The Cost of Compassion: Resource Allocation and Disorders of Consciousness

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 159-162
Author(s):  
Mackenzie Graham
Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha

This chapter discusses several classes of potential games that are common in the literature and how to derive the Nash equilibrium for such games. It first considers identical interests games and dummy games before turning to decoupled games and bilateral symmetric games. It then describes congestion games, in which all players are equal, in the sense that the cost associated with each resource only depends on the total number of players using that resource and not on which players use it. It also presents other potential games, including the Sudoku puzzle, and goes on to analyze the distributed resource allocation problem, the computation of Nash equilibria for potential games, and fictitious play. It concludes with practice exercises and their corresponding solutions, along with additional exercises.


2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hemant Kumar Mehta ◽  
Eshan Gupta

Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) offers hardware resources (computing power, storage and network) as a service to its customers. The customers order these resources in the form of a lease. Aim of any service provider is to make a leasing plan to maximize the number of accepted leases. Opennebula is popular open source toolkit for building IaaS cloud. Opennebula has its own lease manager and it can also be integrated with Haizea which is an open source lease manager. An economy based algorithm should focus on incentives of both the consumers and the providers. In this paper, an economy based leasing algorithm is developed and integrated with Haizea. This economy based algorithm takes care of incentives of both the parties i.e. customer and service provider. It uses the concept of optimization techniques to optimize the costs. The incentive for customers is lower cost of execution of its lease on the capable node as compare to existing non-economy based algorithms. If an appropriate resource is not found, then the algorithm uses negotiation on budget and resource demand; that increases the number of accepted lease. Thus, incentive for providers is an increase in profit as the amount of accepted leases increase. Experimental results show that the proposed economy based leasing algorithm reduces the cost of execution of the consumer’s lease and increases the profit of the provider to a considerable extent.


1988 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 64-72

The diagnostic case, BTR Ltd., Rampur, UP, raised many questions such as reasons for BTR's poor performance, pricing policies of the Consortium of producers of which BTR was a member, and the implications of state intervention in pricing and allocation of resin, the main input. In this Diagnoses feature, experts from both practising and academic worlds examine these and other questions. Vederah, Dholakia, and Sandesara argue, based on the analysis of case data, that the relatively poor performance of BTR has more to do with its own inefficiency than with the rosin prices fixed by the Consortium. They suggest the areas where BTR should improve its performance and comment on how the Consortium could strengthen and redefine its role. Gurdev Singh develops a framework for evaluating state intervention and applies it to the various stages of resin processing. Vederah's comparison of the cost of imported and indigenous rosin shows how neglected the interests of the users are. The high level of protective import duty and the inadequacy of resource allocation for improvement of production and productivity point to the need for coordinated strategies that take account of both producers and users.


1995 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-79
Author(s):  
Geoff Harris

Economists have traditionally been concerned with allocative efficiency, that is, with trying to make sure that the various factors of production are allocated so that the cost of any given output is minimized. Thus, they have emphasized the importance of ‘getting the prices right’ so that these reflect the relative scarcities of inputs in the economy and give the right signals, as regards resource allocation, to economic decision-makers. From the mid-1960s, Harvey Leibenstein has drawn attention to what he has termed X-inefficiencies which derive from non-price factors such as protection/shelter of enterprises from competition, inertia on the part of managers and limited effort by workers. This article examines the relative importance of allocative inefficiency, X-inefficiency, bureaucracy and corruption in LDCs. It finds that X-inefficiencies in developing countries are far more important than allocative inefficiencies. In addition, the inefficiencies resulting from each of bureaucracy and corruption, whilst difficult to measure, are at the very least as important as allocative inefficiencies and probably much more important. It also appears that X-inefficiencies are easier and less costly to reduce than allocative inefficiencies.


2011 ◽  
Vol 347-353 ◽  
pp. 1295-1298
Author(s):  
Bin Xia ◽  
Ting Gao

At present, the development of new energy industry has the great significance in optimizing the energy structure and energy security and increasing energy supply in China. In the new energy industry development process existing obvious external effectiveness, make the competition market resources allocation efficiency losses, resulting in deviating from the Pareto optimal state that cause "market failure". According to the general principles that externalities cause resource allocation misconduct eliminate, from an economic point of view that this article point out that the decrease of the cost of production and the increased output efficiency could play the same role in resource allocation efficiency improvements, and through government intervention to make the necessary corrections to optimize the allocation of resources to ensure the development of new energy industries.


1990 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-164
Author(s):  
Martin D. Fraser ◽  
Ross A. Gagliano ◽  
Mark E. Schaefer

Author(s):  
P. K. KAPUR ◽  
ANU. G. AGGARWAL ◽  
KANICA KAPOOR ◽  
GURJEET KAUR

The demand for complex and large-scale software systems is increasing rapidly. Therefore, the development of high-quality, reliable and low cost computer software has become critical issue in the enormous worldwide computer technology market. For developing these large and complex software small and independent modules are integrated which are tested independently during module testing phase of software development. In the process, testing resources such as time, testing personnel etc. are used. These resources are not infinitely large. Consequently, it is an important matter for the project manager to allocate these limited resources among the modules optimally during the testing process. Another major concern in software development is the cost. It is in fact, profit to the management if the cost of the software is less while meeting the costumer requirements. In this paper, we investigate an optimal resource allocation problem of minimizing the cost of software testing under limited amount of available resources, given a reliability constraint. To solve the optimization problem we present genetic algorithm which stands up as a powerful tool for solving search and optimization problems. The key objective of using genetic algorithm in the field of software reliability is its capability to give optimal results through learning from historical data. One numerical example has been discussed to illustrate the applicability of the approach.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (12) ◽  
pp. 2050007
Author(s):  
Guanghai Cui ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Ling Dong ◽  
Xiaoli Cao ◽  
Yue Liu ◽  
...  

In social networks, resource sharing behaviors always take place in groups of individuals and rely on voluntary cooperation. In this work, first, a multi-player donor recipient game in which strategies describe individuals’ varying degrees of willingness to share resources is formulated, instead of using the limited binary decisions (e.g. share or not share) in a classical donor-recipient game. Second, the evolutionary dynamics of individual strategies are explored under the influence of two contribution-based resource allocation mechanisms: the total contribution-based allocation mechanism (TCAM) and the direct contribution-based allocation mechanism (DCAM). The results indicate that the network is dominated by the full-cooperation strategy when the cost-to-benefit ratio of resources is not too large and the DCAM is more effective than TCAM. Furthermore, the underlying reason why some strategies with higher sharing willingness can coexist in specific situations, is also explained in detail by leveraging macroscopic and microscopic perspective analysis. Finally, the influences of slandering and whitewashing behaviors conducted by a few malicious individuals on the allocation mechanisms are also studied. Current research will offer new insights into understanding the influence and optimizing the resource allocation policies in social networks.


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