scholarly journals Group Formation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: a Survey and Meta-Analytic Evidence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Guido ◽  
Andrea Robbett ◽  
Rustam Romaniuc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Group Formation ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Sorting Method ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Highly Sensitive ◽  
Social Dilemma Games

We survey the growing literature on group formation in the context of three types of social dilemma games: public goods games, common pool resources, and the prisoner’s dilemma. The 62 surveyed papers study the effect of different sorting mechanisms – endogenous, endogenous with the option to play the game, and exogenous – on cooperation rates. Our survey shows that cooperators are highly sensitive to the presence of free-riders, independently of the sorting mechanism. We complement the survey with a meta-analysis showing no difference in terms of cooperation between studies implementing an endogenous and exogenous sorting. What is more, we find that it is no more likely for a cooperator to be matched with like-minded partners in endogenously formed groups than in exogenously formed groups. These observations are related. As we show in the survey, the success of a sorting method in matching like-minded individuals and the levels of cooperation are closely interlinked.

REDUCED ENTANGLEMENT FOR QUANTUM GAMES

2003 ◽  
Vol 01 (03) ◽  
pp. 321-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
LI ZHANG ◽  
TAD HOGG
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Entangled States ◽  
Improve Performance ◽  
Quantum Games ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Social Dilemma Games ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium

Quantum generalizations of conventional games exploit entangled states to improve performance. With many players, quantum games can require entangling many states. Such entanglement is difficult to implement, especially if the states must be communicated over some distance. To simplify possible implementations, we examine some quantum versions of social dilemma games and show their use of entanglement can be substantially reduced by randomly replacing some of the entangled states by unentangled ones. For the example of public goods games, we identify a unique Nash equilibrium invariant with respect to the amount of this replacement. We also show players obtain no advantage from adding more entanglement to states which they control. With many players, a fairly small number of entangled states can give nearly as good performance as using the full number of such states.

Gossip and Reputation in Social Dilemmas

2019 ◽  
pp. 192-213
Author(s):  
Manfred Milinski
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Interaction Partner ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
The Individual

In a social dilemma the interest of the individual is in conflict with that of the group. However, individuals will help their group, if they gain in reputation that pays off later. Future partners can observe cooperative or defective behavior or, more likely, hear about it through gossip. In Indirect Reciprocity games, Public Goods games, and Trust games gossip may be the only information a participant can use to decide whether she can trust her interaction partner and give away her holdings hoping for reciprocation. Even the mere potential for gossip can increase trust and trustworthiness thus promoting cooperation. Gossip is a cheap mechanism for disciplining free riders, potentially even extortioners. The temptation for manipulative gossip defines the gossiper’s dilemma. Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity help to avoid being manipulated. The danger of false gossip is reduced when multiple gossips exist.

scholarly journals Acute hunger does not always undermine prosociality

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan A. Häusser ◽  
Christina Stahlecker ◽  
Andreas Mojzisch ◽  
Johannes Leder ◽  
Paul A. M. Van Lange ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Blood Glucose ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Lay Theories ◽  
Total N ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Decrease Blood Glucose ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
Stark Contrast

Abstract It has been argued that, when they are acutely hungry, people act in self-protective ways by keeping resources to themselves rather than sharing them. In four studies, using experimental, quasi-experimental, and correlational designs (total N = 795), we examine the effects of acute hunger on prosociality in a wide variety of non-interdependent tasks (e.g. dictator game) and interdependent tasks (e.g. public goods games). While our procedures successfully increase subjective hunger and decrease blood glucose, we do not find significant effects of hunger on prosociality. This is true for both decisions incentivized with money and with food. Meta-analysis across all tasks reveals a very small effect of hunger on prosociality in non-interdependent tasks (d = 0.108), and a non-significant effect in interdependent tasks (d = −0.076). In study five (N = 197), we show that, in stark contrast to our empirical findings, people hold strong lay theories that hunger undermines prosociality.

Responsibility to Punish: Discouraging Free-Riders in Public Goods Games

2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zack Devlin-Foltz ◽  
Katherine Lim
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games

scholarly journals BRIBE AND PUNISHMENT: EFFECTS OF SIGNALING, GOSSIPING, AND BRIBERY IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (06) ◽  
pp. 755-771 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. L. C. BAZZAN ◽  
SÍLVIO R. DAHMEN
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Social Mechanisms ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Social Attachments

In public goods games, individuals contribute to create a benefit for a group. However this attracts free-riders, who enjoy the benefits without necessarily contributing. Nonetheless, in real-life scenarios cooperation does not collapse. Several explanations have been proposed in order to explain this phenomenon, such as punishment and signaling. In the present work, we investigate the effects of new elements associated with punishment upon signaling such as gossiping and bribery. Agents may denounce free-riders (who on their turn get punished) or may be bribed to remain silent and even spread rumors of false good behavior. Having a model with richer social mechanisms enable us to test how cooperation develops in situations in which players have social attachments. Our results show that when punishment and bribery are present, the levels of contribution are kept at a relatively higher value compared to the situation when no punishment is exercised. As to what regards gossiping, if the number of free-riders is high, finding mechanisms to prevent gossiping could be an important step in order to increase the contribution. If the ratio between free-riders and other agents is about one, then gossiping does affect contribution in a positive way.

Personality, Punishment and Public Goods: Strategic Shifts towards Cooperation as a Matter of Dispositional Honesty–Humility

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin E. Hilbig ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Timo Heydasch
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Longitudinal Design ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Openness To Experience ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders

Contributions in the public goods game—a classical social dilemma situation—have been shown to depend strongly on the presence versus absence of punishment or sanctions for free riders. Also, there appear to be noteworthy individual differences in the degree to which decision makers cooperate. Herein, we aimed to bring these two lines of research together. Firstly, we predicted that both presence of punishment and high dispositional Honesty–Humility (as conceptualized in the Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to experience model of personality) should yield higher contributions. Secondly, and more importantly, we expected an interaction, such that only those low in Honesty–Humility would condition their behaviour on the presence versus absence of punishment, thus employing cooperation strategically. In line with the hypothesis, the results of two experiments (one of which comprised a longitudinal design) corroborated that the degree to which decision makers shift towards higher contributions when punishment is introduced depends on their dispositional level of Honesty–Humility. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The persistence and transition of multiple public goods games resolves the social dilemma

2022 ◽  
Vol 418 ◽  
pp. 126858
Author(s):  
Jialu He ◽  
Jianwei Wang ◽  
Fengyuan Yu ◽  
Wei Chen ◽  
Wenshu Xu
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
The Social

Individuele verschillen in sociale dilemma’s : Het effect van vertrouwen op straffen in een publiekgoedspel

2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-53
Author(s):  
Esmee Bosma ◽  
Vincent Buskens
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Individual Characteristics ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Multilevel Regression ◽  
Public Goods Games

Summary Individual differences in social dilemmas: the effect of trust on costly punishment in a public goods gameThe establishment of cooperation in public goods dilemmas is important to real life problems such as improving the environment. Cooperation is facilitated when people are able to punish uncooperative behavior. Individual characteristics of persons, however, can affect cooperation and punishment behaviour. This study focuses on individual differences in trust and investigates the effect of trust on cooperation and punishment behaviour in a linear public goods game with peer punishment opportunities. The research question is: ‘What is the effect of individual differences in trust on cooperation and on the likelihood of punishing non-cooperative behaviour of fellow players in public goods games with punishing possibilities?’ Experimental data of 148 participants is used to research their cooperation and punishment behaviour. Multilevel regression is used to analyse the data. The results demonstrate a positive effect of trust on cooperation. We do not find an effect of trust on punishment. Further suggestions are provided for future research on how individual motivations still might affect behaviour in a social dilemma with punishment opportunities.

Behavioral Aspects of the International Law of Global Public Goods and Common Pool Resources

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne van Aaken
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
International Law ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Global Public Goods ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Collective Action Problems

AbstractCollective action problems with public good characteristics such as climate change have important implications for international law. This note argues that behavioral insights from laboratory experiments, in which individuals engage in public goods games, can contribute to our understanding of how best to optimize the design of international legal regimes dealing with global public goods and common pool resources. Behavioral economics, to the extent it supplements or displaces rational-choice models in institutional design, may enable deeper and more sustained forms of international cooperation.

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