scholarly journals An Integrated Supplier-Buyer Inventory Model with Conditionally Free Shipment under Permissible Delay in Payments

2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chia-Hsien Su
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Rate ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Unit Production Cost ◽  
Minimum Requirement

It is well known that production, distribution, marketing, inventory control, and financing all/each have a positive impact on the performance of a supply chain. Despite the growing interest in the development of integrated inventory models, the interactions between these elements of a supply chain may not be efficiently included, resulting in a restricted supply chain model presentation. To incorporate this phenomenon, a mathematical model that tackles the interdependent relationships between these aforementioned elements is developed in this paper. This study considers the determination of the optimal pricing, ordering, and delivery policies of a profit-maximizing supply chain system, faced with (1) unit wholesale price of the supplier is set based on unit production cost, (2) unit production cost is taken as a function of demand rate and production rate, (3) the supplier's production rate is adjusted according to market demand, (4) market demand depends upon buyer's selling price, (5) a free freight is offered if the buyer's order exceeds a certain minimum requirement, and (6) a constant credit period is offered by the supplier to stimulate the demand of the buyer. Algorithm for computing the optimal policies is derived. The sensitivity of the optimal results with respect to those parameters which directly influence the production and transportation costs is also examined.

Two-echelon imperfect production fuzzy supply chain model for reliability dependent demand with probabilistic deterioration and rework

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Sudip Adak ◽  
G.S. Mahapatra
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Rate ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Idle Time ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Specific Time ◽  
Defective Items ◽  
Imperfect Production ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Dependent Demand

This paper develops a fuzzy two-layer supply chain for manufacturer and retailer with defective and non-defective types of products. The manufacturer produces up to a specific time, including faulty and non-defective items, and after the screening, the non-defective item sends to the retailer. The retailer’s strategy is to do the screening of items received from the manufacturer; subsequently, the perfect quality items are used to fulfill the customer’s demand, and the defective items are reworked. The retailer considers that customer demand is time and reliability dependent. The supply chain considers probabilistic deterioration for the manufacturer and retailers along with the strategies such as production rate, unit production cost, cost of idle time of manufacturer, screening, rework, etc. The optimum average profit of the integrated model is evaluated for both the cases crisp and fuzzy environments. Managerial insights and the effect of changes in the parameters’ values on the optimal inventory policy under fuzziness are presented.

scholarly journals Contracts Adjustment under Bilateral Information Updating in a Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Xinhui Wang ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Zihan Zhou ◽  
Yiling Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Minimum Order ◽  
Information Updating ◽  
Minimum Order Quantity ◽  
Market Outlook

This paper investigates contracts adjustment between one manufacturer and one retailer under bilateral information updating. The manufacturer incurs uncertain production cost and the retailer faces uncertain demand, but they can acquire independent signals to update production cost and demand, respectively. They commit an initial agreement on an initial wholesale price, minimum order quantity, and information sharing as well as the transfer payment and decisions adjustment when information is updated. We find that due to the joint impact of production cost variation and market variation, the manufacturer may not decrease (increase) her wholesale price when the updated production cost is lower (higher) than expected. The retailer places an additional order even if the wholesale price rises when the market outlook is good, but places an order with the minimum order quantity even if the wholesale price falls when the market outlook is bad. Secondly, for a certain level of information accuracy of the production cost and market demand, the retailer is always better off with information updating, but the manufacturer may be worse off with information updating when facing a bad market outlook. Thirdly, when information accuracy of the production cost and market demand varies, the manufacturer only benefits from a high accuracy of production cost. Profits of the retailer and the supply chain are increasing (decreasing) with accuracy of production cost if the updated production cost is larger (smaller) than expected.

A multi-retailer supply chain model with backorder and variable production cost

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 943-954 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arunava Majumder ◽  
Chandra K. Jaggi ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Rate ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Optimization Technique ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Multiple Buyers ◽  
Variable Production

The modern marketing environment involves variability and randomness within the numerous parties of any supply chain network. Thus, formation of a supply chain model including multiple buyers and variable production rate is more acceptable than assuming a single-buyer with constant production rate model. This paper considers a supply chain network, where a single-vendor manufactures products in a batch production process and supplies them to a set of buyers over multiple times. Instead of assuming a fixed production rate, as commonly used in the literature, a variable production rate is introduced by the vendor and the production cost of the vendor is treated as a function of production rate. The continuous review inventory model is applied for multiple buyers to inspect inventory levels and a crashing cost is incurred by all buyers to reduce their lead times. The lead time demand follows a normal distribution. The unsatisfied demands at the buyers end are partially backordered. A model is formulated to minimize the joint expected cost of the vendor-buyers supply chain system. A classical optimization technique is utilized to solve the model. An improved algorithm is developed to obtain the numerical solution of the model. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the model.

scholarly journals Strategic Wholesale Pricing and Commonality Strategy in a Supply Chain with Quality Segmentation

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiantian Xu ◽  
Tiaojun Xiao ◽  
Chen Tian
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Unit Production Cost ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
The Common ◽  
Wholesale Pricing

We develop two game models of a one-supplier and one-manufacturer supply chain to investigate the supplier’s strategic wholesale pricing decision and the manufacturer’s commonality strategy. The manufacturer has three commonality strategies for the high-end and low-end products: common high-quality component, common low-quality component, and dedicated components. We consider both wholesale price first scenario and commonality strategy first scenario. Under the wholesale price first scenario, we identify the range of each commonality strategy and find that (i) the common low-quality component strategy is harmful to the supplier; (ii) if the quality of low-quality component and the unit production cost of high-quality component are sufficiently low, the supplier induces the common high-quality component strategy by strategically decreasing the unit wholesale price of high-quality component, while if they are sufficiently high, the supplier induces the dedicated components strategy by increasing the unit wholesale price of high-quality component and decreasing that of low-quality one. Under the commonality strategy first scenario, the common low-quality component strategy may exist. By comparing the two scenarios, we find that (i) if the unit production cost of low-quality component is medium, the equilibrium outcomes under both scenarios are identical; (ii) there exists a first-mover advantage for the two players.

scholarly journals Analysis on the Water Supply Chain Model under Revenue-Sharing Contract considering Marketing Effort, Water Purity

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Lijia Huang ◽  
Deshan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Water Supply ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Marketing Effort ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Comparison Results ◽  
Water Purity

A two-tier water supply chain including a manufacturer and a retailer under revenue-sharing contract is constructed. And the contribution of the model is that marketing effort and water purity has been considered. First, four models including the centralized model (model B) and decentralized models (models BM, I, and II) are established and analyzed. Second, the Stackelberg game model is used to discuss the pricing strategy of water supply chain members in centralized and decentralized scenarios. The comparison results show that revenue-sharing contract is beneficial to improve the level of product greening, the profit of supply chain members, and the overall profit of the water supply chain compared with model BM. However, it leads to the decrease of retailers’ green marketing efforts and the wholesale price of water. In addition, revenue-sharing contract through bargaining makes bigger influence than revenue-sharing contract. Marketing can stimulate the increase of the green product’s market demand on one hand, and on the other hand, it generates the amount of marketing cost. In this study, the profit is that marketing produces cannot offset the cost that it brings. Thus, it will be important to take some measures to make up the loss that marketing generated.

scholarly journals A two-echelon supply chain model with price and warranty dependent demand and pro-rata warranty policy under cost sharing contract

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-75
Author(s):  
Biswarup Samanta ◽  
◽  
Bibhas Chandra Giri ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Warranty Period ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Warranty Cost ◽  
Parameter Values

In this article, a two-echelon supply chain model with a single-vendor a single-buyer is considered. The vendor's production process is imperfect and the market demand is assumed to be dependent on the buyer's selling price and warranty period. The vendor consents to return a definite portion of the buyer's purchase value, if any product is found defective within the length of warranty. The refund value or the warranty cost is considered as a function of the warranty period and the buyer's selling price of the item. This warranty cost is assumed to be fully borne by the vendor in the first model (Model I) while in the second model (Model II), it is assumed that the buyer agrees to bear a portion of the warranty cost. The proposed models are solved under decentralized scenario. We also derive and optimize the average total profit of the supply chain in order to obtain the optimal decisions of the centralized model. We consider a Stackelberg game between the vendor and the buyer in the decentralized scenario, where the vendor is assumed to be the leader and the buyer as the pursuer. Through numerical study, it is observed that, with respect to all the key decisions of the models, Model II provides better outcomes than Model I. Sensitivity analysis is also carried out to examine the impacts of changes of parameter-values on the optimum decisions.

Coordination and competition in two-echelon supply chain using grey revenue-sharing contracts

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayad Hendalianpour ◽  
Mohammad Hamzehlou ◽  
Mohammad Reza Feylizadeh ◽  
Naiming Xie ◽  
Mohammad Hossein Shakerizadeh
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
High Performance ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Quantity Discount ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Supply Chain Model

PurposeThis study examines the potential of contracts as one of the supply chain coordination mechanisms under competitive conditions. It also investigates a two-echelon supply chain model with two manufacturers and two retailers to develop a competitive structure in grey stochastic demand.Design/methodology/approachSupply chain demand is considered as a stochastic phenomenon depending on the selling price of the product. Also, products can be replaced by market manufacturers. Each retailer faces the pricing of products from two manufacturers, leading to competition between downstream retailers. In the present study, the duopoly supply chain model was presented based on the wholesale price contract, revenue-sharing contract and quantity discount contract separately.FindingsGrey optimization and analysis of their coordination were presented. The results showed the high performance of revenue-sharing contracts in the supply chain. Thus, manufacturers will give the next priority to quantity discount contracts.Originality/valueOrdering is the main factor contributing to competitive decision-making. Meanwhile, decision-making along with ordering and pricing will be required due to the nature of the demand.

scholarly journals Two-Echelon Supply Chain Model with Demand Dependent On Price, Promotional Effort and Service Level in Crisp and Fuzzy Environments

2020 ◽  
pp. 317-329
Author(s):  
Sahidul Islam ◽  
Sayan Chandra Deb
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Fuzzy Model ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Cost Parameters

This article explores a supply chain model consisting of a single manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader specifies a wholesale price and bears servicing costs of the products. Then, both the retailers advertise the products and sell them to the customers. So, the demand of the products is influenced by selling price, service level and also promotional effort. On the basis of this gaming structure, two mathematical models have been formed - crisp model, where each member of the chain exactly knows all the cost parameters and fuzzy model where those cost parameters are considered as fuzzy numbers. Optimal strategies for the manufacturer and the retailers are determined and some numerical examples have been given. Finally, how perturbations of parameters affect the profits of the chain members have been determined.

scholarly journals Dynamic Game and Coordination Strategy of Multichannel Supply Chain Based on Brand Competition

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Fang Zhang ◽  
Binshuo Bao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Tracking System ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Channel Competition ◽  
Brand Competition ◽  
Adjustment Speed

In is very important for the corresponding author to have a linked ORCID (Open Researcher and Contributor ID) account on MTS. To register a linked ORCID account, please go to the Account Update page (http://mts.hindawi.com/update/) in our Manuscript Tracking System and after you have logged in click on the ORCID link at the top of the page. This link will take you to the ORCID website where you will be able to create an account for yourself. Once you have done so, your new ORCID will be saved in our Manuscript Tracking System automatically.”"?>this paper, two noncooperative dynamic pricing strategies are used in a supply chain. Two dynamic Stackelberg game models have been built involving both a manufacturer and a retailer assumed to be the leader in order. In the two models, the manufacturer sells national-brand (NB) product to an independent retailer or directly to consumers through a direct channel. The retailers sell a store-brand (SB) product when they sell the NB product coming from the manufacturer. Thus, there is competition both in different channels and in products with different brands. To analyze the complexity of the model, parameter bifurcation diagrams and strange attractor diagrams have been therefore plotted. The results show that the game leader has advantages when the market is stable, but it turns disadvantageous if the state falls into unstable as the game follower can quickly adjust the strategy to seize the market. The wholesale price and the direct selling price are high that they incur larger profits if the manufacturer is dominant, but it gets worse when the adjustment speed increases. While in the model where the retailer plays a dominant role, the increase in the adjustment speed is unfavorable to retailer. By controlling the total cost of the direct channel and increasing channel competition strength and brand competition strength, the manufacturers can increase their profits in the game dominated by the retailer. In addition, the stable region within the system will be narrow since the market is sensitive to the channel competition, brand competition, and advertising indifference.

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