scholarly journals Novel Joint-Financing Model for Bilateral Capital Restricted Supply Chains under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Yanfang Huo ◽  
Xize Wang ◽  
Quan Deng ◽  
Peng Han
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Loan Rate ◽  
The Government ◽  
Buy Back

This paper proposes a novel supply chain joint-financing pattern for SMEs with limited funds and financing difficulties. The proposed pattern was designed for green investment under cap-and-trade systems and to promote low-carbon economies characterized by bilateral capital restricted supply chains. The basic conditions for supply chain coordination of low-carbon buy-back contracts are derived through a basic model with no funding support. The joint-financing decisions model is analyzed according to the decision-making behavior of all parties and coordination among components of the supply chain system. The risk to which the bank is subjected under low-carbon transactions is also discussed. The proposed model not only reduces the carbon emissions of unit products, but also expands the scale of production. There are negative correlations between unit emissions reduction with the sharing coefficient of reduction costs, the loan rate, and the wholesale price. To minimize environmental effects while maximizing societal benefits, the government is recommended to ensure a reasonable trade-off between green-innovation subsidies and penalties.

scholarly journals Decentralized Supply Chains under Random Price-Dependent Demand: Noncooperative Equilibria vs. Coordination with Cost-Sharing Contracts

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yanpeng Sun ◽  
Cheng Ma ◽  
Qi Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Lost Sales ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Equilibrium Response ◽  
Buy Back ◽  
Dependent Demand

It is common for a supplier to sell products to multiple retailers. In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of a decentralized supply chain with multiple retailers facing a random price-dependent demand in the additive form. Here, we consider two kinds of demand functions: the distribution of the demand depends only on the retailer’s own retail price (noncompeting retailers) and not only on his own retail price but also on that of the other retailers (competing retailers). We present appropriate wholesale price, buy-back, and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts to coordinate the total supply chain, so that when all the retailers adopt their equilibrium response, the supply chain system coordination is also achieved. Furthermore, the coalition formation among retailers is also analyzed. We find that with buy-back and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts and linear price-dependent demand function, retailers always prefer being in the grand coalition to forming any other coalition.

Studying the Complexity of Multichannel Supply Chain with Different Power Structures Under Carbon Subsidy Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 2150166
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Yi Tian ◽  
Liu Chengjin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Bifurcation And Chaos ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Subsidy Rate ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Government

The game characteristics and equilibrium strategies of a triple-channel supply chain under the carbon subsidy policy are studied in this work with three different game power structures. There are simultaneous decision-making, manufacturer-dominated market and retailer-dominated market. The decision mechanism for order quantity of manufacturer and dual-channel retailer, is discussed. Meanwhile, their complex dynamic characteristics are studied. It is found that when the government implements dual low-carbon subsidies, the supply chain system in which the manufacturer dominates the market is more stable. The government should pay attention to the power structure of the market to determine an appropriate subsidy rate. The over-adjustment of order quantity from manufacturer’s direct sales channel and retailer’s online channel both will lead to large periodical fluctuations in the system, and even bifurcation and chaos. These will cause substantial fluctuations and even loss in the profits of supply chain companies. This analysis shows that delayed feedback can effectively stabilize the periodic bifurcation and chaos in the system.

scholarly journals Design Crowdsourcing Supply Chain in Short Life Cycle Products

2022 ◽  
Vol 132 ◽  
pp. 01015
Author(s):  
Dolgion Boldbaatar ◽  
Daeheon Choi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Small And Medium Enterprises ◽  
Financial Burden ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Innovation Model ◽  
Buy Back ◽  
Medium Enterprises ◽  
Product Industry

Design crowdsourcing is the largest open innovation model that can create value with potential consumers. It offers an opportunity to quickly respond to the market by obtaining instant designs from the crowd, freelancing designers with fundamental skills. In addition, it can secure globally innovative competitiveness without financial burden, which is more effective to start-up companies and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the field of seasonal product industry. Developing standardized design crowdsourcing supply chain processes and mathematical models is essential to respond to market trends and customer needs in the seasonal product industry. This study has been carried out to determine the best mechanism in the design crowdsourcing supply chain and coordinate each supply chain member whose desires meet each other. Thus, we identify contracts under which conditions can coordinate the crowdsourcing supply chain by a newsvendor model with a manufacturer and a retailer with a crowdsourcing platform. To see that, we study the coordination of the crowdsourcing supply chain through the following contracts: wholesale price, buy-back, and revenue sharing contract. For the forecasting, we present a framework of the design crowdsourcing supply chain and compare supply chain performance under crowdsourcing supply chain coordination. The summarized result shows that the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the crowdsourcing supply chain efficiently. In contrast, buy-back and revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the crowdsourcing supply chain.

scholarly journals Supply chain coordination of biomass moulding fuel under random supply and cyclical demand

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-118
Author(s):  
Xinning Li ◽  
Kun Fan ◽  
Lu Wang ◽  
Lang Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Biomass Energy ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Online Information ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Fuel Supply

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to design a contract to coordinate the biomass molding fuel supply chain consisting of a supplier with uncertain supply and a producer with cyclical demand as well as improve the profit of this supply chain. Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the supply chain model was build and all the variables and assumptions are set. Stackelberg game model was used to analyze and solve the problem. Furthermore, the authors give numerical examples and result analysis on the basis of data coming from field study and online information about a real biomass fuel supply chain. Findings The wholesale price with shortage penalty contract the authors proposed can coordinate the supply chain. And as the dominator of the supply chain, the producer can realize the redistribution of profits within the supply chain by determine the contract parameters. Research limitations/implications This one-to-one supply chain is a basic of complex supply chain system. Multi-to-one, one-to-multi and multi-to-multi supply chain can be studied in the future. Originality/value The results obtained in this paper can be used as a reference for enterprises in biomass energy supply chain to make contracts and realize the long-term co-operations among supply chain members.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Strategy Analysis of Low Carbon Subsidy Policies Based on Carbon Trading

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yinjie Zhang ◽  
Chunxiang Guo ◽  
Liangcheng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Consumer Prices ◽  
The Government

The low-carbon economy has become the focus of global attention and scientific measurement standards with the concepts of low energy consumption, low pollution, and sustainable development. More and more attentions are paid to the research of low-carbon supply chains. Based on a two-level low-carbon supply chain in the context of carbon trading, a Stackelberg game model was established for government subsidies to determine a coordinated and balanced solution for supply chains in situations dominated by manufacturers. The optimal strategies for low-carbon technology innovation are analyzed within the context of governmental subsidies. This study’s conclusions are as follows: (1) When government subsidies are in place, regardless of who the government subsidies are meant for, manufacturers and retailers that do not generate carbon emissions will transfer the subsidies to the companies that generate carbon emissions by adjusting wholesale prices and retail prices to maximize their own profits. (2) When consumer prices are sensitive, the government’s optimal subsidy intensity increases as consumers’ low-carbon preferences increase. When consumer prices are not sensitive, the government should not provide any subsidies. (3) When consumers’ low-carbon preferences are weak, the retail price of products will decrease with the increase in subsidies; when consumers’ low-carbon preferences are strong, the opposite dynamic occurs.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Decisions Under Different Power Structures: Wholesale Price vs. Revenue Sharing Contract

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (21) ◽  
pp. 7737
Author(s):  
Xiaojing Liu ◽  
Wenyi Du ◽  
Yijie Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Power Control ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Control Structure ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System

In the market, once consumers have a low-carbon preference, they will choose green low-carbon products. The market demand for green products is not only related to product price, but also consumers’ low-carbon preference. In this way, enterprise has to consider the cost of carbon emissions in the process of production and operation. In this paper, we consider a two-level supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The supply chain system can determine the price of products and the level of carbon emission reduction through different supply chain contracts: wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract. However, the power control structure of a manufacturer and a retailer is different, which will further affect the decision-making strategy of the supply chain system. We set up four models (Wholesale Price—NM and NR, and Revenue-Sharing—SR and SM) of the supply chain with carbon emission reduction, and calculated and analyzed. The results show that firstly, regardless of whether the manufacturer’s power control structure or the retailer power structure is dominant, the manufacturer wholesale price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price, and it is inversely proportional to the revenue-sharing proportion. Secondly, under the two power control structures, the carbon emission level of the manufacturer with a contract on revenue-sharing is always lower than on wholesale price, and it gradually decreases with the increase of the revenue-sharing proportion of the manufacturers. Thirdly, when the retailer dominates the supply chain, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price. Under the manufacturer’s power control structure, when the revenue-sharing ratio is small, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is higher than on wholesale price; when the revenue-sharing ratio is large, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is lower than on wholesale price. Finally, the validity of the model is verified by an example, and the sensitivity of the parameters is analyzed.

scholarly journals Can cost sharing contracts coordinate green supply chains based on manufacturers’ overconfidence

2021 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 04014
Author(s):  
Hui Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Numerical Experimentation ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Green Supply Chains ◽  
The Impact

Cost sharing contracts is one of the most common contracts to coordinate green supply chains. In this paper, we examine whether it can coordinate green supply chains in the set up of overconfidence. We assume that the manufacturer is overconfident and the retailer is rational. The manufacturer overestimates consumers’ sensitivity to product greenness and accurately estimates the uncertainty of demand. The overconfident manufacturer and the rational retailer cooperate through cost sharing contracts. Then, we construct a game theoretical model to analyze the impact of manufacturers’ overconfident on product greenness, pricing, profit and supply chain cooperation. At last, a numerical experimentation is presented. We find that, (1) the product greenness, wholesale price and retail price increase with the manufacturer’s overconfidence as well as the retailer’s cost sharing proportion. (2) no matter how much the cost sharing proportion is, the profit of manufacturers and retailers decreases with the manufacturer’s overconfidence level. (3) cost sharing contracts can achieve the green supply chain coordination in rational setting. But under manufacturers’ overconfidence, it cannot.

scholarly journals The Model of Distributor Chain Financing Based on Buy Back Guarantee Contract

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian-xin Chen ◽  
Jia-yin Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
The Core ◽  
Core Enterprise ◽  
Buy Back ◽  
Optimal Ordering ◽  
Ordering Quantity

This paper considers the strategy employed by a buy back guarantee contract with a capital-constrained distributor and a core enterprise. The distributor faces a nonnegative random demand, and the core enterprise applies buy back guarantee contract in order to interact with the capital-constrained distributor. Mathematical model is built to get the optimal ordering quantity of the distributor and the optimal wholesale price of the core enterprise. Then sensitivity analysis of optimal ordering quantity is obtained about the wholesale price, the initial funds, and the salvage of the product. On that basis, the comparison is made between two financing modes—trade credit contract and buy back guarantee contract. In the end, a numerical analysis is illustrated. The results show that the different financing modes bring the different expected profits to supply chain system with the different initial funds, finding that the financing modes, buy back guarantee contract discussed in the paper, can create more value for supply chain system than trade credit contract.

scholarly journals Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism and Differential Game Model Construction of Mask Emergency Supply Chain Cooperation Based on COVID-19 Outbreak

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1115
Author(s):  
Shufan Zhu ◽  
Kefan Xie ◽  
Ping Gui
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Dynamic Adjustment ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
The Impact

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination Contracts under Double Sided Disruptions Simultaneously

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huan Zhang ◽  
Yang Liu ◽  
Jingsi Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Pricing Policy ◽  
Product Cost ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Supply Chain Contracts ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Key Factor

Supply chain coordination models are developed in a two-echelon supply chain with double sided disruptions. In a supply chain system, the supplier may suffer from the product cost disruption and the retailer suffers from the demand disruption simultaneously. The purpose of this study is to design proper supply chain contracts, under which the supply chain with double sided disruption can be coordinated. Firstly, the centralized decision-making models are applied to find the optimal price and quantity under three cases as the baseline. The different cases are divided by the different relationship between the product cost disruption and the demand disruption. Secondly, two different types of contracts are introduced to coordinate the whole supply chain. One is all-unit wholesale quantity discount policy (AQDP) contract, and the other one is capacitated linear pricing policy (CLPP) contract. And it is found out that the gap between the demand disruption and the product cost disruption is the key factor to influence the supply chain coordination. Some numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are given to illustrate the models. The AQDP contracts are listed out under different cases to show how to use it under double sided disruptions.

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