Optimal decisions and coordination strategy of a capital-constrained supply chain under customer return and supplier subsidy

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gongbing Bi ◽  
Ping Chen ◽  
Yalei Fei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Modeling Framework ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Joint Operations ◽  
Fixed Proportion ◽  
Customer Returns ◽  
Credit Financing

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to explore impacts of financing and supplier subsidy on capital-constrained retailer and the value of returns subsidy contract under a situation where the retailer makes joint operations and finance decisions. Design/methodology/approach This paper considers a two-level supply chain, including a retailer and a supplier. Facing problems of capital constraints and even customer returns, the newsvendor-like retailer orders from a well-capitalized supplier. The supplier allows the retailer a delay in payment and provides a subsidy contract to alleviate its problems if it is profitable. Considering their difference of initial capital status, the retailer is assumed to be Follower of Stackelberg Game and the supplier is the Leader. Findings The supplier return subsidy contract has some merits for both of partners in the chain. And it does not coordinate the supply chain when the retailer has enough initial capital; however, when the retailer is capital constrained, it does. In addition, the retailer’s initial capital level significantly affects the supplier’s subsidy decision. Research limitations/implications Return rate is simplified to a fixed proportion of completed demand. In addition, trade credit is only financing source in this paper, and other types of financing methods, such as bank credit, can be taken too. Originality/value This paper first incorporates trade credit financing and customer returns into a modeling framework to investigate the capital-constrained retailer’s joint operations and finance decisions and the value of supplier’s subsidy contract.

scholarly journals Joint financing and ordering decisions in a capital-constrained supply chain with risk preference

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Zhen ◽  
Jing Ru Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Bank Credit ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Preference Behavior ◽  
Credit Financing

We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one dominant supplier and one capital-constrained retailer. The retailer needs to solve the shortage of working capital either from a bank or from its core supplier, which offers trade credit when it is also beneficial to itself. We assume the retailer is risk-averse behavior and the supplier has different risk preference behaviors that jointly model risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-taking. With a wholesale price contract, we incorporate each member’s risk preference behavior into its objective function. Then we derive the optimal decisions in a Stackelberg game under bank credit financing and trade credit financing, respectively. We find that there exists a supplier’s risk preference threshold that distinguishes financing scheme. When the supplier is a relatively higher risk preference, trade credit financing makes both the retailer and the supplier better off and is a unique financing equilibrium. Otherwise, the members prefer bank credit financing . Besides, the supplier with relatively higher risk preference behavior prefers the retailer with a low initial capital as a partner; the supplier with relatively lower risk preference behavior prefers the retailer with a higher initial capital level. The above theoretical results are verified by numerical analysis.

scholarly journals Optimal Operation and Financing Decisions in Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Manufacturer

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Lijuan Xia ◽  
Lixin Qiao ◽  
Xiaochen Ma ◽  
Yuanze Sun ◽  
Yongli Li
Keyword(s):  
Business Models ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Optimal Operation ◽  
Initial Capital ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Financing Channels ◽  
Financing Channel ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
D Investment

Capital constraint, immensely existing in practice, became major stressors for manufacturers during the green research and development (R & D) triggered by managers integrating green concept into their business models. Considering the initial capital of a capital-constrained manufacturer, this paper formulates a Stackelberg game model comprising a manufacturer and a retailer, to discuss the optimal operation and financing decisions under the bank financing channel and trade credit financing channel, to detect the relationship between the manufacturer’s initial capital and green R & D investment, and to find which financing channel is better by comparing the two financing channels when the same initial capital is set. According to the above analysis, the results find that the capital-constrained manufacturer prefers financing only when meeting certain conditions. Furthermore, financing might be detrimental to the manufacturer but always beneficial to the retailer. Especially, under trade credit financing channel, the profit improvement of the retailer is higher than the manufacturer in the same financing channel, which suggests that the retailer has strong internal motivation to cooperate with the manufacturer from the perspective of financing.

Two-echelon supply chain operational strategy under portfolio financing and tax shield

2019 ◽  
Vol 120 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-656
Author(s):  
Guoshu Dong ◽  
Lihong Wei ◽  
Jiaping Xie ◽  
Weisi Zhang ◽  
Zhefu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Tax Shield

Purpose The development of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is vital to the economy, as such the financing of SMEs has become the focus of government and enterprises. The purpose of this paper is to find the operational and financial strategies of the supplier and retailer in supply chain. Design/methodology/approach In a Stackelberg game, supplier moves first setting wholesale price, while the retailer follows, setting the ordering quantity. Enterprises maximize their profits by optimization. When measuring profit targets, the capital constraints and income taxes of two companies are considered. In the portfolio financing model, the retailer can obtain products from suppliers through trade credit, and the supplier can use asset-backed securitization (ABS) to solve his/her financing problems. Findings The wholesale price is a decreasing function of retailer’s initial cash balance, and the supplier’s financing interest rate is a decreasing function of his/her own capital, the incentive effect of the supplier’s price discount strategy on retailer is more intense in the supply chain with high-priced product or high-capital retailer. And in a capital-constrained supply chain, an increase in tax rate or financing rate does not necessarily motivate the supplier to increase wholesale price. Most importantly, if the supplier’s markup is moderate, portfolio financing has value for both retailer and supplier, while solving the financing problems of both parties. Research limitations/implications Future research can consider the explicit and implicit interest when supplier provides trade credit to retailer. It is also possible to consider the portfolio financing when multiple retailers are facing financial constraints. Practical implications It provides guidance for supply chain enterprises with financing needs, helping them find optimal decisions. With financial interest, enterprise income tax on the enterprises’ financing factors will produce a tax shield effect; thus, a cost–benefit analysis with the tax shield effect can provide more accurate picture when making corresponding decisions. Social implications Government takes feasible adjustments of tax rate for the sake of motivation on financial SMEs tax shield. Furthermore, ABS calls for service from financial institutions, which will, in turn, expedite financial institutions revenue. Originality/value The authors provide insights on enterprise financing models, combining ABS with trade credit, expanding enterprise financing channels and enriching the theory of financial supply chain and supply chain management. The authors analyze in detail the influence of tax factors on enterprises by introducing tax factors into traditional process of enterprise operation and financing strategy.

scholarly journals The role of voucher sale in advance for a capital-constrained supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haijun Wang ◽  
Guanmei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
The Impact

This paper studies voucher sale as an operational method to raise working capital for a supply chain, which consists of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer takes advantage of an online platform to sell vouchers and to get access to borrowing from a bank. By formulating a Stackelberg game model, we show the retailer's possible order quantities in the cases without and with bank loan and analyze the impact of voucher sale on the retailer's optimal choice of order quantity and the supplier's optimal wholesale price. We find that a smaller voucher's price induces the retailer to be more likely to order with loan from a bank while a larger voucher's value induces an order quantity with the loan more difficult to be repaid. In addition, if voucher's price is large, the supplier decides a wholesale price which leads the retailer not to borrow from a bank; and if voucher's price is small, the supplier's optimal decision is obtained by anticipating the retailer to borrow from a bank. We also analyze the impact of voucher sale in the presence of trade credit financing on the firms' decisions. The results show that the voucher's price should be small so that the retailer can repay the supplier if voucher's value is large; otherwise, the retailer either does not borrow from the supplier or may not repay the supplier. Besides, the supplier decides a wholesale price so that the retailer does not borrow or can repay the supplier, except that the voucher's value is large and the voucher's price is medium.

scholarly journals Optimal Financing Strategy in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain with Retailer Green Marketing Efforts

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1357
Author(s):  
Xiaoli Zhang ◽  
Guoyi Xiu ◽  
Fakhar Shahzad ◽  
Yupeng Duan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Green Marketing ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
Financing Strategy

The purpose of this research is to examine the green supply chain (GSC) financing decisions of manufacturers and capital-constrained retailers in order to establish a Stackelberg game model under decentralized and centralized decision-making. This paper studies the influence of retailers’ choice of trade credit or bank loan financing strategy on a GSC’s performance and analyzes their decision-making tendency. The results show that manufacturers should provide trade credit and participate in retailers’ financing decisions to avoid double marginal effects under both centralized and decentralized decision-making. Interestingly, the optimal value of green marketing effort and retailer order quantity was twice as high as the decentralized under the centralized decision, indicating that the centralized decision could better improve GSC’s financing efficiency. Especially when the trade credit financing strategy is feasible, this effect is more significant. Finally, the outcomes are verified through numerical simulation, which references GSC practitioners in management decisions.

Procedural fairness concerns in supply chain with retailer promotional effort

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 302-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tengfei Nie ◽  
Hualin Liu ◽  
Yilun Dong ◽  
Shaofu Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Procedural Fairness ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Fair Process ◽  
Slotting Allowances ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Distributional Fairness

Purpose The existing literature has a lack of modeling of procedural fairness concerns in the supply chain level. This paper aims to investigate how procedural fairness concerns affect channel decisions, performance and coordination. Design/methodology/approach This paper considers a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer who have procedural fairness concerns in a classic Stackelberg game setting. The model is set in sales promotional environment. According to the existing literature, engagement is used to depict fair process. Some findings are made through analyzing respective decisions of the supplier and the retailer under the influence of procedural fairness concerns. Findings The results show that the channel efficiency can be improved when the retailer exhibits procedural fairness concerns, but if the aversion to unfair process exceeds a certain threshold, the retailer cannot benefit from it. Besides, the retailer profits more when he cares about distributional fairness, although the whole channel surplus can be improved by procedural fairness concerns. Originality/value This is the first paper to study the influences of procedural fairness concerns on supply chain decisions and channel performance. Finally, a mechanism combining a wholesale price contract with slotting allowances is proposed to coordinate the supply chain.

Effects of human errors and trade-credit financing in two-echelon supply chain models

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 465
Author(s):  
Mandeep Mittal ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar ◽  
Dongmin Shin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Human Errors ◽  
Credit Financing

scholarly journals Two-Level Credit Financing for Noninstantaneous Deterioration Items in a Supply Chain with Downstream Credit-Linked Demand

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong He ◽  
Hongfu Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Financing Policy ◽  
Sensitive Analysis ◽  
Eoq Model ◽  
Replenishment Cycle ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
Delay In Payments ◽  
Optimal Ordering ◽  
Total Average

Trade credit financing is a useful tool in business today, which can be characterized as the agreement between supply chain members such as permissible delay in payments. In this study, we assume that the items have the property of noninstantaneous deterioration and the demand is a function of downstream credit. Then, an EOQ model for noninstantaneous deterioration is built based on the two-level financing policy. The purpose of this paper is to maximize the total average profit by determine the optimal downstream credit period, the optimal replenishment cycle length, and the optimal ordering quantity per cycle. Useful theorems are proposed to characterize the method of obtaining the optimal solutions. Based on the theorems, an algorithm is designed, and numerical tests and sensitive analysis are provided. Lastly, according to the sensitive analysis, managerial insights are proposed.

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