Modeling the cost of resource allocation in distributed control

1990 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-164
Author(s):  
Martin D. Fraser ◽  
Ross A. Gagliano ◽  
Mark E. Schaefer
Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha

This chapter discusses several classes of potential games that are common in the literature and how to derive the Nash equilibrium for such games. It first considers identical interests games and dummy games before turning to decoupled games and bilateral symmetric games. It then describes congestion games, in which all players are equal, in the sense that the cost associated with each resource only depends on the total number of players using that resource and not on which players use it. It also presents other potential games, including the Sudoku puzzle, and goes on to analyze the distributed resource allocation problem, the computation of Nash equilibria for potential games, and fictitious play. It concludes with practice exercises and their corresponding solutions, along with additional exercises.


2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hemant Kumar Mehta ◽  
Eshan Gupta

Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) offers hardware resources (computing power, storage and network) as a service to its customers. The customers order these resources in the form of a lease. Aim of any service provider is to make a leasing plan to maximize the number of accepted leases. Opennebula is popular open source toolkit for building IaaS cloud. Opennebula has its own lease manager and it can also be integrated with Haizea which is an open source lease manager. An economy based algorithm should focus on incentives of both the consumers and the providers. In this paper, an economy based leasing algorithm is developed and integrated with Haizea. This economy based algorithm takes care of incentives of both the parties i.e. customer and service provider. It uses the concept of optimization techniques to optimize the costs. The incentive for customers is lower cost of execution of its lease on the capable node as compare to existing non-economy based algorithms. If an appropriate resource is not found, then the algorithm uses negotiation on budget and resource demand; that increases the number of accepted lease. Thus, incentive for providers is an increase in profit as the amount of accepted leases increase. Experimental results show that the proposed economy based leasing algorithm reduces the cost of execution of the consumer’s lease and increases the profit of the provider to a considerable extent.


1988 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 64-72

The diagnostic case, BTR Ltd., Rampur, UP, raised many questions such as reasons for BTR's poor performance, pricing policies of the Consortium of producers of which BTR was a member, and the implications of state intervention in pricing and allocation of resin, the main input. In this Diagnoses feature, experts from both practising and academic worlds examine these and other questions. Vederah, Dholakia, and Sandesara argue, based on the analysis of case data, that the relatively poor performance of BTR has more to do with its own inefficiency than with the rosin prices fixed by the Consortium. They suggest the areas where BTR should improve its performance and comment on how the Consortium could strengthen and redefine its role. Gurdev Singh develops a framework for evaluating state intervention and applies it to the various stages of resin processing. Vederah's comparison of the cost of imported and indigenous rosin shows how neglected the interests of the users are. The high level of protective import duty and the inadequacy of resource allocation for improvement of production and productivity point to the need for coordinated strategies that take account of both producers and users.


1995 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-79
Author(s):  
Geoff Harris

Economists have traditionally been concerned with allocative efficiency, that is, with trying to make sure that the various factors of production are allocated so that the cost of any given output is minimized. Thus, they have emphasized the importance of ‘getting the prices right’ so that these reflect the relative scarcities of inputs in the economy and give the right signals, as regards resource allocation, to economic decision-makers. From the mid-1960s, Harvey Leibenstein has drawn attention to what he has termed X-inefficiencies which derive from non-price factors such as protection/shelter of enterprises from competition, inertia on the part of managers and limited effort by workers. This article examines the relative importance of allocative inefficiency, X-inefficiency, bureaucracy and corruption in LDCs. It finds that X-inefficiencies in developing countries are far more important than allocative inefficiencies. In addition, the inefficiencies resulting from each of bureaucracy and corruption, whilst difficult to measure, are at the very least as important as allocative inefficiencies and probably much more important. It also appears that X-inefficiencies are easier and less costly to reduce than allocative inefficiencies.


2010 ◽  
Vol 44-47 ◽  
pp. 242-246
Author(s):  
Jian Bing Huang ◽  
Duo Ning ◽  
Zhong Jun Xiao

According to the features of papermaking production line, a new kind domestic distributed control system MACS is developed here for the practice application. The methods of hardware component and software realization for the control system are proposed. Practices prove that the novel distributed control system for the paper-making production line can run automatically, safely and smoothly which can achieve high performance index, and it can sharply reduce the cost of construction and installation as well as the cost of maintenance.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document