MONEY DOES GROW ON TREES: IMPACTS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON THE NEW ZEALAND ECONOMY

2018 ◽  
Vol 09 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850005 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARIO A. FERNANDEZ ◽  
ADAM J. DAIGNEAULT

The Paris Agreement (PA) asserts that emissions pathways of greenhouse gases (GHG) should be consistent with holding the increase in global temperature below 1.5[Formula: see text]C or 2[Formula: see text]C above pre-industrial levels. New Zealand (NZ) committed to reduce emissions to 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. The purpose of this paper is to assess the range of economic costs for NZ derived from the commitment under the PA, conditional to the mitigation potential of forestry carbon sequestration (FCS), pricing agricultural emissions, and linking the NZ emissions tradable scheme (NZ ETS) to the European Union ETS (EU ETS). We use a general equilibrium model and “soft-link” it with the global timber model. We found that NZ can meet the PA terms; however, important GDP decreases may arise due to limited domestic mitigation potential from the energy and transport sectors. FCS plays a significant role in mitigating the negative impacts, where the benefits of FCS outweigh those of pricing agricultural emission and linking the NZ ETS.

Author(s):  
Ilaria Perissi ◽  
Falsini Sara ◽  
Ugo Bardi ◽  
Davide Natalini ◽  
Michael Green ◽  
...  

The Global Carbon Budget is the cumulative carbon emissions that human activities can generate while limiting the global temperature increase to less than 2°C. On this basis, most countries ratified the Paris Agreement 2015, pledging to reduce national emissions and the impacts of climate change. The European Union has planned to reduce emissions by 80% of their 1990 value by 2050 but such a target needs to be coupled with a further constraint on the cumulative greenhouse gases released along the path to 2050. The aim and the novelty of this study are to propose, for the first time, a carbon budget for the European Union, which represents the most significant physical characteristic to assess the feasibility of current EU-28 greenhouse gas reduction objectives under the goals of the 2015 Paris treaty


2004 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 183-195
Author(s):  
Andreas P. Kyriacou

Abstract The enlargement of the European Union generates socio-economic costs and benefits for the citizens of new members and as such it is bound to affect their perceived legitimacy of the whole enterprise. The legitimacy of EU accession is likely to be enhanced by the inclusion of compensatory transfers and transition periods in the terms of accession, by the perception that EU membership represents the most favorable terms of exchange available and by the linking of accession to a sustained period of economic growth, a favorable movement in prices, improving relative incomes and the consolidation of a level playing field across new members.


Climate Law ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 182-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjan Peeters

The European Union is the only party to the unfccc that is a regional organization. The European Union’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, submitted on behalf of itself and its member states, contains a pledge to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40 per cent by 2030 compared with 1990 levels, in pursuit of the general objective to keep the global average temperature increase below 2°C. Given, however, that the Paris Agreement aims not only to hold the increase ‘well below’ 2°C, but also to ‘pursue efforts’ to limit the increase to 1.5°C, one wonders whether the outcome of cop 21 may lead the European Union to a reconsideration—with possibly a strengthening—of the mitigation effort proposed in its indc.


2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 1071-1096 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Hovi ◽  
Detlef F. Sprinz ◽  
Håkon Sælen ◽  
Arild Underdal

Although the Paris Agreement arguably made some progress, interest in supplementary approaches to climate change co-operation persist. This article examines the conditions under which a climate club might emerge and grow. Using agent-based simulations, it shows that even with less than a handful of major actors as initial members, a club can eventually reduce global emissions effectively. To succeed, a club must be initiated by the ‘right’ constellation of enthusiastic actors, offer sufficiently large incentives for reluctant countries and be reasonably unconstrained by conflicts between members over issues beyond climate change. A climate club is particularly likely to persist and grow if initiated by the United States and the European Union. The combination of club-good benefits and conditional commitments can produce broad participation under many conditions.


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