DELEGATED MANAGEMENT IN DYNAMIC DUOPOLIES
Keyword(s):
This paper studies the commitment value of delegation in a model of dynamic competition. We argue that separating ownership and control delivers an instantaneous first-mover advantage. Thus, delegation would enable an oligopolistic firm to increase its equilibrium profit relative to direct management. We focus on remuneration strategies that provide managers with intertemporal production incentives: future wages depend on current effort. Their composition and functional form are endogenously determined by the requirement for Markov perfection. For the case of linear-quadratic payoffs, we obtain a closed-form solution for the equilibrium wage strategies which is independent of industry structure.
2010 ◽
Vol 100
(5)
◽
pp. 2548-2564
◽
2001 ◽
Vol 31
(2)
◽
pp. 235-259
◽
Keyword(s):
2017 ◽
Vol 40
(2)
◽
pp. 477-483
◽
2013 ◽
Vol 457-458
◽
pp. 350-353
Keyword(s):
1990 ◽
Vol 65
(1)
◽
pp. 139-147
◽
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):