scholarly journals Optimal Operation and Financing Decisions in Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Manufacturer

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Lijuan Xia ◽  
Lixin Qiao ◽  
Xiaochen Ma ◽  
Yuanze Sun ◽  
Yongli Li
Keyword(s):  
Business Models ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Optimal Operation ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Financing Channels ◽  
Financing Channel ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
D Investment

Capital constraint, immensely existing in practice, became major stressors for manufacturers during the green research and development (R & D) triggered by managers integrating green concept into their business models. Considering the initial capital of a capital-constrained manufacturer, this paper formulates a Stackelberg game model comprising a manufacturer and a retailer, to discuss the optimal operation and financing decisions under the bank financing channel and trade credit financing channel, to detect the relationship between the manufacturer’s initial capital and green R & D investment, and to find which financing channel is better by comparing the two financing channels when the same initial capital is set. According to the above analysis, the results find that the capital-constrained manufacturer prefers financing only when meeting certain conditions. Furthermore, financing might be detrimental to the manufacturer but always beneficial to the retailer. Especially, under trade credit financing channel, the profit improvement of the retailer is higher than the manufacturer in the same financing channel, which suggests that the retailer has strong internal motivation to cooperate with the manufacturer from the perspective of financing.

Optimal decisions and coordination strategy of a capital-constrained supply chain under customer return and supplier subsidy

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gongbing Bi ◽  
Ping Chen ◽  
Yalei Fei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Modeling Framework ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Joint Operations ◽  
Fixed Proportion ◽  
Customer Returns ◽  
Credit Financing

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to explore impacts of financing and supplier subsidy on capital-constrained retailer and the value of returns subsidy contract under a situation where the retailer makes joint operations and finance decisions. Design/methodology/approach This paper considers a two-level supply chain, including a retailer and a supplier. Facing problems of capital constraints and even customer returns, the newsvendor-like retailer orders from a well-capitalized supplier. The supplier allows the retailer a delay in payment and provides a subsidy contract to alleviate its problems if it is profitable. Considering their difference of initial capital status, the retailer is assumed to be Follower of Stackelberg Game and the supplier is the Leader. Findings The supplier return subsidy contract has some merits for both of partners in the chain. And it does not coordinate the supply chain when the retailer has enough initial capital; however, when the retailer is capital constrained, it does. In addition, the retailer’s initial capital level significantly affects the supplier’s subsidy decision. Research limitations/implications Return rate is simplified to a fixed proportion of completed demand. In addition, trade credit is only financing source in this paper, and other types of financing methods, such as bank credit, can be taken too. Originality/value This paper first incorporates trade credit financing and customer returns into a modeling framework to investigate the capital-constrained retailer’s joint operations and finance decisions and the value of supplier’s subsidy contract.

scholarly journals Joint financing and ordering decisions in a capital-constrained supply chain with risk preference

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Zhen ◽  
Jing Ru Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Preference Behavior ◽  
Credit Financing

We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one dominant supplier and one capital-constrained retailer. The retailer needs to solve the shortage of working capital either from a bank or from its core supplier, which offers trade credit when it is also beneficial to itself. We assume the retailer is risk-averse behavior and the supplier has different risk preference behaviors that jointly model risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-taking. With a wholesale price contract, we incorporate each member’s risk preference behavior into its objective function. Then we derive the optimal decisions in a Stackelberg game under bank credit financing and trade credit financing, respectively. We find that there exists a supplier’s risk preference threshold that distinguishes financing scheme. When the supplier is a relatively higher risk preference, trade credit financing makes both the retailer and the supplier better off and is a unique financing equilibrium. Otherwise, the members prefer bank credit financing . Besides, the supplier with relatively higher risk preference behavior prefers the retailer with a low initial capital as a partner; the supplier with relatively lower risk preference behavior prefers the retailer with a higher initial capital level. The above theoretical results are verified by numerical analysis.

scholarly journals Optimal Financing Strategy in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain with Retailer Green Marketing Efforts

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1357
Author(s):  
Xiaoli Zhang ◽  
Guoyi Xiu ◽  
Fakhar Shahzad ◽  
Yupeng Duan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Green Marketing ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
Financing Strategy

The purpose of this research is to examine the green supply chain (GSC) financing decisions of manufacturers and capital-constrained retailers in order to establish a Stackelberg game model under decentralized and centralized decision-making. This paper studies the influence of retailers’ choice of trade credit or bank loan financing strategy on a GSC’s performance and analyzes their decision-making tendency. The results show that manufacturers should provide trade credit and participate in retailers’ financing decisions to avoid double marginal effects under both centralized and decentralized decision-making. Interestingly, the optimal value of green marketing effort and retailer order quantity was twice as high as the decentralized under the centralized decision, indicating that the centralized decision could better improve GSC’s financing efficiency. Especially when the trade credit financing strategy is feasible, this effect is more significant. Finally, the outcomes are verified through numerical simulation, which references GSC practitioners in management decisions.

scholarly journals The role of voucher sale in advance for a capital-constrained supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haijun Wang ◽  
Guanmei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
The Impact

This paper studies voucher sale as an operational method to raise working capital for a supply chain, which consists of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer takes advantage of an online platform to sell vouchers and to get access to borrowing from a bank. By formulating a Stackelberg game model, we show the retailer's possible order quantities in the cases without and with bank loan and analyze the impact of voucher sale on the retailer's optimal choice of order quantity and the supplier's optimal wholesale price. We find that a smaller voucher's price induces the retailer to be more likely to order with loan from a bank while a larger voucher's value induces an order quantity with the loan more difficult to be repaid. In addition, if voucher's price is large, the supplier decides a wholesale price which leads the retailer not to borrow from a bank; and if voucher's price is small, the supplier's optimal decision is obtained by anticipating the retailer to borrow from a bank. We also analyze the impact of voucher sale in the presence of trade credit financing on the firms' decisions. The results show that the voucher's price should be small so that the retailer can repay the supplier if voucher's value is large; otherwise, the retailer either does not borrow from the supplier or may not repay the supplier. Besides, the supplier decides a wholesale price so that the retailer does not borrow or can repay the supplier, except that the voucher's value is large and the voucher's price is medium.

scholarly journals Research on Trade Credit and Bank Credit Based on Dynamic Inventory

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (13) ◽  
pp. 3608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei ◽  
Xu ◽  
Yang
Keyword(s):  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Stock Status ◽  
Business Financing

Trade credit is a short-term business financing based on purchases between the retailer and the supplier. This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a well-funded supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. At the beginning of each sales season, the retailer need to place an order from the supplier to meet the stochastic demand. The capital-constrained retailer determines the order quantity and whether to borrow loans from a bank or the supplier or just use its initial capital, according to its finance and stock status with the wholesale price provided by the supplier. We build the Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader and divide the retailer’s initial inventory and capital into different wealth regions to discuss the optimal strategies of different wealth regions. We extend to the two-period dynamic financing model based on dynamic inventory and capital flow so as to obtain the optimal strategy matrix of the retailer and the supplier under bank and trade credit. Numerical results validate our theoretical analysis of bank credit and supplier credit with dynamic inventory under different period setting.

scholarly journals Financing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement in a Supply Chain considering Retailers’ Competition

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Man Yu ◽  
Tuo Li ◽  
Zhanwen Shi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Emission Abatement ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Financing Channels ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
Financing Strategy

This paper investigates the issues of financing channels (bank credit financing, trade credit financing, and dual-channel financing) and carbon emission abatement in a supply chain consisting of one capital-constrained manufacturer and two capital-constrained retailers. Compared with bank credit, we find that every member can make more profit under trade credit when only one financing channel is available. When both bank credit and trade credit are available, the retailers’ financing strategy highly depends on the interest rates charged by the creditors. In addition, we also examine the impact of financing channels on emission abatement. It shows that the manufacturer reduces more carbon emissions under trade credit. Interestingly, the emission abatement has nothing to do with trade credit interest rate when retailers only adopt trade credit, whereas it is closely related to trade credit interest rate under dual-channel financing.

scholarly journals Relationship lending and the use of trade credit: the role of relational capital and private information

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierluigi Murro ◽  
Valentina Peruzzi
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
Soft Information ◽  
Relational Capital ◽  
Relationship Lending ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Italian Manufacturing Firms

AbstractUsing a unique sample of Italian manufacturing firms, we investigate the impact of relationship lending on firms’ use of trade credit. We find that firms maintaining close and long-lasting relationships with their main banks are associated with higher amounts of trade credit extended by suppliers. This result is robust to alternative measures of trade credit and relationship lending, and to different estimation techniques. We also analyze the mechanisms driving the association between relationship lending and the use of trade credit. Regression results suggest that the positive link between accounts payable and relationship lending is especially significant for firms that use to provide soft information to their lenders and for companies with greater relational abilities.Plain English Summary The existence of close and long lasting lending relationships positively affects the amount of trade credit manufacturing firms receive from their suppliers. By relying on the Survey on Italian Manufacturing Firms, we show that the positive link between relationship lending and the use of trade credit is driven by two channels: private information and relational capital. In a policy perspective, our findings reveal a need for banking regulation and supervision to encompass banking business models in evaluating banks. The current approach might not be suitable for local banks investing in soft information acquisition and could weaken SMEs’ chances to receive both bank financing and trade credit from suppliers. Moreover, from a managerial point of view, our results uncover the relevance of firms’ ability to create strong relationships with banks, suppliers, and other companies that may help alleviating financial constraints.

scholarly journals Inventory Modeling for Deteriorating Imperfect Quality Items with Selling Price Dependent Demand and Shortage Backordering under Credit Financing

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 110-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aditi Khanna ◽  
Prerna Gautam ◽  
Chandra K. Chandra K.
Keyword(s):  
Trade Credit ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Manufacturing Processes ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Imperfect Quality ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
Fierce Competition ◽  
Dependent Demand

The production processes throughout the world aim at improving quality by introducing latest technologies so as to perform well in fierce competition. Despite this due to various unavoidable factors, most of the manufacturing processes end up with certain imperfections. Hence, all the items produced are not of perfect quality. The condition tends to be more susceptible while dealing with items of deteriorating quality; therefore an inspection process is must for screening good quality items from the ordered lot. Demand is assumed to be price dependent and it is represented by a constant price elasticity function. Also to endure with the rapid growth and turbulent markets, the suppliers try to engage and attract retailers through various gimmicks and one such contrivance is offering trade credit, which is proved to be an influential strategy for attracting new customers. In view of this, the present paper develops an inventory model for items of imperfect quality with deterioration under trade-credit policies with price dependent demand. Shortages are allowed and fully backlogged. A mathematical model is developed to depict this scenario. The aim of the study is to optimize the optimal order level, backorder level and selling price so as to maximize the retailer’s total profit. Findings are validated quantitatively by using numerical analysis. Sensitivity analysis is also performed so as to cater some important decision-making insights.

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