China’s Favored Muslims? The Complex Relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Hui Ethnic Group

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-448
Author(s):  
Erik Durneika
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Model Minority ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
Fair Treatment ◽  
Business Transactions ◽  
Muslim Countries ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

The People’s Republic of China remains a multinational unitary state, where the prc Constitution expressly guarantees freedom of religion and fair treatment of ethnic minorities. The Chinese Communist Party (ccp) retains ultimate authority regarding internal and external affairs, including the selective enforcement of constitutional rights. Various ethnic groups, such as the Turkic Uighurs, have long been perceived as rebellious, while the Muslim Hui have often been treated favorably, with laxer enforcement of laws and more religious autonomy. Many attribute this “model minority” perception of the Hui to cultural similarities shared with the Han. Although the ccp continues to allow religious freedoms to the Hui, the trajectory of persecution has slightly increased due to threats of global Islamist insurgencies. Leadership under President Xi Jinping seeks to maintain its power by combating “foreign infiltration” of Islam. Party officials allow Hui to interact with Muslim countries internationally under one circumstance—beneficial business transactions.

scholarly journals Challenges against Xi Jinping: an ASEAN Perspective

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Abdullah Dahana ◽  
Kelly Rosalin
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Deng Xiaoping ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Power Struggle ◽  
Leadership Change ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
General Secretary

Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping in 1997, factionalism and power struggle as the characteristic of leadership change in China has ended. Although factionalism still exists, it has been converted to collaboration among all factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The election of Xi Jinping to the presidency of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and to the position as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is therefore, as the result of cooperation among factions. This paper discusses various challenges, including nationalism as the most serious issue faced by Xi Jinping as a leader elected through compromise.

The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan

1987 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 256-275
Author(s):  
Jon W. Huebner
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The United States ◽  
People’S Republic Of China ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Final Phase ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

On 1 October 1949 the People's Republic of China was formally established in Beijing. On 7 December Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), who had earlier moved to Taiwan to secure a final base of resistance in the civil war, ordered the Kuomintang (KMT) regime to withdraw to the island from Chengdu, Sichuan, its last seat on the mainland. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared its commitment to the goal of unifying the nation under the People's Republic, and thus called for the “liberation” of Taiwan. Although Taiwan represented the final phase of the still unfinished civil war, it was the strategic significance of the island that became of paramount concern to the CCP, the KMT and the United States.

Mao, Tibet, and the Korean War

2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael M. Sheng
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Korean War ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Chinese Leader ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Korean War ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

In October 1950 the Chinese leader Mao Zedong embarked on a two-front war. He sent troops to Korea and invaded Tibet at a time when the People's Republic of China was burdened with many domestic problems. The logic behind Mao's risky policy has baffled historians ever since. By drawing on newly available Chinese and Western documents and memoirs, this article explains what happened in October 1950 and why Mao acted as he did. The release of key documents such as telegrams between Mao and his subordinates enables scholars to understand Chinese policymaking vis-à-vis Tibet much more fully than in the past. The article shows that Mao skillfully used the conflicts for his own purposes and consolidated his hold over the Chinese Communist Party.

Reconstructing China: Japanese technicians and industrialization in the early years of the People's Republic of China

2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
AMY KING
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
New Technology ◽  
Early Years ◽  
People’S Republic Of China ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
Continuity And Change ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Foreign Ministry

AbstractThe Chinese Communist Party was confronted with the pressing challenge of ‘reconstructing’ China's industrial economy when it came to power in 1949. Drawing on recently declassified Chinese Foreign Ministry archives, this article argues that the Party met this challenge by drawing on the expertise of Japanese technicians left behind in Northeast China at the end of the Second World War. Between 1949 and 1953, when they were eventually repatriated, thousands of Japanese technicians were used by the Chinese Communist Party to develop new technology and industrial techniques, train less skilled Chinese workers, and rebuild factories, mines, railways, and other industrial sites in the Northeast. These first four years of the People's Republic of China represent an important moment of both continuity and change in China's history. Like the Chinese Nationalist government before them, the Chinese Communist Party continued to draw on the technological and industrial legacy of the Japanese empire in Asia to rebuild China's war-torn economy. But this four-year period was also a moment of profound change. As the Cold War erupted in Asia, the Chinese Communist Party began a long-term reconceptualization of how national power was intimately connected to technology and industrial capability, and viewed Japanese technicians as a vital element in the transformation of China into a modern and powerful nation.

Party Congress will set China's course to 2022

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
100Th Anniversary ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sixth Generation ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Party Congress

Subject China's 19th Communist Party Congress. Significance Preparations are underway for the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which is likely to be scheduled for October or November. Much political groundwork has been laid in support of President Xi Jinping and for progress on his vision for China. The Congress will set a direction towards the 100th anniversary in 2021 of the founding of the Party and the handover of power to a sixth generation of leaders shortly after. Impacts Beijing will probably be cautious in its foreign policy during the months running up to the Congress. Consolidating his position at the Congress should increase Xi's ability to press his economically reformist, politically illiberal agenda. Bar any serious reversal, Xi will be in a position to dominate Chinese politics after he retires from formal offices.

The Civil Governance of Death: The Making of Chinese Political Subjects at the End of Life

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Huwy-Min Lucia Liu
Keyword(s):  
End Of Life ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The State ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
Funerary Rituals ◽  
Chinese State ◽  
The Dead ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Party State

This article discusses how the Chinese Communist Party governed death in Shanghai during the first half of the People's Republic of China. It examines how officials nationalized funeral institutions, promoted cremation, and transformed what they believed to be the unproductivity of the funeral industry into productivity (by raising pigs in cemeteries, for instance). I show how each of these policies eliminated possible sources of identity that were prevalent in conceptualizing who the dead were and what their relationships with the living could be. Specifically, in addition to the construction of socialist workers, the state worked to remove cosmopolitan, associational, religious, and relational ideas of self. By modifying funerary rituals and ways of interment, the Chinese state aimed to produce individualized and undifferentiated political subjects directly tied to the party-state. The civil governance of death aimed to produce citizen-subjects at the end of life.

scholarly journals The Strength of a Weak Organization: The Communist Youth League as a Path to Power in Post-Mao China

2019 ◽  
Vol 243 ◽  
pp. 780-800
Author(s):  
Jérôme Doyon
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Communist Youth League ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Leading Cadres

AbstractHow can a weak organization be a path to power? The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) lacks autonomy and coherence yet it is seen as the cradle for one of the main factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To understand this tension, I provide a novel account of the role played by the CYL in the recruitment of leading cadres since the 1980s. Against explanations based on factional struggles, I argue that the rise of CYL-affiliated cadres is a by-product of the organization's weakness. As the Party appoints CYL heads, CCP leaders, at various levels and at different points in time, have used the League to accelerate the promotion of their protégés. For years, there has been little incentive for Party bosses to dismantle this promotion path. However, in his bid to consolidate his power, Xi Jinping has weakened this channel so that it may not be used by potential rivals.

scholarly journals Chinese Football in the Era of Xi Jinping: What do Supporters Think?

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilker Gündoğan ◽  
Albrecht Sonntag
Keyword(s):  
Development Strategy ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Stakeholder Group ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Chinese Dream ◽  
General Secretary

Football has become a field of high priority for development by the central government of the People's Republic of China. After Xi Jinping took office as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, a football development strategy was launched, including four “comprehensive” reforms. The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of these reforms by Chinese football supporters – a fundamental stakeholder group – through an online survey. Particular emphasis was laid on how nationalistic attitudes underpin supporters' expectations, especially with regard to the concept of the “Chinese Dream.” In addition, issues of football governance were also addressed.

Rebuilding the Leninist Party Rule: Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping's Stewardship

2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (01) ◽  
pp. 5-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
State Administration ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

In 2015, Xi Jinping tried to restore many Leninist features to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He took measures to rebuild the ideological faith, entrench Party organisations with state administration and run the CCP as a meritocracy. “Party groups” (dangzu) are extended to non-governmental, non-profit and other societal organisations. He insisted that party members must observe both formal disciplines and informal norms of the Party, and show loyalty to the leadership.

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