scholarly journals China-U.S.-Europe Relations: Shaping a Future-Oriented World Order

2016 ◽  
Vol 02 (04) ◽  
pp. 449-464
Author(s):  
Wu Chunsi

China, Europe, and the United States constitute a very important trilateral relationship in China’s diplomacy. This trilateral relationship is incomparable to that of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War not only in that “polar” is no longer a valid concept to describe major-power relations today, but also in that China-U.S.-Europe relations are not deliberately constructed for the three parties to balance each other or oppose any party. To be more specific, China’s deliberations on Europe’s role in the world have gone beyond the logic of balance of power. Especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, China has taken ever more efforts to strengthen its ties with European nations, both to meet its growing economic demands, and because it seeks to learn from the post-modern social governance experience in Europe. In comparison, China’s relationship with the United States is far more complex as the two countries have been engaged in increasing divergence and competition not only on specific issues, but more importantly, in trends of the world order. As three giants that have the potential to lead the world to a better future, China, Europe, and the United States need to deepen their mutual understanding and foster greater consensus about the future world order through closer communication and exchange, as well as enhanced cooperation on global governance.

1987 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 37-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanley Hoffmann

International systems have historically come in two forms: those based on the balance of power and those of a revolutionary nature, including systems organized around bipolar competition. Hoffmann finds the world order of 1987 to contain both these systems and judges it both ambiguous and original. While the tension of these extremes can make the world appear “anarchical,” there are certain agreed upon rules by which the superpowers interact. These rules ultimately preserve order by embracing competition between the United States and the Soviet Union; superpower confrontation is prevented by each nation holding to their own ideals and sovereignty while embracing nuclear deterrence. Having revealed the rules of the superpower game, Hoffmann then subjects them to ethical judgment. Despite the historic duration of peace between superpowers that seems to have been sustained by these rules, Hoffmann finds them both ethically flawed and ultimately unstable. Turning to a brief consideration of United States foreign policy, he points to particular moral difficulties in U.S. stances and urges the development of superpower rules that are effective and ethical.


Author(s):  
Rush Doshi

For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries—not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or even the Soviet Union—has ever reached 60 percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it? The Long Game draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades’ worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, as well as careful analysis of China's conduct, to provide a history of China’s grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party’s closed doors, this book uncovers Beijing’s long, methodical game to displace America from the regional and global order through three sequential “strategies of displacement.” The book shows how China’s strategy is profoundly shaped by key events that change its perception of American power—the end of the Cold War, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the populist elections of 2016, and the coronavirus pandemic of 2020. Finally, the book offers a comprehensive yet “asymmetric” plan for an effective US response to the China challenge. Ironically, the proposed approach takes a page from Beijing’s own strategic playbook to undermine China’s ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.


Author(s):  
Andrew Preston

The modern era was the American century, but it was also very much the communist century. Between them, the United States and the Soviet Union held the fate of the world in their hands. If there was to be a just and durable peace after 1945, an understanding between Washington and Moscow would have to be its foundation. Instead, in a conflict quickly dubbed “the Cold War,” the world suffered through four decades of existential tension between the Soviets and the Americans. ‘Superpower’ explains why the Soviets and Americans moved from cooperating in a world war to resisting each other in the Cold War, before exploring the events and ending of the Cold War in the 1980s.


Author(s):  
Aryeh Neier

This chapter illustrates that many Americans took part in struggles for rights during the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. Though it was a fertile period for those promoting rights within the United States, few Americans were concerned in those years with efforts to secure rights in other parts of the world. The emergence of a rights movement in the Soviet Union in the 1960s was little noted, and relatively few in the United States joined Amnesty International, which developed far more rapidly in Europe. Americans concerned about rights in that era could be mobilized to deal with American violations of rights, but not with rights abuses by other governments. Inattention to such matters by those deeply engaged in domestic rights struggles was, in a way, a counterpart to the disdain for international law frequently expressed by partisans of American exceptionalism.


Author(s):  
Amaney A. Jamal

This chapter offers a detailed historical analysis of the emergence of regime clientelism in Jordan and Kuwait. It illustrates how the end of the Cold War restructured the ways in which international hierarchy shifted debates about democratization at the domestic level. During the Cold War, the bipolar nature of the world order meant that if the United States were to lose its ally in Jordan, the Soviet Union would be able to step up on the back of a new regime. If the United States then decided to cut off economic and security ties to Jordan, Jordanians might find comfort in the fact that the Soviet Union could play a role in continuing to secure Jordan's interests. Thus, those who resisted anti-American presence in the Arab world could launch their concerns more effectively because of an alternate patron—the Soviet Union—in the global order.


1952 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-467
Author(s):  
Raymond Dennett

Speculation about the future, particularly about the nature and character of the problems which Americans may have to face in foreign policy, is admittedly risky. It is particularly so at a time when international society is far from static and domestic policy in a score of states may at any moment directly influence and even fundamentally change the balance of power as it now exists. Nevertheless, such speculation can be justified. However effective present policy may be judged to be, few would be brash enough to assert that “we planned it that way.” Postwar American policy, in the main, has not been planned: it has consisted until very recently of a series of reactions to the diplomatic and military initiative exercised by the Soviet Union and its satellites. These reactions have created a current pattern of policy for the United States which contains more long-range commitments for this country than at any previous time in American history. Future policy obviously must operate within the limits established by these commitments. Yet these are fairly broad in character in many areas of the world and any one of a number of policies might be chosen. It is not too soon to begin to plan now for some of the problems the United States will face in the very near future.


2018 ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka

This chapter chronicles how the United States designed and adjusted its alliance commitments in Western Europe and East Asia during the first three decades of the Cold War (1949-1980). The purpose of this chapter is not only to introduce historical events to readers, but also to highlight key variation decision-makers implemented changes in American strategic posture and, by extension, the security guarantees provided to American allies. It covers how the United States expanded its commitments around the world early in the Cold War before contracting them by the late 1960s amid changes to the nuclear balance between it and the Soviet Union.


Author(s):  
Marc Trachtenberg

This chapter examines the policies pursued by the American government to deal with the problem of Eastern Europe in 1945. At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union, it was said, sought to communize eastern Europe; the western powers, and especially the United States, were deeply opposed to that policy; and the clash that developed played the key role in triggering the Cold War. But historians in recent years have been moving away from that sort of interpretation. American policy is also being seen in a new light by many historians. Increasingly the argument seems to be that U.S. leaders in 1945 did not really care much about eastern Europe—that their commitment to representative government in that region was surprisingly thin and that by the end of 1945 they had more or less come to the conclusion that the sort of political system the Soviets were setting up in that part of the world was something the United States could live with.


1996 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 149-163
Author(s):  
Arthur M. Schlesinger

Building on an earlier argument that isolationism may well be America's natural state, Schlesinger explains how the apparent rejection of isolationism during the long standoff with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was nothing more than a reaction to what was perceived as a direct and urgent threat to the security of the United States. In the wake of the Cold War's end, the incompatibility between collective international action and conceptions of national interest has highlighted the difficulties of democracies in sending their armies to war, especially those that do not directly threaten national security. While much more can and should be done to enhance the effectiveness of global organizations already in place, what is needed, Schlesinger argues, is both a reexamination of the Wilsonian doctrine of collective security and a greater concentration on preventive diplomacy.


1991 ◽  
Vol 6 (0) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Chong-Ki Choi

Order is not always the same as justice. But after radical changes of the Soviet Union and east Europe, most analysts and specialists of international politics are trying to predict new world order after Cold War. Of course order gives us concrete situation for making foreign policies and economic cooperation and pursuing them. And order at least frees us from instability of international politics. But order, at the same time, limits each country's right to take alternatives for her interests. At any rate, we need to analyze the international situation and predict new world order after Cold War. What will be the shape of the new world order? Some analyst, such as Prof. Paul Kennedy in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers describe the change in the world as the decline of the superpowers, including both the Soviet Union and the United States. Other specialists such as Prof. Joseph Nye in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power describes that while the United States will remain the largest state, the world will see a diffusion of power and a growth of multiple inter-dependencies.


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