scholarly journals BRIBE AND PUNISHMENT: EFFECTS OF SIGNALING, GOSSIPING, AND BRIBERY IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (06) ◽  
pp. 755-771 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. L. C. BAZZAN ◽  
SÍLVIO R. DAHMEN
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Social Mechanisms ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Social Attachments

In public goods games, individuals contribute to create a benefit for a group. However this attracts free-riders, who enjoy the benefits without necessarily contributing. Nonetheless, in real-life scenarios cooperation does not collapse. Several explanations have been proposed in order to explain this phenomenon, such as punishment and signaling. In the present work, we investigate the effects of new elements associated with punishment upon signaling such as gossiping and bribery. Agents may denounce free-riders (who on their turn get punished) or may be bribed to remain silent and even spread rumors of false good behavior. Having a model with richer social mechanisms enable us to test how cooperation develops in situations in which players have social attachments. Our results show that when punishment and bribery are present, the levels of contribution are kept at a relatively higher value compared to the situation when no punishment is exercised. As to what regards gossiping, if the number of free-riders is high, finding mechanisms to prevent gossiping could be an important step in order to increase the contribution. If the ratio between free-riders and other agents is about one, then gossiping does affect contribution in a positive way.

Gossip and Reputation in Social Dilemmas

2019 ◽  
pp. 192-213
Author(s):  
Manfred Milinski
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Interaction Partner ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
The Individual

In a social dilemma the interest of the individual is in conflict with that of the group. However, individuals will help their group, if they gain in reputation that pays off later. Future partners can observe cooperative or defective behavior or, more likely, hear about it through gossip. In Indirect Reciprocity games, Public Goods games, and Trust games gossip may be the only information a participant can use to decide whether she can trust her interaction partner and give away her holdings hoping for reciprocation. Even the mere potential for gossip can increase trust and trustworthiness thus promoting cooperation. Gossip is a cheap mechanism for disciplining free riders, potentially even extortioners. The temptation for manipulative gossip defines the gossiper’s dilemma. Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity help to avoid being manipulated. The danger of false gossip is reduced when multiple gossips exist.

Responsibility to Punish: Discouraging Free-Riders in Public Goods Games

2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zack Devlin-Foltz ◽  
Katherine Lim
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games

scholarly journals Group Formation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: a Survey and Meta-Analytic Evidence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Guido ◽  
Andrea Robbett ◽  
Rustam Romaniuc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Group Formation ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Sorting Method ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Highly Sensitive ◽  
Social Dilemma Games

We survey the growing literature on group formation in the context of three types of social dilemma games: public goods games, common pool resources, and the prisoner’s dilemma. The 62 surveyed papers study the effect of different sorting mechanisms – endogenous, endogenous with the option to play the game, and exogenous – on cooperation rates. Our survey shows that cooperators are highly sensitive to the presence of free-riders, independently of the sorting mechanism. We complement the survey with a meta-analysis showing no difference in terms of cooperation between studies implementing an endogenous and exogenous sorting. What is more, we find that it is no more likely for a cooperator to be matched with like-minded partners in endogenously formed groups than in exogenously formed groups. These observations are related. As we show in the survey, the success of a sorting method in matching like-minded individuals and the levels of cooperation are closely interlinked.

Individuele verschillen in sociale dilemma’s : Het effect van vertrouwen op straffen in een publiekgoedspel

2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-53
Author(s):  
Esmee Bosma ◽  
Vincent Buskens
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Individual Characteristics ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Multilevel Regression ◽  
Public Goods Games

Summary Individual differences in social dilemmas: the effect of trust on costly punishment in a public goods gameThe establishment of cooperation in public goods dilemmas is important to real life problems such as improving the environment. Cooperation is facilitated when people are able to punish uncooperative behavior. Individual characteristics of persons, however, can affect cooperation and punishment behaviour. This study focuses on individual differences in trust and investigates the effect of trust on cooperation and punishment behaviour in a linear public goods game with peer punishment opportunities. The research question is: ‘What is the effect of individual differences in trust on cooperation and on the likelihood of punishing non-cooperative behaviour of fellow players in public goods games with punishing possibilities?’ Experimental data of 148 participants is used to research their cooperation and punishment behaviour. Multilevel regression is used to analyse the data. The results demonstrate a positive effect of trust on cooperation. We do not find an effect of trust on punishment. Further suggestions are provided for future research on how individual motivations still might affect behaviour in a social dilemma with punishment opportunities.

scholarly journals Persistence of cooperation in diffusive public goods games

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Gerlee ◽  
Philipp M. Altrock
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Spectral Decomposition ◽  
Cost Ratio ◽  
Physical Parameters ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Limited Dispersal ◽  
Size Correction ◽  
Finite Cell

Diffusive public goods (PG) games are difficult to analyze due to population assortment affecting growth rates of cooperators (producers) and free-riders. We study these growth rates using spectral decomposition of cellular densities, and derive a finite cell-size correction of the growth rate advantage, which exactly describes the dynamics of a randomly assorted population, and approximates the dynamics under limited dispersal. The resulting effective benefit to cost ratio relates the physical parameters of PG dynamics to the persistence of cooperation, and our findings provide a powerful tool for the analysis of diffusive PG games, explaining commonly observed patterns of cooperation.

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