Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment

We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation.

The Impact of Advance Selling Strategies on a Three-Echelon Supply Chain in the Presence of Social Influence

As the quality of new products is ex-ante uncertain, social influence plays an important role in the diffusion of a new product. An important question is how to expand public knowledge about consumer experience with a new product by using promotion strategies. This paper discusses the impact of advance selling strategies on a three-echelon supply chain when upstream enterprises launch a new product facing strategic consumers under social influence. This problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game, and a two-advance-selling-discount model is presented. Furthermore, we consider the impact of advance purchase behavior on the financing strategy when the retailer places an advance order. Several results are obtained: (i) the consumers’ utility in the second period is increasing in the number of predecessors. (ii) Upstream enterprises will provide deeper advance selling discounts when consumers become more patient or predecessors have a greater influence on imitators. Moreover, the total demand will increase when the consumer’s discount factor decreases or the impact intensity of predecessors increases. However, high innovation levels will drive enterprises to set high advance selling discounts. We also obtain the condition under which the total demand increases quickly as the innovation level changes. (iii) The two-advance-selling-discount model yields Pareto-improved results compared with the case where there is no advance purchase, though it cannot coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we extend the model to analyze the two-advance-selling-discount model with a minimum order quantity constraining the precommitted order quantity, and we show this can allow the enterprises to increase their profits. We also determine a condition under which the upstream enterprises should put a constraint on the minimum order quantity.

Contracts Adjustment under Bilateral Information Updating in a Supply Chain

This paper investigates contracts adjustment between one manufacturer and one retailer under bilateral information updating. The manufacturer incurs uncertain production cost and the retailer faces uncertain demand, but they can acquire independent signals to update production cost and demand, respectively. They commit an initial agreement on an initial wholesale price, minimum order quantity, and information sharing as well as the transfer payment and decisions adjustment when information is updated. We find that due to the joint impact of production cost variation and market variation, the manufacturer may not decrease (increase) her wholesale price when the updated production cost is lower (higher) than expected. The retailer places an additional order even if the wholesale price rises when the market outlook is good, but places an order with the minimum order quantity even if the wholesale price falls when the market outlook is bad. Secondly, for a certain level of information accuracy of the production cost and market demand, the retailer is always better off with information updating, but the manufacturer may be worse off with information updating when facing a bad market outlook. Thirdly, when information accuracy of the production cost and market demand varies, the manufacturer only benefits from a high accuracy of production cost. Profits of the retailer and the supply chain are increasing (decreasing) with accuracy of production cost if the updated production cost is larger (smaller) than expected.

Green Product Pricing and Order Strategies in a Supply Chain under Demand Forecasting

In this paper, we investigate price and order strategies for innovative green products using demand forecasting and sharing. We formulate the problem using a Stackelberg game and propose a dynamic contract that specifies an initial wholesale price, a minimum order quantity, a demand sharing agreement, and a decisions adjustment agreement. We arrived at the following main findings and implications. First, the manufacturer offers a higher or lower wholesale price than the initial one depending on the variation in the market status. Also, the retailer’s ordering decisions will increase with the wholesale price, which contradicts the common assumption that ordering decisions decrease with the wholesale price. Interestingly, if the market improves, the manufacturer obtains a higher profit margin than the retailer; if the market worsens, the manufacturer suffers more loss of profit margin than the retailer. Second, when the cost of information sharing is smaller than an upper bound, demand forecasting and sharing are always beneficial to the manufacturer. However, the value of demand forecasting and sharing for the retailer is significantly affected by the market status variation. Third, high information accuracy will not necessarily increase the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer, even if the market status is better than expected. Finally, numerical examples show the parameters’ effects. We have several main managerial insights. When the shared demand information is received from the retailer, the manufacturer can determine wholesale price strategies according to the retailer’s demand forecast. Moreover, if the manufacturer wants to ensure profitability, they should not choose retailers with a higher capability of demand forecasting.

PERLAKUAN PAJAK PERTAMBAHAN NILAI (PPN) ATAS DEBIT NOTE EKSPOR JASA KENA PAJAK

This study was conducted to determine about the debit notes is a taxable and tariffs 10% ( ten percent ) on export of taxable service if it is reviewed by taxable supplies, and to determine the treatment of VAT on Debit Note reviewed by the concept of destination principle and to determine whether it is acceptable in tax regulation of Indonesia if It’s issued a Debit Note for collecting of company income and to estimate how much penalties arise. This study used qualitative methods with qualitative descriptive analysis. The object of research is based on data available at the company that is secondary data. Data collection techniques are Library research.The results of data processing that the Debit Note is an taxable of VAT. In terms of destination Principle Debit Note is taxable to VAT 0 % (Zero Percent) for the shipping charge, the Minimum Order Quantity (MOQ) charge and cancel orders charge / penalty fees. Debit Note Billing mechanism is allowed in tax regulation as long as there is a document whose position equivalent to tax invoice for canceled order charge/penalty fees, but charge for shipping and the Minimum Order Quantity (MOQ) charge don’t allow in the tax regulation because it is non-compliance of the material terms of the tax invoice. As a result of the Debit Note that issued raised the sanctions of Article 14 paragraph (2) of general provisions and taxation procedures for 2 % of the tax base.Based on the suggested better in making commercial document to charge must analyze aspects of taxation in order to prevent tax penalties in this case to issue Debit Note need to create a document that is equivalent to a Tax Invoice because mechanism of the Debit Note is taxable of VAT.

A Two-Echelon Inventory System with a Minimum Order Quantity Requirement

In this paper, we study a two-echelon inventory system with one warehouse and multiple retailers, under the setting of periodic review and infinite horizon. In each period, retailers replenish their stocks from the warehouse, and the warehouse in turn replenishes from an external supplier. Particularly, as stipulated by the supplier, there is a minimum order quantity (MOQ) requirement for the warehouse. That is, the warehouse must order either none or at least as much as the MOQ. To investigate this system analytically, we assume retailers adopt the base-stock policy, and we design for the warehouse a new heuristic ordering policy, called refined base-stock policy, which conforms to the MOQ requirement. Moreover, in the case of shortages, we assume the warehouse adopts a virtual allocation policy, and therefore the orders for individual units are filled in the same order as the original demands at the retailers. To evaluate the long-run average system cost exactly, we present a position-based cost-accounting scheme, in which the cost associated with each unit is assigned to its first position at the warehouse. We also derive lower and upper bounds of the inventory parameters, facilitating the search for the optimal policy that minimizes the long-run average system cost.

Polynomial-Time Solvability of Dynamic Lot Size Problems

There has been a lot of research on dynamic lot sizing problems with different nonlinear cost structures due to capacitated production, minimum order quantity requirements, availability of quantity discounts, etc. Developing optimal solutions efficiently for dynamic lot sizing models with nonlinear cost functions is a challenging topic. In this paper, we present a set of sufficient conditions such that if a single-item dynamic lot sizing problem satisfies these conditions, then the existence of a polynomial-time solution method for the problem is guaranteed. Several examples are presented to demonstrate the use of these sufficient conditions.