The 7-Round Subspace Trail-Based Impossible Differential Distinguisher of Midori-64
This paper analyzes the subspace trail of Midori-64 and uses the propagation law and mutual relationship of the subspaces of Midori-64 to provide a 6-round Midori-64 subspace trail-based impossible differential key recovery attack. The data complexity of the attack is 2 54.6 chosen plaintexts, and the computational complexity is 2 58.2 lookup operations. Its overall complexity is less than that of the known 6-round truncated impossible differential distinguisher. This distinguisher is also applicable to Midori-128 with a secret S -box. Additionally, utilizing the properties of subspaces, we prove that a subspace trail-based impossible differential distinguisher of Midori-64 contains at most 7 rounds. This is 1 more than the upper bound of Midori-64’s truncated impossible differential distinguisher which is 6. According to the Hamming weights of the starting and ending subspaces, we classify all 7-round Midori-64 subspace trail-based impossible differential distinguishers into two types and they need 2 59.6 and 2 51.4 chosen plaintexts, respectively.