Individuele verschillen in sociale dilemma’s : Het effect van vertrouwen op straffen in een publiekgoedspel

2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-53
Author(s):  
Esmee Bosma ◽  
Vincent Buskens
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Individual Characteristics ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Multilevel Regression ◽  
Public Goods Games

Summary Individual differences in social dilemmas: the effect of trust on costly punishment in a public goods gameThe establishment of cooperation in public goods dilemmas is important to real life problems such as improving the environment. Cooperation is facilitated when people are able to punish uncooperative behavior. Individual characteristics of persons, however, can affect cooperation and punishment behaviour. This study focuses on individual differences in trust and investigates the effect of trust on cooperation and punishment behaviour in a linear public goods game with peer punishment opportunities. The research question is: ‘What is the effect of individual differences in trust on cooperation and on the likelihood of punishing non-cooperative behaviour of fellow players in public goods games with punishing possibilities?’ Experimental data of 148 participants is used to research their cooperation and punishment behaviour. Multilevel regression is used to analyse the data. The results demonstrate a positive effect of trust on cooperation. We do not find an effect of trust on punishment. Further suggestions are provided for future research on how individual motivations still might affect behaviour in a social dilemma with punishment opportunities.

Personality, Punishment and Public Goods: Strategic Shifts towards Cooperation as a Matter of Dispositional Honesty–Humility

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin E. Hilbig ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Timo Heydasch
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Longitudinal Design ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Openness To Experience ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders

Contributions in the public goods game—a classical social dilemma situation—have been shown to depend strongly on the presence versus absence of punishment or sanctions for free riders. Also, there appear to be noteworthy individual differences in the degree to which decision makers cooperate. Herein, we aimed to bring these two lines of research together. Firstly, we predicted that both presence of punishment and high dispositional Honesty–Humility (as conceptualized in the Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to experience model of personality) should yield higher contributions. Secondly, and more importantly, we expected an interaction, such that only those low in Honesty–Humility would condition their behaviour on the presence versus absence of punishment, thus employing cooperation strategically. In line with the hypothesis, the results of two experiments (one of which comprised a longitudinal design) corroborated that the degree to which decision makers shift towards higher contributions when punishment is introduced depends on their dispositional level of Honesty–Humility. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Group preferential selection promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (11) ◽  
pp. 1450062 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong-Bin Zhang ◽  
Hong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Role Model ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Learning Mechanism ◽  
Preferential Selection ◽  
Cooperative Evolution ◽  
Public Goods Games

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the co-player learning mechanism based on the preferential selection that are brought about by wealthy information of groups where participants collect and search for potential imitators from those groups. We find that co-player learning mechanism based on the choice of weighted group can lead to the promotion of public cooperation by means of the information of wealthy groups that is obtained by participants, and after that the partial choice of public goods groups is enhanced with the tunable preferential parameter. Our results highlight that the learning interactions is not solely confined to the restricted connection among players, but co-players of wealthy groups have the opportunity to be as a role model in the promotion of cooperative evolution. Moreover, we also find the size of learning affects the choice of distant players, cooperators (defectors) having more paths to exploit the phalanx of opponents to survive when the value of preferential parameter is small. Besides, the extinction thresholds of cooperators and defectors for different values of noise are also investigated.

REDUCED ENTANGLEMENT FOR QUANTUM GAMES

2003 ◽  
Vol 01 (03) ◽  
pp. 321-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
LI ZHANG ◽  
TAD HOGG
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Entangled States ◽  
Improve Performance ◽  
Quantum Games ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Social Dilemma Games ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium

Quantum generalizations of conventional games exploit entangled states to improve performance. With many players, quantum games can require entangling many states. Such entanglement is difficult to implement, especially if the states must be communicated over some distance. To simplify possible implementations, we examine some quantum versions of social dilemma games and show their use of entanglement can be substantially reduced by randomly replacing some of the entangled states by unentangled ones. For the example of public goods games, we identify a unique Nash equilibrium invariant with respect to the amount of this replacement. We also show players obtain no advantage from adding more entanglement to states which they control. With many players, a fairly small number of entangled states can give nearly as good performance as using the full number of such states.

scholarly journals Measuring individual differences in cognitive biases: The Cognitive Bias Inventory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent Berthet ◽  
Vincent de Gardelle
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Bias ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Temporal Stability ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Personality Factors ◽  
Wrong Answer ◽  
Outcome Bias

This article described the behavioral measurement of six classic cognitive biases (framing, availability, anchoring, overconfidence, hindsight/outcome bias, confirmation bias). Each measure showed a satisfactory level of reliability with regard both to internal consistency (mean Cronbach’s alpha = .77) and temporal stability (mean test-retest correlation = .71). Multivariate analysis supported the hypothesis that each cognitive bias captures specific decision-making processes as the six biases: (a) were virtually uncorrelated (mean correlation = .08), thus indicating no general decision-making competence factor, (b) were moderately correlated with other relevant constructs (the A-DMC components, cognitive ability, decision-making styles, and personality factors), (c) were more related to performance on a narrow domain of decision-making (the ability to overcome an intuitive wrong answer as measured by the CRT) than to the general success in real-life decision-making as measured by the Decision Outcomes Inventory (DOI). We introduce this set of behavioral tasks as the Cognitive Bias Inventory (CBI), a psychometric tool allowing for the reliable assessment of individual differences in six common, independent cognitive shortcuts. The CBI appears as a useful tool for future research on decision-making competence and how it relates to decision errors.

scholarly journals Asymmetric effects of social and economic incentives on cooperation in real effort based public goods games

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. e0249217
Author(s):  
Jakob Hackel ◽  
Hitoshi Yamamoto ◽  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Akira Goto ◽  
Alfred Taudes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Asymmetric Effect ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Ample Evidence ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Social Incentives ◽  
Economic Decision Making ◽  
Real Effort

Many practitioners as well as researchers explore promoting environmentally conscious behavior in the context of public goods systems. Numerous experimental studies revealed various types of incentives to increase cooperation on public goods. There is ample evidence that monetary and non-monetary incentives, such as donations, have a positive effect on cooperation in public goods games that exceeds fully rational and optimal economic decision making. Despite an accumulation of these studies, in the typical setting of these experiments participants decide on an allocation of resources to a public pool, but they never exert actual effort. However, in reality, we often observe that players’ real effort is required in these public goods game situations. Therefore, more analysis is needed to draw conclusions for a wider set of incentive possibilities in situations similar to yet deviating from resource allocation games. Here we construct a real effort public goods game in an online experiment and statistically analyze the effect different types of incentives have on cooperation. In our experiment, we examine combinations of monetary and social incentives in a setting aimed closer to practical realities, such as financial costs and real effort forming part of the decision to cooperate on a public good. In our real effort public goods game participants cooperate and defect on image-scoring tasks. We find that in our setting economic and social incentives produce an asymmetric effect. Interestingly economic incentives decreased the share of highly uncooperative participants, while social incentives raised the share of highly cooperative participants.

Gossip and Reputation in Social Dilemmas

2019 ◽  
pp. 192-213
Author(s):  
Manfred Milinski
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Interaction Partner ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
The Individual

In a social dilemma the interest of the individual is in conflict with that of the group. However, individuals will help their group, if they gain in reputation that pays off later. Future partners can observe cooperative or defective behavior or, more likely, hear about it through gossip. In Indirect Reciprocity games, Public Goods games, and Trust games gossip may be the only information a participant can use to decide whether she can trust her interaction partner and give away her holdings hoping for reciprocation. Even the mere potential for gossip can increase trust and trustworthiness thus promoting cooperation. Gossip is a cheap mechanism for disciplining free riders, potentially even extortioners. The temptation for manipulative gossip defines the gossiper’s dilemma. Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity help to avoid being manipulated. The danger of false gossip is reduced when multiple gossips exist.

Personality traits and personal values of servant leaders

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-192
Author(s):  
Peter Sun ◽  
Sudong Shang
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Servant Leadership ◽  
Personality Traits ◽  
Leadership Behaviors ◽  
Personal Values ◽  
Individual Characteristics ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Servant Leaders ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Direct Reports

Purpose Servant leaders focus on their direct reports to enable them to grow to be independent and autonomous leaders. The purpose of this paper is to understand the way personal values and personality traits collectively influence this other-centered behavior. This will go a long way to unravel this unique style of leadership. Design/methodology/approach The study surveys managers and their direct reports. Leaders rated their personality trait and personal values, while their direct reports rated the leader’s servant leadership behaviors. Age, educational level, conscientiousness, extraversion and neuroticism of leaders were used as controls. The study also checked for endogeneity threats. Findings Using a sample of 81 leaders and 279 of their direct reports, the study finds that the personal value of benevolent dependability relates negatively to servant leadership behaviors. In addition, the personality traits of agreeableness and openness/intellect moderate the relationship between benevolent dependability and servant leadership behaviors. Research limitations/implications The findings shed important insights into what motivates servant leaders to engage in other-directed behaviors, thereby enabling future research into individual characteristics that define servant leaders. Originality/value Although studies have examined how values and personality traits influence leadership behaviors, no research has examined both types of individual differences in a single study. Studies examining the individual differences of servant leaders are few, and this study answers the call by Liden et al. (2014) to examine individual characteristics that are both personality based (traits) and malleable (values).

Ideology and social cognition

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-25
Author(s):  
Jordan Mansell
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Cognition ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Social Behaviors ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Cognitive Characteristics ◽  
The Social ◽  
Group Members

AbstractResearch links liberal and conservative ideological orientations with variation on psychological and cognitive characteristics that are important for perceptual processes and decision-making. This study investigates whether this variation can impact the social behaviors of liberals and conservatives. A sample of subjects (n = 1,245) participated in a modified public goods game in which an intragroup inequality was introduced to observe the effect on individuals’ tendency toward self-interested versus prosocial behavior. Overall, the contributions of neither liberal- nor conservative-oriented individuals were affected by conditions of a general intragroup inequality. However, in response to the knowledge that group members voted to redress the inequality, levels of contribution among liberals significantly increased in comparison to the control. This was not true for conservatives. The results provide evidence that differences in ideological orientation are associated with individual differences in social cognition.

scholarly journals BRIBE AND PUNISHMENT: EFFECTS OF SIGNALING, GOSSIPING, AND BRIBERY IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (06) ◽  
pp. 755-771 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. L. C. BAZZAN ◽  
SÍLVIO R. DAHMEN
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Social Mechanisms ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Social Attachments

In public goods games, individuals contribute to create a benefit for a group. However this attracts free-riders, who enjoy the benefits without necessarily contributing. Nonetheless, in real-life scenarios cooperation does not collapse. Several explanations have been proposed in order to explain this phenomenon, such as punishment and signaling. In the present work, we investigate the effects of new elements associated with punishment upon signaling such as gossiping and bribery. Agents may denounce free-riders (who on their turn get punished) or may be bribed to remain silent and even spread rumors of false good behavior. Having a model with richer social mechanisms enable us to test how cooperation develops in situations in which players have social attachments. Our results show that when punishment and bribery are present, the levels of contribution are kept at a relatively higher value compared to the situation when no punishment is exercised. As to what regards gossiping, if the number of free-riders is high, finding mechanisms to prevent gossiping could be an important step in order to increase the contribution. If the ratio between free-riders and other agents is about one, then gossiping does affect contribution in a positive way.

scholarly journals Hunger affects social decisions in a multi-round Public Goods Game but not a single-shot Ultimatum Game

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Fraser ◽  
Daniel Nettle
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Experimental Tests ◽  
Single Shot ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Social Decisions ◽  
Group Members

Objective. People have the intuition that hunger undermines social cooperation, but experimental tests of this have often produced null results. One possible explanation is that the experimental tasks used are not rich enough to capture the diverse pathways by which social cooperation can be sustained or break down in real life. We studied the effects of hunger on cooperation in two tasks of differential interaction richness. Methods. We manipulated hunger by asking participants to eat, or refrain from eating, breakfast. Participants in experiment 1 (n = 106) played a one-shot Ultimatum Game. Participants in experiment 2 (n = 264) played twenty rounds of a Public Goods Game in the same groups of four, ten rounds with the possibility of punishing other group members, and ten without. Results. In experiment 1, skipping breakfast had no significant effects on either amounts proposed or minimum acceptable offers. In experiment 2, there were multiple different significant effects of the manipulation. No-breakfast participants were more generous in the first round of the game without punishment, and in subsequent rounds, were more influenced by what other group members had done the round before. In the punishment game, no-breakfast participants were also less likely to punish their group-mates than breakfast participants. Consequently, the possibility of punishment was less effective in increasing group cooperation levels in no-breakfast groups. Conclusion. Replicating earlier findings, we found a null effect of hunger on cooperation in a one-shot Ultimatum Game. However, in our richer Public Goods Game, the dynamics of cooperation differed with hunger, in subtle ways not simply classifiable as hungry participants being ‘more’ or ‘less’ cooperative overall.

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