scholarly journals Information Acquisition Incentive Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Lihong Dong ◽  
Xirong Wang ◽  
Beizhan Liu ◽  
Tianwei Zheng ◽  
Zheng Wang

Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper proposes a new information acquisition mechanism for intelligent mine construction, which solves the problem of incomplete information acquisition in the construction of new intelligent mining area and reduces the difficulty of information acquisition, which solves the problem of the imperfect mine information acquisition in the construction of a new smart mine regions and decreases the difficulty of a mine information acquisition. Based on the evolutionary game model, the perceptual incentive model based on group is established. The reliability of information collection is ensured by sharing and modifying the information collector. Through the analysis of the simulation results, it is found that the regional coverage model based on the cooperation in game theory and evolutionary game theory has a good effect on solving the bottleneck problem of the current intelligent mining area. This paper has an enlightening effect on the optimization of the mine information acquisition system. Through the improvement of the mine information acquisition system, the working efficiency of the information acquisition terminal can be effectively increased by 6%.

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengyu Guo ◽  
Pan Zhang ◽  
Jianying Yang

To address the gap, that is, few studies have explored the influence of the participants’ interactions with one another during construction quality supervision, this paper proposes a system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory to describe the complex and dynamic interactions among tripartite stakeholders in China, including the project owner (PO), construction supervising engineer (CSE), and construction contractor (CC). First, the replicated dynamic equation set is established in terms of expense targets. Second, the equilibrium solutions of the equation set are obtained to test strategy options. The trends of system fluctuations caused by penalty and reward changes are also analyzed. Finally, the stability of the proposed model is improved by integrating a dynamic penalty–reward scenario into the evolutionary strategy of the PO. Simulation results show that: 1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in initial interactions, 2) the degrees of penalty and reward considerably affect the CC’s rate variable, and 3) the dynamic penalty–reward scenario could effectively improve the stability of the proposed model. The unsteadiness of the quality supervision system and the stability control scenario could help in understanding the impact of interactions among stakeholders and provide suggestions for optimizing quality supervision procedures.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 434-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jialu Li ◽  
Meiying Yang ◽  
Wei Xing ◽  
Xuan Zhao

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