The Rules of the Game

1987 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 37-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanley Hoffmann

International systems have historically come in two forms: those based on the balance of power and those of a revolutionary nature, including systems organized around bipolar competition. Hoffmann finds the world order of 1987 to contain both these systems and judges it both ambiguous and original. While the tension of these extremes can make the world appear “anarchical,” there are certain agreed upon rules by which the superpowers interact. These rules ultimately preserve order by embracing competition between the United States and the Soviet Union; superpower confrontation is prevented by each nation holding to their own ideals and sovereignty while embracing nuclear deterrence. Having revealed the rules of the superpower game, Hoffmann then subjects them to ethical judgment. Despite the historic duration of peace between superpowers that seems to have been sustained by these rules, Hoffmann finds them both ethically flawed and ultimately unstable. Turning to a brief consideration of United States foreign policy, he points to particular moral difficulties in U.S. stances and urges the development of superpower rules that are effective and ethical.

2016 ◽  
Vol 02 (04) ◽  
pp. 449-464
Author(s):  
Wu Chunsi

China, Europe, and the United States constitute a very important trilateral relationship in China’s diplomacy. This trilateral relationship is incomparable to that of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War not only in that “polar” is no longer a valid concept to describe major-power relations today, but also in that China-U.S.-Europe relations are not deliberately constructed for the three parties to balance each other or oppose any party. To be more specific, China’s deliberations on Europe’s role in the world have gone beyond the logic of balance of power. Especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, China has taken ever more efforts to strengthen its ties with European nations, both to meet its growing economic demands, and because it seeks to learn from the post-modern social governance experience in Europe. In comparison, China’s relationship with the United States is far more complex as the two countries have been engaged in increasing divergence and competition not only on specific issues, but more importantly, in trends of the world order. As three giants that have the potential to lead the world to a better future, China, Europe, and the United States need to deepen their mutual understanding and foster greater consensus about the future world order through closer communication and exchange, as well as enhanced cooperation on global governance.


1952 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-467
Author(s):  
Raymond Dennett

Speculation about the future, particularly about the nature and character of the problems which Americans may have to face in foreign policy, is admittedly risky. It is particularly so at a time when international society is far from static and domestic policy in a score of states may at any moment directly influence and even fundamentally change the balance of power as it now exists. Nevertheless, such speculation can be justified. However effective present policy may be judged to be, few would be brash enough to assert that “we planned it that way.” Postwar American policy, in the main, has not been planned: it has consisted until very recently of a series of reactions to the diplomatic and military initiative exercised by the Soviet Union and its satellites. These reactions have created a current pattern of policy for the United States which contains more long-range commitments for this country than at any previous time in American history. Future policy obviously must operate within the limits established by these commitments. Yet these are fairly broad in character in many areas of the world and any one of a number of policies might be chosen. It is not too soon to begin to plan now for some of the problems the United States will face in the very near future.


1991 ◽  
Vol 6 (0) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Chong-Ki Choi

Order is not always the same as justice. But after radical changes of the Soviet Union and east Europe, most analysts and specialists of international politics are trying to predict new world order after Cold War. Of course order gives us concrete situation for making foreign policies and economic cooperation and pursuing them. And order at least frees us from instability of international politics. But order, at the same time, limits each country's right to take alternatives for her interests. At any rate, we need to analyze the international situation and predict new world order after Cold War. What will be the shape of the new world order? Some analyst, such as Prof. Paul Kennedy in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers describe the change in the world as the decline of the superpowers, including both the Soviet Union and the United States. Other specialists such as Prof. Joseph Nye in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power describes that while the United States will remain the largest state, the world will see a diffusion of power and a growth of multiple inter-dependencies.


Author(s):  
Simon Miles

This chapter sketches how the world looked from Washington and Moscow at the dawn of the 1980s. It explains why policymakers in the United States were convinced that they had fallen behind the Kremlin when the Soviet Union was already beginning to come apart at the seams. It also cites Soviet leaders that were confident in their own position despite the acute problems plaguing their country as they viewed the perceived balance of power as one tipped in the Kremlin's favor. The chapter discusses the détente as a golden age of US–Soviet arms control agreements but had eventually failed to make the United States and its allies any more secure by the beginning of the 1980s. It cites the Western European public opinion, in which several West German and French respondents believed that the Soviet bloc had a military edge over the West.


Author(s):  
R. Väyrynen

Three alternative world orders can be imagined in the post-World War II international relations. During most of the Cold War a bipolar order, centered on the possession of nuclear weapons, existed. This world order was incomplete, however. The United States and the Soviet Union faced each other with equal capacity to destroy each other, but in terms of economic and global influence the United States was superior. The strengthening of economic and technological dynamics increased further the U.S. influence, but also sparked the power of non-states actors, including transnational corporations and banks, independent of states. Simultaneously with the globalization of the world, one could witness the rise of non-state actors in the military and political fields. The emergence of the world order of the third type has sometimes been called the neomedieval world in which some central tenets of feudalism has re-emerged. None of these world order models can be said to dominate in today’s world and none of them is likely to emerge victorious any time soon. In recent times., globalization has suffered from various setbacks and state-centric relations have reemerged. Their focus is not, however, any more on the military competition between the United States and Russia, although some of its elements remain in the arms competition between them. Globalization has brought in new ingredients in the rivalries between states and it has appeared most visibly in the U.S.-Chinese rivalry for economic and technological dominance of the globalized world economy. In other words, a new type of economic bipolarity is winning ground and is only secondarily manifesting itself in military relations. Patterns of warfare has in recent decades been colored by fighting of non-state military forces and the rise of new feudal patterns of behavior, but they have not been pronounced enough to justify the labeling of the entire world order by the name.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.


2012 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul C. Avey

Many self-identified realist, liberal, and constructivist scholars contend that ideology played a critical role in generating and shaping the United States' decision to confront the Soviet Union in the early Cold War. A close look at the history reveals that these ideological arguments fail to explain key aspects of U.S. policy. Contrary to ideological explanations, the United States initially sought to cooperate with the Soviet Union, did not initially pressure communist groups outside the Soviet orbit, and later sought to engage communist groups that promised to undermine Soviet power. The U.S. decision to confront the Soviets stemmed instead from the distribution of power. U.S. policy shifted toward a confrontational approach as the balance of power in Eurasia tilted in favor of the Soviet Union. In addition, U.S. leaders tended to think and act in a manner consistent with balance of power logic. The primacy of power over ideology in U.S. policymaking—given the strong liberal tradition in the United States and the large differences between U.S. and Soviet ideology—suggests that relative power concerns are the most important factors in generating and shaping confrontational foreign policies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-156
Author(s):  
Mediel Hove

This article evaluates the emergence of the new Cold War using the Syrian and Ukraine conflicts, among others. Incompatible interests between the United States (US) and Russia, short of open conflict, increased after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. This article argues that the struggle for dominance between the two superpowers, both in speeches and deed, to a greater degree resembles what the world once witnessed before the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. It asserts that despite the US’ unfettered power, after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is now being checked by Russia in a Cold War fashion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-31
Author(s):  
Jakub Majkowski

This essay will firstly address the extent of Stalin’s achievements in leading the course for domestic policy of the Soviet Union and its contribution towards maintaining the country’s supremacy in the world, for example the rapid post-war recovery of industry and agriculture, and secondly, the foreign policy including ambiguous relations with Communist governments of countries forming the Eastern Bloc, upkeeping frail alliances and growing antagonism towards western powers, especially the United States of America.   The actions and influence of Stalin’s closest associates in the Communist Party and the effect of Soviet propaganda on the society are also reviewed. This investigation will cover the period from 1945 to 1953. Additionally, other factors such as the impact of post-war worldwide economic situation and attitude of the society of Soviet Union will be discussed.    


Author(s):  
N. Gegelashvili ◽  
◽  
I. Modnikova ◽  

The article analyzes the US policy towards Ukraine dating back from the time before the reunification of Crimea with Russia and up to Donald Trump coming to power. The spectrum of Washington’s interests towards this country being of particular strategic interest to the United States are disclosed. It should be noted that since the disintegration of the Soviet Union Washington’s interest in this country on the whole has not been very much different from its stand on all post-Soviet states whose significance was defined by the U,S depending on their location on the world map as well as on the value of their natural resources. However, after the reunification of Crimea with Russia Washington’s stand on this country underwent significant changes, causing a radical transformation of the U,S attitude in their Ukrainian policy. During the presidency of Barack Obama the American policy towards Ukraine was carried out rather sluggishly being basically declarative in its nature. When President D. Trump took his office Washington’s policy towards Ukraine became increasingly more offensive and was characterized by a rather proactive stance not only because Ukraine became the principal arena of confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation, but also because it became a part of the US domestic political context. Therefore, an outcome of the “battle” for Ukraine is currently very important for the United States in order to prove to the world its role of the main helmsman in the context of a diminishing US capability of maintaining their global superiority.


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