scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination Contracts under Double Sided Disruptions Simultaneously

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huan Zhang ◽  
Yang Liu ◽  
Jingsi Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Pricing Policy ◽  
Product Cost ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Supply Chain Contracts ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Key Factor

Supply chain coordination models are developed in a two-echelon supply chain with double sided disruptions. In a supply chain system, the supplier may suffer from the product cost disruption and the retailer suffers from the demand disruption simultaneously. The purpose of this study is to design proper supply chain contracts, under which the supply chain with double sided disruption can be coordinated. Firstly, the centralized decision-making models are applied to find the optimal price and quantity under three cases as the baseline. The different cases are divided by the different relationship between the product cost disruption and the demand disruption. Secondly, two different types of contracts are introduced to coordinate the whole supply chain. One is all-unit wholesale quantity discount policy (AQDP) contract, and the other one is capacitated linear pricing policy (CLPP) contract. And it is found out that the gap between the demand disruption and the product cost disruption is the key factor to influence the supply chain coordination. Some numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are given to illustrate the models. The AQDP contracts are listed out under different cases to show how to use it under double sided disruptions.

Benefit sharing in inter‐organizational coordination

2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 400-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karuna Jain ◽  
Lokesh Nagar ◽  
Vivek Srivastava
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Benefit Sharing ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Pricing Policy ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Holding Costs ◽  
The One

PurposeTo develop an EOQ based model to quantify the benefit accrue due to coordination for the one supplier and n retailer supply chain system and concept to share the benefits derived from coordination.Design/methodology/approachAn intensive literature review has been done in the area of supply chain coordination covering both marketing and operational perspective. The analysis of literature has shown that models to quantify the benefits for supply chains consisting of a single supplier who supplies a product to multiple heterogeneous buyers are very limited. To fill this critical research gap the benefit sharing mechanism is derived based on optimal order quantity of the supply chain system.FindingsThis paper demonstrates the benefits of coordination to the supply chain system in terms of cost saving and generating the surplus money. It also suggests a way to find the range of prices to facilitated coordination. Under the developed pricing policy, no partner after coordination had to bear a loss. So in that sense we can say that the benefits of coordination are distributed to all the partners.Practical implicationsThe proposed model for benefit sharing protects the interest of all supply chain partners and hence will be profitable to all. The pricing scheme suggested will motivate retailers to increase ordering quantity per order, thereby reducing the joint ordering and holding costs.Originality/valueThe paper is unique in terms of quantifying and sharing the benefits of coordination for one supplier – multi heterogeneous buyer supply chain system.

scholarly journals A Model of Waste Price in a Symbiotic Supply Chain Based on Stackelberg Algorithm

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1740
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Liangyan Zhao ◽  
Zhihong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Sensitivity Analysis ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Income Level ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Revenue Model

By establishing a two-level symbiotic supply chain system consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer, we use Stackelberg method to analyze the optimal price and revenue model of supplier and manufacturer in the symbiotic supply chain under two power structures in which the supplier and manufacturer are dominant respectively, and analyze the influence of the degree of symbiosis and power structure on the model. Through comparative analysis, we find that: There is a relationship between the income level and the degree of symbiosis in the symbiotic supply chain. The change of power structure will affect the relative benefits of suppliers and manufacturers in the symbiotic supply chain. The manufacturer’s expected unit product revenue will affect the supply chain revenue when the manufacturer is dominant. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters is carried out through an example analysis, and the validity of the conclusion is verified. This paper has a guiding significance for the behavior of enterprises in the cogeneration supply chain.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination under Stock- and Price-Dependent Selling Rates under Declining Market

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Sambhu Das ◽  
Manjusri Basu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Time Price

We explore coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a distributor and a retailer. The effect of revenue-sharing contract mechanism is examined under stock-time-price-sensitive demand rate. First, we investigate relationships between distributor and retailer under noncooperative distributor-Stackelberg games. Then we establish analytically that revenue sharing contact is able to coordinate the system and leads to the win-win outcomes. Finally, numerical examples are presented to compare results between the different models.

The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Returns Policies and Supply Chain Coordination

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gulay Samatli-Pac ◽  
Wenjing Shen ◽  
Xinxin Hu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Lower Price ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Product Return ◽  
Returns Policy ◽  
The Impact

Product return is a common after-sale service. Existing literature has assumed loss neutral consumers, while in practice consumers are often more sensitive to utility losses than gains, i.e., customers are often loss averse. In this paper, we study the impact of such loss aversion on the retailer's optimal pricing and returns policies. We analyze three scenarios where the seller offers no refund, full refund and partial refund for the returned products. Under each scenario, the seller determines the optimal price, quantity, and refund amount (under partial refund case) in order to maximize the expected profit. Our results demonstrate that consumer loss aversion leads a no-refund retailer to charge lower price and order smaller quantity, has no impact on a full-refund retailer, and results in a more lenient returns policy for a partial-refund retailer. We also find contracts that coordinate supply chains selling to loss averse consumers. Therefore, this article sheds some lights on how the management of returns policies should be adapted when consumers are loss averse.

Coordination and Decision of Supply Chain Under

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 21-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangdong Liu ◽  
Tianjian Yang ◽  
Yao Wei ◽  
Xuemei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Decentralized System ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Future Work ◽  
Dependent Demand

In order to investigate supply chain coordination and decision under customer balking and stochastic demand, the article considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer with risk-neutral and one retailer with risk-neutral and develops two models in a centralized and a decentralized system and the three contracts are designed to coordinate supply chain and the optimal price and customer balking strategies are obtained. The results show that the revenue and cost-sharing contract can coordinate supply chain under customer balking and price-dependent demand and achieve the Pareto-improvement; the expected sales quantity and expected reduced sales quantity are influenced conversely by the threshold of inventory and probability of a sale under customer balking. In addition, numerical analysis is given to verify the effectiveness of revenue and cost-sharing contract and the paper gives some managerial insights and puts forward to the future work at last.

scholarly journals Strategic Conditions for Opening an Internet Store and Pricing Policies in a Retailer-Dominant Supply Chain

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yonghong Cheng ◽  
Zhongkai Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Pricing Policies ◽  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
Multichannel Retailing ◽  
Dominant Retailer ◽  
Theoretical Results

To examine when the manufacturer and dominant retailer open their own Internet stores and how setting prices to ensure opening Internet stores are profitable. We consider a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and one dominant retailer. The retailer has a physical store in a monopolist market. Depending on whether the Internet stores are opened successfully by them, we firstly obtain equilibrium prices and profits under four possible supply chain structures. Secondly, we identify several strategic conditions when it is optimal to open an Internet store for the manufacturer and dominant retailer and discuss its implications. It is interesting to note that multichannel retailing is not necessarily the best strategy for the dominant retailer. In addition, we investigate the impacts of problem parameters (the dominant retailer’s bargaining power and consumers’ disutility of purchasing a product from Internet store) on the manufacturer and dominant retailer’s pricing policies. We find that the manufacturer’s optimal price at her Internet store is not always being lower than the dominant retailer’s. Finally, we conduct numerical examples to illustrate the theoretical results.

A Multi-Retailer Decentralized Supply Chain Coordination Based on Revenue-Sharing Contracts

2014 ◽  
Vol 668-669 ◽  
pp. 1587-1590
Author(s):  
Jin Yu Ren ◽  
Yong Xian Liu ◽  
Peng Fei Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Optimal Solutions ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Numerical Example ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain

To a decentralized supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and multiple independent retailers, the game models about the decentralized solution and centralized solution are developed. Comparison of the optimal solutions to two models reveals that the supply chain needs coordination. Then a coordination model on the revenue-sharing contracts is introduced. Finally, a numerical example shows that the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible allocation of the profit can be achieved when a complementary profit-sharing agreement is included.

scholarly journals An Algebraic Decision Support Model for Inventory Coordination in the Generalized n-Stage Non-Serial Supply Chain with Fixed and Linear Backorders Costs

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 1998
Author(s):  
Mohamed Seliaman ◽  
Leopoldo Cárdenas-Barrón ◽  
Sayeed Rushd
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Total System ◽  
Decision Support Model ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Operational Information ◽  
N Stage ◽  
Inventory Decisions

This paper extends and generalizes former inventory models that apply algebraic methods to derive optimal supply chain inventory decisions. In particular this paper considers the problem of coordinating production-inventory decisions in an integrated n-stage supply chain system with linear and fixed backorder costs. This supply chain system assumes information symmetry which implies that all partners share their operational information. First, a mathematical model for the supply chain system total cost is formulated under the integer multipliers coordination mechanism. Then, a recursive algebraic algorithm to derive the optimal inventory replenishment decisions is developed. The applicability of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated using two different numerical examples. Results from the numerical examples indicate that adopting the integer multiplier mechanism will reduce the overall total system cost as compared to using the common cycle time mechanism.

SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION WITH UNCERTAINTY IN TWO-ECHELON YIELDS

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (01) ◽  
pp. 1250044 ◽  
Author(s):  
HONGJUN PENG ◽  
MEIHUA ZHOU ◽  
LING QIAN
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Profit Value ◽  
Production Decision

This paper researches the coordination models in the supply chain where there are uncertain two-echelon yields and random demand. We analyzed three contracts of revenue sharing (RS), overproduction risk sharing (OS), and combination of RS and OS (RO), and contrasted them with uncoordinated model. We studied the optimal order decision for downstream manufacturer and the optimal production decision for upstream manufacturer. Numerical examples were presented to illustrate the results. The study showed that the RS contract and OS sharing contract both have their advantages and disadvantages and the RO contract could benefit the whole supply chain best. We found out that the OS contract gives the upstream manufacturer incentive to produce more so as to maximize the profit value, but the upstream manufacturer may receive less as the price of overproduced part increases. We also found out that under most scenarios, the supply chain benefits from the yields and demand risks reduction and generates a higher profit. But sometimes in the OS contract the downstream manufacturer profit can increase as yields randomness increases. And, in the uncoordinated case and OS contract, the upstream manufacturer profit can increase as demand randomness increases.

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