supply chain as the benchmark for a comparative analysis of the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we study pricing strategies when the retailer has fairness concerns and determine the complete equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the parameters representing cross-price sensitivity and fairness. Finally, through numerical experiments, the pricing strategies, the profit and utility of the manufacturer and retailer, and the channel efficiency of the supply chain are compared and analysed for two scenarios. We find that fairness concerns reduce the manufacturer's profits, while for the most part, the retailers’ profit can be improved; however, the supply chain cannot achieve complete coordination.

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Game-Theoretic Analysis of Pricing Models in a Dyadic Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns

International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences ◽

10.4018/ijsds.2019040101 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 10 (2) ◽

pp. 1-24 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Abhishek Sharma

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Channel Coordination ◽

Theoretic Analysis ◽

Nash Game ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

Pricing Decisions ◽

Fairness Concerns ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Fairness Concern

The existing studies on fairness in channel coordination assume markets as the group of oligopolies in which a few firms dominate, scant evidence has been provided where fairness concerns are investigated for a market scenario where all firms share equal dominance. This article considers a dyadic supply chain composed of one fair-minded manufacturer and one fair-minded retailer and investigate their pricing decisions under two different non-cooperative game-theoretic frameworks: manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and Vertical Nash game and provide a comparative analysis. The results show that the prices of the Stackelberg game model are always higher than that of the corresponding prices of the Vertical Nash game. We also find that the prices gap between the two models decreases with the retailer's fairness concern, and is uncertain with respect to manufacturer's fairness. In addition, the manufacturer's (retailer's) profit in the Stackelberg game is decreasing (increasing) in its own fairness and is uncertain in the Vertical Nash game. Furthermore, findings are illustrated through a numerical example.

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The Impact of Service and Channel Integration on the Stability and Complexity of the Supply Chain

Complexity ◽

10.1155/2020/8178947 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 2020 ◽

pp. 1-27 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Jianheng Zhou ◽

Xingli Chen

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Dynamic Models ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Profit Sharing ◽

System Stability ◽

Stable Region ◽

Channel Integration ◽

Profit Allocation ◽

The Stability ◽

The Impact

This paper constructs a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Considering channel integration and service cooperation, two dynamic Stackelberg game models are established: one without unit profit allocation M and the other one with unit profit allocation Mε. In two dynamic models, we analyze the influence of relevant parameters on the stability and complexity of the dynamic system and system profit by nonlinear system theory and numerical simulation. We find that the higher adjustment parameters can cause the system to lose stability, showing double period bifurcation or wave-shape chaos. The stable region becomes larger with increase in service value and value of unit profit sharing. Besides, when the system is in chaotic state, we find that the profit of the system will fluctuate or even decline sharply; however, keeping the parameters in a certain range is helpful in maintaining the system stability and is conducive to decision-makers to obtain steady profits. In order to control the chaos phenomenon, the state feedback method is employed to control the chaotic system well. This study provides some valuable significance to supply chain managers in channel integration and service cooperation.

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