scholarly journals Why and How Does a Supplier Choose Factoring Finance?

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chunying Tian ◽  
Dongyan Chen ◽  
Zhaobo Chen ◽  
Ding Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Credit Risk ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Financial Benefit ◽  
Risk Neutral

Suppliers offering trade credit to the downstream retailers have to face many problems, such as receivables management, capital occupancy, and buyer’s credit risk. Many of them choose factoring finance to solve those problems simultaneously. This paper develops several supply chain decision models to show the benefits a supplier can obtain from the main functions of factoring and how he should choose between recourse factoring and nonrecourse factoring. In particular, we identify the conditions on which factoring may bring benefits (including financial benefit, guarantee benefit, and receivables management benefit) to the supplier. The supplier’s choice between recourse and nonrecourse factoring relies on his risk attitude. Given that the supplier is risk-neutral and the factoring fees are acceptable, recourse factoring is preferred when the factoring finance ratio is relatively high; otherwise, nonrecourse factoring is preferred. However, if the supplier is risk-averse, his preference for the two factoring schemes under different finance ratios may change when the risk constraints become stricter. If the target profit is lower than a certain level, the supplier’s financial choice will switch from recourse factoring to nonrecourse factoring in the case finance ratio is relatively low; otherwise, his financial choice switches from nonrecourse factoring to recourse factoring in the case finance ratio is relatively high.

scholarly journals Pemodelan Rantai Suplai Berbasis Economic Production Quantity dengan Menerapkan Kredit Perdagangan Dua Eselon

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 14
Author(s):  
Jaka Permana
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Neutral Solution ◽  
Economic Production Quantity ◽  
Economic Production ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Replenishment Policy ◽  
Production Quantity ◽  
Better Than

<p><em>Implementation of the supply chain is felt more important and very useful in today’s era  of industrialization. But in the process of supply chain encountered  various  risks that may affect the flow of the supply chain so it can not run smoothly, such as interference or imperfectness  in transportations. This research  was made to propose a mathematical model for a supply chain under the effect of unexpected disruptions  in transport. Supplier/manufacturer offers the retailer  a trade credit period t<sub>1</sub> , then the retailer offers the customer a credit with a period of t<sub>2</sub>  and finally the retailer receives the revenue from t<sub>2</sub>  ke T + t<sub>2</sub> , where T is the cycle time at the retailer.  Under this situation,  the three cases such as T ≤ t<sub>1</sub> ≤ T + t<sub>2</sub> , T ≤ T + t<sub>1</sub> ≤ t<sub>2</sub>, and  t<sub>1</sub>  ≤ t<sub>2</sub> are discussed. An EPQ (Economic Production Quantity) based model is established and retailer’s optimal replenishment policy is obtained through mathematical theorems. From the results of testing on several cases, the best solution for the two procedures has been obtained, namely between risk neutral and risk averse solutions based on the level or number of items damaged/defective. If the number of items damaged is 2 units, then solution risk neutral is far better than the risk averse solution, whereas if the number of items is damaged </em> <em>3 units, then the risk averse solution is far better than the risk neutral solution.</em></p><p class="HowToCite"> </p>

scholarly journals OPTIMAL OUTCOME SHARING WITH A CONSORTIUM OF CONTRACTORS

2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 655-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Mahdi HOSSEINIAN ◽  
David G. CARMICHAEL
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Optimal Outcome ◽  
Original Solution ◽  
Project Outcome ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Current Practices

Where a consortium of contractors is involved, there exist no guidelines in the literature on what the outcome sharing arrangement should be. The paper addresses this shortfall. It derives the optimal outcome sharing arrangement for risk-neutral and risk-averse contractors within the consortium, and between the consortium and a risk-neutral owner. Practitioners were engaged in a designed exercise in order to validate the paper’s propositions. The paper demonstrates that, at the optimum: the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same risk-attitude should reflect the levels of their contributions; the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same level of contribu­tion should be lower for contractors with higher levels of risk aversion; a consortium of risk-neutral contractors should receive or bear any favourable or adverse project outcome respectively; and the proportion of outcome sharing to a con­sortium of risk-averse contractors should reduce, and the fixed component of the consortium fee should increase, when the contractors become more risk-averse or the level of the project outcome uncertainty increases. The paper proposes an original solution to the optimal sharing problem in contracts with a consortium of contractors, thereby contributing to current practices in contracts management.

Cutoff Threshold Decisions for Classification Algorithms with Risk Aversion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea C. Hupman
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Classification Algorithm ◽  
Classification Algorithms ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Optimal Cutoff ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Bayes Algorithm ◽  
Cutoff Threshold

Classification algorithms predict the class membership of an unknown record. Methods such as logistic regression or the naïve Bayes algorithm produce a score related to the likelihood that a record belongs to a particular class. A cutoff threshold is then defined to delineate the prediction of one class over another. This paper derives analytic results for the selection of an optimal cutoff threshold for a classification algorithm that is used to inform a two-action decision in the cases of risk aversion and risk neutrality. The results provide insight to how the optimal cutoff thresholds relate to the associated costs and the sensitivity and specificity of the algorithm for both the risk neutral and risk averse decision makers. The optimal risk averse threshold is not reliably above or below the optimal risk neutral threshold, but the relation depends on the parameters of a particular application. The results further show the risk averse optimal threshold is insensitive to the size of the data set or the magnitude of the costs, but instead is sensitive to the proportion of positive records in the data and the ratio of costs. Numeric examples and sensitivity analysis derive further insight. Results show the percent value gap from a misspecified risk attitude increases as the specificity of the classification algorithm decreases.

Information Fake in Supply Chains

2011 ◽  
Vol 267 ◽  
pp. 958-962
Author(s):  
Jiang Hong
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Information Management ◽  
Stable Distribution ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Stochastically Stable

In this paper, we set risk attitude into decision making research for the supply chain manage. We focus on the information management. We discuss the stable states and the stochastically stable distribution for the fake game in the supply chain. We find there always exist information fake behaviors of low-yield suppliers. And, the less risk averse suppliers are, the more information fake they use.

scholarly journals The Incentive Model in Supply Chain with Trade Credit and Default Risk

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Hong Cheng ◽  
Yingsheng Su ◽  
Jinjiang Yan ◽  
Xianyu Wang ◽  
Mingyang Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Default Risk ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Incentive Contract ◽  
Risk Neutral

Trade credit is widely used for its advantages. However, trade credit also brings default risk to the manufacturer due to the uncertain demand. And moral hazard may aggravate the default risk. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of moral hazard in trade credit and explore incentive contract under uncertain demand and asymmetric information. We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral retailer ordering a single product from a risk-neutral manufacturer. Market demand is stochastic and is influenced by retailer’s sales effort which is his private information. Incentive theory is used to develop the principal-agent model and get the incentive contract from the manufacturer’s perspective. Results show that the retailer will reduce his effort level to get more profit and the manufacturer’s profit will be reduced, in the case of asymmetric information. Facing this result, the manufacturer will reduce the order quantity in incentive contract to lessen his losses. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate all these theoretical results and to draw managerial insights.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Stage Fashion Supply Chain with Risk-Averse Retailer and Price-Dependent Demand

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minli Xu ◽  
Qiao Wang ◽  
Linhan Ouyang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Mean Variance ◽  
Variance Approach ◽  
Dependent Demand

When the demand is sensitive to retail price, revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract have been shown to be able to coordinate supply chains with risk neutral agents. We extend the previous studies to consider a risk-averse retailer in a two-echelon fashion supply chain. Based on the classic mean-variance approach in finance, the issue of channel coordination in a fashion supply chain with risk-averse retailer and price-dependent demand is investigated. We propose both single contracts and joint contracts to achieve supply chain coordination. We find that the coordinating revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract in the supply chain with risk neutral agents are still useful to coordinate the supply chain taking into account the degree of risk aversion of fashion retailer, whereas a more complex sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract fails to do so. When using combined contracts to coordinate the supply chain, we demonstrate that only revenue sharing with two-part tariff contract can coordinate the fashion supply chain. The optimal conditions for contract parameters to achieve channel coordination are determined. Numerical analysis is presented to supplement the results and more insights are gained.

scholarly journals Risk-Averse Co-Decision for Lower-Carbon Product Family Configuration and Resilient Supplier Selection

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 384
Author(s):  
Dengzhuo Liu ◽  
Zhongkai Li ◽  
Chao He ◽  
Shuai Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supplier Selection ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Ghg Emissions ◽  
Product Family ◽  
Mixed Integer ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Disruption Risks

Due to global pandemics, political unrest and natural disasters, the stability of the supply chain is facing the challenge of more uncertain events. Although many scholars have conducted research on improving the resilience of the supply chain, the research on integrating product family configuration and supplier selection (PCSS) under disruption risks is limited. In this paper, the centralized supply chain network, which contains only one major manufacturer and several suppliers, is considered, and one resilience strategy (i.e., the fortified supplier) is used to enhance the resilience level of the selected supply base. Then, an improved stochastic bi-objective mixed integer programming model is proposed to support co-decision for PCSS under disruption risks. Furthermore, considering the above risk-neutral model as a benchmark, a risk-averse mixed integer program with Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) is formulated to achieve maximum potential worst-case profit and minimum expected total greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. Then, NSGA-II is applied to solve the proposed stochastic bi-objective mixed integer programming model. Taking the electronic dictionary as a case study, the risk-neutral solutions and risk-averse solutions that optimize, respectively, average and worst-case objectives of co-decision are also compared under two different ranges of disruption probability. The sensitivity analysis on the confidence level indicates that fortifying suppliers and controlling market share in co-decision for PCSS can effectively reduce the risk of low-profit/high-cost while minimizing the expected GHG emissions. Meanwhile, the effects of low-probability risk are more likely to be ignored in the risk-neutral solution, and it is necessary to adopt a risk-averse solution to reduce potential worst-case losses.

The pricing strategy of dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse agents and heterogeneous preference consumers

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rufeng Wang ◽  
Zhiyong Chang ◽  
Shuli Yan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Control ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Risk Attitudes ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Heterogeneous Preference ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the pricing strategy and the impact of agents' risk preference in a dual-channel supply chain in which both agents are risk-averse.Design/methodology/approachThe authors make use of the mean-variance (MV) method to measure the risk aversion of the agents and apply Stackelberg game to obtain the optimal strategies of the proposed models. Furthermore, the authors compare the optimal strategies with that in the benchmark model in which no agent is risk-averse.FindingsThe authors find that the pricing decisions can be divided into four categories according to the risk attitudes of the agents: the decisions that are independent of two agents' risk attitudes, the decisions that depend on only one agent’s risk attitude (i.e. depend on only manufacturer's risk attitude and depend on only retailer's risk attitude) and the decisions that depend on both agents' risk attitudes. In addition, the authors find that the retail price will be lower and the wholesale price in most cases will be lower than that in the benchmark when at least one agent's risk control is effective; the demand will be always increasing as long as one agent's risk control is effective. Furthermore, compared to the benchmark, a win-win strategy (i.e. Pareto improvement) for the supply chain members can be obtained in a certain range where the agents' risk controls are appropriate.Originality/valueThis research provides a theoretical reference for the managers to make the pricing decisions and the risk control in dual-channel supply chains with heterogeneous preference consumers.

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