The Welfare Implications of Health Capital Investment

I present a model of the health capital investment decision of a firm using a moral hazard framework. Health capital investment increases the probability that a worker is present and productive. The firm cannot verify a worker's health capital investment decision. When a firm invests in health capital, the investment is verifiable because the firm contracts with the insurer. I derive the optimal contract for when the worker and for when the firm invests in health capital. When the firm invests in health capital, the level of investment is higher and wages are less volatile. In my model, firms invest more than workers because of a production externality and because it is less costly to invest in health capital than to compensate the worker for bearing the risk of an uncertain labor realization. This result improves welfare, contrary to the benchmark that workers consume more health care than is efficient ex post when firms provide health insurance. Unlike the benchmark model of a worker and insurer, my model includes a profit maximizing firm, includes an endogenous probability of getting sick, and allows the insurer to set premiums by anticipating the health care investment level of the insured.

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The Welfare Implications of Health Capital Investment

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.1696008 ◽

2010 ◽

Author(s):

Sara B. Holland

Keyword(s):

Capital Investment ◽

Health Capital ◽

Welfare Implications

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BPJS Kesehatan Memberikan Jaminan Kesehatan Terhadap Pasien Atau Masyarakat

Jurnal YUSTITIABELEN ◽

10.36563/yustitiabelen.v7i2.304 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 7 (2) ◽

pp. 146-154

Author(s):

Aidha Puteri Mustikasari

Keyword(s):

Health Care ◽

Health Insurance ◽

Health Services ◽

Social Security ◽

The State ◽

Universal Health Care ◽

Universal Health Insurance ◽

Universal Health ◽

Provide Health Insurance

Abstrak. Kepesertaan BPJS Kesehatan pada tahun 2020 tidak akan mencakup 90% penduduk Indonesia, namun rencana Universal Health Care Implementation (UHC) telah direncanakan sejak tahun sebelumnya. Di masa pandemi Covid, sejumlah besar status kepesertaan BPJS Kesehatan dicabut karena terlambat, padahal masyarakat membutuhkan layanan kesehatan dan asuransi dengan kondisi yang ada. Kajian ini bersifat norma deskriptif , dibahas dalam konteks kepesertaan BPJS kesehatan, dan cukup menggunakan prinsip asuransi dengan hanya memberikan jaminan kepada peserta, tetapi negara mengikuti kewajiban UUD 1945 yaitu memberikan jaminan kesehatan dan pelayanan kepada warga negara. Untuk mendukung keberadaan jaminan kesehatan universal, Indonesia perlu menerapkan formulir kepesertaan dan sanksi untuk ketentuan wajib peserta jaminan sosial yang efektif dan efisien. Abstract. BPJS Health membership in 2020 will not cover 90% of Indonesia's population, but the Universal Health Care Implementation (UHC) plan has been planned since the previous year. During the Covid pandemic, a large number of BPJS Health membership statuses were revoked because they were late, even though people needed health services and insurance with the existing conditions. This study is descriptive in nature, discussed in the context of BPJS health participation, and it is sufficient to use the insurance principle by only providing guarantees to participants, but the state follows the obligations of the 1945 Constitution, namely to provide health insurance and services to citizens. To support the existence of universal health insurance, Indonesia needs to implement an effective and efficient membership form and sanctions for mandatory provisions for social security participants.

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The Optimal Multistage Effort and Contract of VC’s Joint Investment

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society ◽

10.1155/2015/958212 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 2015 ◽

pp. 1-14

Author(s):

Meng Wu

Keyword(s):

Capital Investment ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Decision Making Process ◽

Game Model ◽

Venture Capitalists ◽

Optimal Contract ◽

Venture Capital Investment ◽

Ex Post ◽

Ex Ante

If the venture project has a great demand of investment, venture entrepreneurs will seek multiple venture capitalists to ensure necessary funding. This paper discusses the decision-making process in the case that multiple venture capitalists invest in a single project. From the beginning of the project till the withdrawal of the investment, the efforts of both parties are long term and dynamic. We consider the Stackelberg game model for venture capital investment in multiple periods. Given the optimal efforts by the entrepreneurs, our results clearly show that as time goes, in every single period entrepreneurs will expect their share of revenue paid to shrink. In other words, they expect a higher ex ante payment and a lower ex post payment. But, in contrast, venture capitalists are expecting exactly the opposite. With a further analysis, we also design an optimal contract in multiple periods. Last but not the least, several issues to be further investigated are proposed as well.

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Voluntary private health insurance, health-related behaviours and health outcomes: evidence from Russia

The European Journal of Health Economics ◽

10.1007/s10198-020-01252-2 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Andrey Aistov ◽

Ekaterina Aleksandrova ◽

Christopher J. Gerry

Keyword(s):

Health Care ◽

Health Insurance ◽

Moral Hazard ◽

Private Health Insurance ◽

Health Behaviours ◽

Ex Post ◽

Ex Ante ◽

Supplemental Health Insurance ◽

Self Assessed Health ◽

The Impact

AbstractThis paper contributes to the discussion around ex-post (increased utilisation of health care) and ex-ante (changes in health behaviours) moral hazard in supplemental private health insurance. Applying a range of methodologies to data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey—Higher School of Economics we exploit a selection mechanism in the data to compare the impact of workplace provided and individually purchased supplemental health insurance on the utilisation of health care, on a range of health behaviours and on self-assessed health. We find compelling policy-relevant evidence of ex-post moral hazard that confirms a theoretical prediction and empirical regularity found in other settings. In contrast to other empirical findings though, our data reveals evidence of ex-ante moral hazard demonstrated by clear behavioural differences between those with self-funded supplemental health insurance and those for whom the workplace finances the additional insurance. We find no evidence that either form of insurance is related to improved self-assessed health.

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Hubungan Hukum Antara Dokter dan Pasien dalam Pemberian Jasa Kesehatan

SALAM Jurnal Sosial dan Budaya Syar i ◽

10.15408/sjsbs.v8i5.22530 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 8 (5) ◽

pp. 1273-1288

Author(s):

Iman Imanuddin ◽

RR Dewi Anggraeni ◽

Maulin Nasikah

Keyword(s):

Public Health ◽

Health Care ◽

Health Insurance ◽

Medical Practice ◽

Qualitative Method ◽

Community Services ◽

Health Improvement ◽

Legal Relationship ◽

To Receive ◽

Provide Health Insurance

The health care system in Indonesia includes medical services and community services. In general, public health is a service substance that aims to achieve preventive (prevention) and promotive (health improvement) services. In addition, the target is for the community to receive curative (treatment) and rehabilitative (recovery) services. The legal relationship between doctors and patients has been regulated in Hospital Law Number 29 of 2004 concerning Medical Practice and Law Number 44 of 2009 concerning Hospitals. This study uses a qualitative method with a literature approach. The results of the study stated that the need for supervision from the hospital to the doctors to provide health insurance according to the procedure should be as regulated in the Act.Keywords: Legal Relations; Doctor; Patient Abstrak:Sistem pelayanan kesehatan di Indonesia mencakup pelayanan kedokteran dan pelayanan masyarakat. Secara umum kesehatan masyarakat merupakan subtansi pelayanan yang bertujuan untuk mencapai pelayanan prefentif (pencegahan) dan promotive (peningkatan kesehatan). Selain sasarannya agar masyarakat mendapat pelayanan kuratif (pengobatan) dan rehabilitasif (pemulihan). Hubungan Hukum antara Dokter dan Pasien telah diatur dalam Undang-Undang Rumah Sakit Nomor 29 Tahun 2004 Tentang Praktek Kedokteran dan Undang-Undang Nomor 44 Tahun 2009 Tentang Rumah Sakit. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan literature. Hasil penelitian menyatakan bahwa perlunya pengawasan dari pihak Rumah Sakit terhadap para dokter untum memberikan jaminan kesehatan sesuai prosedur seharunya sebagaimana yang diatur dalam Undang-Undang.Kata Kunci: Hubungan Hukum; Dokter; Pasien

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The case for risk-based premiums in public health insurance

Health Economics Policy and Law ◽

10.1017/s1744133105001064 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 1 (2) ◽

pp. 171-188 ◽

Cited By ~ 24

Author(s):

Peter Zweifel ◽

Michael Breuer

Keyword(s):

Public Health ◽

Health Care ◽

Health Insurance ◽

Risk Adjustment ◽

Public Health Insurance ◽

Managed Competition ◽

Insurance Contracts ◽

Ex Post ◽

Ex Ante ◽

Ex Post Moral Hazard

Uniform, risk-independent insurance premiums are accepted as part of ‘managed competition’ in health care. However, they are not compatible with optimality of health insurance contracts in the presence of both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. They have adverse effects on insurer behaviour even if risk adjustment is taken into account. Risk-based premiums combined with means-tested, tax-financed transfers are advocated as an alternative.

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