scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Decisions Under Different Power Structures: Wholesale Price vs. Revenue Sharing Contract

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (21) ◽  
pp. 7737
Author(s):  
Xiaojing Liu ◽  
Wenyi Du ◽  
Yijie Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Power Control ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Control Structure ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System

In the market, once consumers have a low-carbon preference, they will choose green low-carbon products. The market demand for green products is not only related to product price, but also consumers’ low-carbon preference. In this way, enterprise has to consider the cost of carbon emissions in the process of production and operation. In this paper, we consider a two-level supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The supply chain system can determine the price of products and the level of carbon emission reduction through different supply chain contracts: wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract. However, the power control structure of a manufacturer and a retailer is different, which will further affect the decision-making strategy of the supply chain system. We set up four models (Wholesale Price—NM and NR, and Revenue-Sharing—SR and SM) of the supply chain with carbon emission reduction, and calculated and analyzed. The results show that firstly, regardless of whether the manufacturer’s power control structure or the retailer power structure is dominant, the manufacturer wholesale price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price, and it is inversely proportional to the revenue-sharing proportion. Secondly, under the two power control structures, the carbon emission level of the manufacturer with a contract on revenue-sharing is always lower than on wholesale price, and it gradually decreases with the increase of the revenue-sharing proportion of the manufacturers. Thirdly, when the retailer dominates the supply chain, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price. Under the manufacturer’s power control structure, when the revenue-sharing ratio is small, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is higher than on wholesale price; when the revenue-sharing ratio is large, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is lower than on wholesale price. Finally, the validity of the model is verified by an example, and the sensitivity of the parameters is analyzed.

scholarly journals Decision Optimization of Low-Carbon Dual-Channel Supply Chain of Auto Parts Based on Smart City Architecture

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheng Liu ◽  
Bin Hu ◽  
Bangtong Huang ◽  
Lingling Lang ◽  
Hangxin Guo ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Smart City ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Auto Parts

Affected by the Internet, computer, information technology, etc., building a smart city has become a key task of socialist construction work. The smart city has always regarded green and low-carbon development as one of the goals, and the carbon emissions of the auto parts industry cannot be ignored, so we should carry out energy conservation and emission reduction. With the rapid development of the domestic auto parts industry, the number of car ownership has increased dramatically, producing more and more CO2 and waste. Facing the pressure of resources, energy, and environment, the effective and circular operation of the auto parts supply chain under the low-carbon transformation is not only a great challenge, but also a development opportunity. Under the background of carbon emission, this paper establishes a decision-making optimization model of the low-carbon supply chain of auto parts based on carbon emission responsibility sharing and resource sharing. This paper analyzes the optimal decision-making behavior and interaction of suppliers, producers, physical retailers, online retailers, demand markets, and recyclers in the auto parts industry, constructs the economic and environmental objective functions of low-carbon supply chain management, applies variational inequality to analyze the optimal conditions of the whole low-carbon supply chain system, and finally carries out simulation calculation. The research shows that the upstream and downstream auto parts enterprises based on low-carbon competition and cooperation can effectively manage the carbon footprint of the whole supply chain through the sharing of responsibilities and resources among enterprises, so as to reduce the overall carbon emissions of the supply chain system.

A Multi-Retailer Decentralized Supply Chain Coordination Based on Revenue-Sharing Contracts

2014 ◽  
Vol 668-669 ◽  
pp. 1587-1590
Author(s):  
Jin Yu Ren ◽  
Yong Xian Liu ◽  
Peng Fei Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Optimal Solutions ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Numerical Example ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain

To a decentralized supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and multiple independent retailers, the game models about the decentralized solution and centralized solution are developed. Comparison of the optimal solutions to two models reveals that the supply chain needs coordination. Then a coordination model on the revenue-sharing contracts is introduced. Finally, a numerical example shows that the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible allocation of the profit can be achieved when a complementary profit-sharing agreement is included.

COORDINATING TWO-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAINS UNDER STOCK AND PRICE DEPENDENT DEMAND RATE

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (02) ◽  
pp. 1250051 ◽  
Author(s):  
SHIBAJI PANDA
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Integrated System ◽  
Cost Structure ◽  
Inventory Level ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Implicit Information ◽  
Demand Rate

Coordination is imperative for improving supply chain performance. In this paper, we focus on coordination of a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a price-setting retailer, which operates for a single product. Customer demand is influenced by retailer's instantaneous inventory level and selling price. The integrated system and the decentralized scenario, by considering manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader, are discussed. It is shown that conventional revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate the system but revenue and cost sharing (RCS) contract is able to coordinate the system and leads to a win–win outcome. The key contract parameters — cost sharing fraction, along with revenue sharing fraction and wholesale price are determined under explicit and implicit information of retailer's cost structure. Finally, it is shown that range of cost sharing fraction that leads to win–win situation is independent of the format of cost structure of retailer. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the development of the model.

scholarly journals Government Subsidies and Revenue Sharing Decisions for Port and Shipping Service Supply Chain in Emission Control Areas

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Bing Han ◽  
Xia Pan ◽  
Yu Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Emission Control ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
System Optimization ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
The Government

As the core of the port and shipping service supply chain system, the port and shipping companies must urgently solve the problem of how to balance emissions, costs, and benefits with the gradual extension of China’s emission control area (ECA) and the stringent emission requirements. From the perspective of system optimization, this research constructs a revenue sharing model of the port and shipping service supply chain and deals with the revenue sharing decision-making problem of the secondary service supply chain after port enterprises and shipping enterprises joining the government subsidy mechanism driven by ECA’s policy. Research shows that the government subsidy mechanism directly affects the profit of the port and shipping service supply chain, which is the key factor in implementing the ECA’s policy and promoting the emission reduction of the port and shipping enterprises. The revenue sharing of the port and shipping enterprises plays a decisive role in the revenue of the shipping enterprises. Cooperative emission reduction mechanism should be led by port enterprises to promote the balance between revenue and emission reduction in the supply chain system. Results provide a reference for the Chinese government to formulate corresponding incentives and subsidy policy under the new ECA’s regulations as well as solving the problems of how to balance emissions reduction and cost improvement for port and shipping enterprises.

scholarly journals Carbon Emission Reduction Decision and Revenue-Sharing Contract with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference and CER Cost under Carbon Tax

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Chao-qun Han ◽  
Hua-ying Gu ◽  
Li-hui Sui ◽  
Chang-peng Shao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Theoretical And Numerical Analysis ◽  
The Impact

Since the tax of carbon emission is popular and consumers are exhibiting low-carbon preference, the green manufactures have to spend more extra cost on investing carbon emission reduction (CER) technology to decrease the carbon emission. To encourage the manufacture’s CER investment efforts, this paper explores the impact of carbon tax, CER cost, and consumers’ low-carbon preference on low-carbon decision-making and designs a revenue-sharing contract (RS) by constructing Stackelberg models. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, this paper finds that the supply chain would benefit from the increment of consumer’s environmental awareness but be depressed by the increase of the CER investment cost factor. Additionally, there exists a unique optimal carbon tax to make CER degree the maximum. Furthermore, RS can effectively promote manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions and also improve the supply chain efficiency.

scholarly journals The Stability and Complexity Analysis of a Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concern Behavior and Sales Service

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (15) ◽  
pp. 2711 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiuxiang Li ◽  
Xingli Chen ◽  
Yimin Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Stable Range ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Fairness Concern

This paper studies a low-carbon dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells products through the direct channel and traditional channel, and a retailer sells products through the traditional channel. The manufacturer considers carbon emission reduction and has fairness concern behavior. The retailer provides sales service in the traditional channel and considers fairness concern behavior. The objective of this paper is to analyze the effects of different parameter values on the price stability and utility of the supply chain system emphatically using 2D bifurcation diagram, parameter plot basin, the basins of attraction, chaos attractor and sensitivity to the initial value, etc. The results find that the retailer’s fairness concern behavior shrinks the stability of the supply chain system more than that of the manufacturer’s fairness concern behavior. The system stability region decreases with the increase of carbon emission reduction level and the retailer’s fairness concern. The customers’ preference for the direct channel decreases the stable range of the direct channel, while it enlarges the stable range of the traditional channel. The supply chain system enters into chaos through flip bifurcation with the increase of price adjustment speed. In a stable state, the manufacture improving customer’s preference for the direct channel and the retailer choosing the appropriate fairness concern level can achieve the maximum utility separately. In a chaotic state, the average utilities of the manufacturer and retailer all decline, while that of the retailer declines even more. By selecting appropriate control parameter, the low-carbon dual-channel supply chain system can return to a stable state from chaos again. The research of this paper is of great significance to price decisions of participants and supply chain operation management.

scholarly journals A Study on Supply Chain Emission Reduction Level Based on Carbon Tax and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preferences under Stochastic Demand

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liang Wang ◽  
Tingjia Xu ◽  
Longhao Qin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Concave Function ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Stochastic Market

This article focuses on the level of supply chain emission reduction, taking into account consumers’ low-carbon preferences, stochastic market demand, and carbon tax policy. By introducing the emission reduction penalty mechanism and adopting reverse derivation method, it derives the revenue model of the retailer and the manufacturer in decentralized and centralized supply chain when the supply chain reduces emissions or is not under stochastic market demand. The research results are as follows. (i) The optimal retailer’s revenue is strictly monotonous increasing with respect to the consumers’ low-carbon preferences in the decentralized supply chain. However, in the centralized supply chain, the optimal revenue of the retailer and the manufacturer are strictly monotonously decreasing of the consumers’ low-carbon preferences respectively. (ii) The retailer’s revenue is a concave function of the order quantity, and there exists a unique order quantity that can maximize retailer’s revenue. The manufacturer’s revenue is a concave function of the wholesale price, and there exists a unique wholesale price that can maximize manufacturer’s revenue. (iii) When consumers’ low-carbon preferences are given, there is an optimal emission reduction level that maximizes the overall revenue of the supply chain. Furthermore, as the carbon tax increases, the optimal emission reduction level gradually rises. (iv) As the level of emission reduction in the supply chain increases, the range of the revenue sharing coefficient becomes larger, and it is easier for supply chain members to reach a revenue sharing contract. However, when consumers’ low-carbon preferences and carbon tax increase, the opposite is true.

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