scholarly journals The Pricing Strategy of Dual Recycling Channels for Power Batteries of New Energy Vehicles under Government Subsidies

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Wei Li
Keyword(s):  
Automobile Industry ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
Recycling Networks ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Cost

The vigorous development of the new energy automobile industry has highlighted the issue of efficient recycling of power batteries. Using a Stackelberg game, the pricing mechanism of dual-channel power battery recycling models under different government subsidies is investigated. Consequently, sensitivity analysis and comparison analysis are conducted, providing the pricing decision and the optimal profit of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) systems. Finally, the effects of recycling efforts, power battery greenness levels, service levels, and consumer green recycling awareness on prices of power batteries and profits are determined through numerical simulations, and the optimal prices under different strategies are compared. The results indicate that recycling prices of each party in the manufacturer subsidy model are relatively high, and consumers’ green awareness and the green levels of power batteries are directly proportional to the recycling prices offered by recycling parties. Automobile 4S stores and recycling networks should pay attention to the balance between the increase in the cost and the quantity of government subsidies for their recycling efforts. For recycling enterprises, maintaining an appropriate service level can maximize their profits and positively motivate the development of them.

scholarly journals Research on Pricing and Service Level Strategies of Dual Channel Reverse Supply Chain Considering Consumer Preference in Multi-Regional Situations

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (23) ◽  
pp. 9143
Author(s):  
Yao Kang ◽  
Juhong Chen ◽  
Di Wu
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Transfer Prices ◽  
High Level

Facing the increasingly serious waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) recycling problem, recycling enterprises actively introduce online recycling channels, build dual channel reverse supply chains (DRSC), and use high-level recycling price and service levels to enhance consumers’ recycling enthusiasm and recycling amount. Nevertheless, in China, where the imbalance of regional development is widespread, the recycling center, third-party recycler (TPR), and third-party platform (TPP) are faced with the choices of pricing and service level when facing multi-regional consumers. This paper mainly answers the following questions: (1) When the recycling center and TPP introduce online recycling channels in multi-regional situations, how should they set online recycling price, transfer price, and service level? (2) When consumer preference for online channels changes in a certain region, how should recycling enterprises adjust their optimal pricing and service level decisions for different regions to maximize their own profits? How do the profits of recycling enterprises change? In order to solve the above problems, in this paper, we propose three pricing and service level decision models for the recycling center with online channels, namely, keeping prices unchanged, unifying all prices, and maximizing its own profits. By using the Stackelberg game to solve the model, we get the optimal pricing, service level decisions, as well as the maximum profits of the recycling center, TPP, and TPR when consumer preference changes. By analyzing the results of the model, we find that the change of consumer preference for online channels in a certain region will affect the decision and profits of multi-regional recycling enterprises. Specifically, consumer preference for online channels in a certain region will not only lead to an increase in the profits of the recycling center and TPP and a decrease in the profit of local TPRs, but also an increase in the profit of TPRs in other regions. In addition, at the beginning of introducing online channels, the recycling center can adopt two strategies to avoid conflicts among channels: keeping offline transfer prices unchanged and unifying all transfer prices, but the former promotes its economic profits more significantly.

scholarly journals Economic research and suggestions on the recycling of waste power batteries for China’s new energy vehicles

2020 ◽  
Vol 165 ◽  
pp. 01028
Author(s):  
Li Zhenbiao ◽  
Li Yuke ◽  
Pan Wei ◽  
Wang Jia
Keyword(s):  
Economic Research ◽  
Hydrometallurgical Process ◽  
Analysis Model ◽  
Rare Metals ◽  
Recycling Industry ◽  
Battery Recycling ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Cost ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

With the rapid promotion of the number of China’s new energy vehicles in promotion and application, it is of great significance to ensure the recycling of the waste power batteries. It can not only effectively reduce the safety and environmental protection risks brought by the waste power battery, but also alleviate China’s dependence on rare metals such as cobalt and lithium, which has been widely concerned by the industry. In this paper, the cost analysis model of waste power battery treated by hydrometallurgical process is established, and the economy of recycling of ternary material battery and LFP battery is compared and analysed, and the overall economy of the whole power battery recycling industry is analysed, and the relevant conclusions are obtained, and the relevant suggestions of recycling of power battery are put forward according to the analysis results, to provide reference for industry and related management departments.

Competition and Coordination in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain With Asymmetric Retailers

2020 ◽  
pp. 1311-1328
Author(s):  
YuHang Zhang ◽  
Ying Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Different Characteristics ◽  
Linear Quantity

This article studies competition and coordination in a dual-channel supply chain where one supplier supplies homogeneous products to multiple asymmetric retailers, meanwhile, selling products to the end consumers acting as retailers, through a two-level Stackelberg game. This article first studies the asymmetry among the retailers in terms of the different characteristics of the cost, price, quantity. This article finds that a supplier's profits increase when the number of retailers are high enough in the retail market, even though the retail price of the retailers is lower than that of the supplier, or the wholesale price is cut down when there are many retailers competing in the retail market. On the other hand, under certain conditions, the efficiency of supply chain goes to 1. In this article, the authors show that some traditional contracts that can perfectly coordinate the single-channel supply chain, while failing to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. Therefore, this article puts forth a linear quantity discount contract and first proves it can be applicable to the dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric retailers under a certain special condition where the lead retailer exits the retail market. The authors examine contracts which can reduce the loss of the efficiency, though they cannot completely coordinate a dual-channel supply chain.

scholarly journals Pricing decision of a dual-channel supply chain with different payment, corporate social responsibility and service level

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baogui Xin ◽  
Le Zhang ◽  
Lei Xie
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Payment Methods ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Strategies such as price, CSR, and service have an important impact on enterprises and supply chains. This paper proposes a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. Considering the product pricing, CSR level, and service level in the supply chain, this paper employs the Stackelberg game to depict supply chain participants' optimal decisions and analyze the influence of explanatory variables on the optimal decision with retailer's payment methods. The results state that market share, service level, CSR, and financing interest rate significantly impact the pricing decision of all participants in the supply chain. In addition, strategies of CSR level and service level are also affected by the discount rate of advance payment, financing interest rate, return on investment, and opportunity cost rate. This paper incorporates CSR and service level into the objective function, considers a variety of retailers' payment methods, enriches the supply chain's pricing model, and is of great value to scientific decision-making of enterprises and sustainable development of supply chains.

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Models of Green Products in a Two-Echelon Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenkai Lou ◽  
Xuming Lou ◽  
Xiaozhen Dai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Layer Model ◽  
Numerical Illustration ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper deals with issues concerning green subsidies of government and optimal decisions of a manufacture and dual-channel retailers in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain. Both a decentralized supply chain and a centralized supply chain are considered. Sufficient and necessary conditions for guaranteeing that the two supply chains run normally under government subsidies are proposed. For the decentralized supply chain, a three-layer model is constructed according to different priorities of the four participants. Both Bertrand game and Stackelberg game are involved. For the centralized supply chain, a two-layer model is given. Decision models of the government under a financial budget are developed for maximizing the green degree of each case. It is shown that the green degree of the product of the centralized supply chain is always higher than that of the decentralized supply chain. Meanwhile, the total profit of the centralized supply is also higher. Finally, a numerical illustration is presented to visualize the discussed models and make some supplements.

scholarly journals Government subsidies and corporate innovation performance- Based on the empirical analysis of the new energy automobile industry

2020 ◽  
Vol 214 ◽  
pp. 01006
Author(s):  
Wu Xiaoman ◽  
Wu Shiqi
Keyword(s):  
Automobile Industry ◽  
Significant Inhibition ◽  
Innovation Performance ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Corporate Innovation ◽  
Panel Data Regression ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
Analysis Models ◽  
D Investment

This paper selects 112 listed companies in China’s a-share new energy vehicle sector from 2009 to 2018 as a research sample, and uses panel data regression analysis models to empirically test the effects of government subsidies on corporate R&D investment and corporate innovation performance. It shows that government subsidies have a significant promotion effect on enterprises R&D investment; government subsidies have a significant inhibition effect on enterprises’ innovation performance.

Competition and Coordination in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain With Asymmetric Retailers

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
YuHang Zhang ◽  
Ying Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Different Characteristics ◽  
Linear Quantity

This article studies competition and coordination in a dual-channel supply chain where one supplier supplies homogeneous products to multiple asymmetric retailers, meanwhile, selling products to the end consumers acting as retailers, through a two-level Stackelberg game. This article first studies the asymmetry among the retailers in terms of the different characteristics of the cost, price, quantity. This article finds that a supplier's profits increase when the number of retailers are high enough in the retail market, even though the retail price of the retailers is lower than that of the supplier, or the wholesale price is cut down when there are many retailers competing in the retail market. On the other hand, under certain conditions, the efficiency of supply chain goes to 1. In this article, the authors show that some traditional contracts that can perfectly coordinate the single-channel supply chain, while failing to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. Therefore, this article puts forth a linear quantity discount contract and first proves it can be applicable to the dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric retailers under a certain special condition where the lead retailer exits the retail market. The authors examine contracts which can reduce the loss of the efficiency, though they cannot completely coordinate a dual-channel supply chain.

scholarly journals Impacts of government interventions on pricing policies of the dual-channel supply chain by considering retailer services

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (S1) ◽  
pp. 231-252
Author(s):  
Taher Javadi ◽  
Ashkan Hafezalkotob
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Government Interventions ◽  
Response Strategies ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Best Response ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

AbstractIn this study, the implications of the government’s tariffs on optimal pricing decisions in a dual-channel SC with one manufacturer and one retailer by taking into account the retailer services are examined. First, the best response strategies of retailer and manufacturer have obtained following the government’s tariffs by using a Stackelberg game model. Then, the government problem has modeled in six scenarios in a competitive mode about service level, social welfare, and government’s revenue-seeking policies. It can be concluded that retailer services affect the optimal manufacturer and retailer’s decisions. Moreover, with the sensitivities analysis that was studied on government models, it was shown that an integrated SC could better serve the government to achieve its goals. Also, the optimal strategies of the manufacturer and retailer of a dual-channel supply chain have been reached to the government’s social and economic goals. It can be found that the government with proper tariffs could coordinate social, economic, and service objectives.

Pareto Improvement Strategy for Service-Based Free-Riding in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (06) ◽  
pp. 1450050 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin Dan ◽  
Can Liu ◽  
Guangye Xu ◽  
Xumei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Relative Size ◽  
System Optimization ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

With the rapid development of the Internet, many manufacturers nowadays are increasingly adopting a dual-channel strategy to sell their products. In this paper, we present an analytical framework in a single-channel supply chain and a dual-channel supply chain, respectively. We compare the optimal service levels under different scenarios to investigate the impacts of bidirectional free-riding and service competition on members' decisions. In order to realize system optimization, we propose contracts to coordinate the decentralized supply chain under different cases. We find that when a new channel is added, the retailer will always increase his service level to compete with the manufacturer, while the manufacturer needs to take the relationship with the retailer into consideration and decides whether to increase or decrease her service level. We also find that the contracts for different cases can make the optimal solutions the same as those under the centralized scenario by adjusting service levels based on the relative size of competition effect and spillover effect. Finally, we conduct numerical examples to verify the existence of Pareto improvement intervals and derive some managerial insights.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document