scholarly journals A segurança do Japão e os Estados Unidos da América

1969 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Paulo Daniel Watanabe

Since the end of World War II the issues regarding Japan’s security and defense have been discussed as a natural continuation of the American Foreign Policy. Although Japan is said to decide its own foreign policy by itself after getting back its sovereignty in the 50’s,Washington has always been deciding along with Japan and justifying its acts on the conflicting international system. At the end of World War II the Cold War was the main reason for the USA to take part almost by itself in the protection of the Japanese archipelago* Nowadays,Japan is still constitutionally prohibited from maintaining conventional armed forces having to delegate this mission to the USA, which has military bases on Okinawa Island- The negative impacts of this policy are already felt by Japan especially under the constant threats from North Korea and the military and economic growth of China. After the attacks of September 11th 2001,new government leaders have been trying to make Japan less dependent on the USA. Washington will not abandon its regional policy,as shown by Prime Minister Hatoyama’s fall. For some authors,Japan must have independent deterrence ways to guarantee its security and integrity in a still hostile environment shaped by the disasters of Japan's imperialist era. This article intends to analyze the evolution of Japan's defense policy since the occupation of the Allied Powers.

2020 ◽  
pp. 239-242
Author(s):  
David F. Schmitz

The crisis of the 1930s made changes in American foreign policy a necessity, and events demonstrated that Franklin Roosevelt made the correct decisions on the major issues to protect American interests and meet the challenges. For FDR, World War II was the second chance for the United States to create a lasting peace, one based on the Grand Alliance, collective security, and the United Nations. Beyond just the defeat of Germany and Japan, it was an opportunity to build a world order that would produce peace and prosperity through a cooperative, multilateral international system. This was Roosevelt's great legacy, to envision a different world than the one that proceeded the war and to begin to establish the values and institutions it would be built on. In doing so, he transformed American foreign policy. Roosevelt was the most important and most successful foreign policymaker in the nation's history.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-218
Author(s):  
Stanislav Gennadyevich Malkin

The following paper deals with methodological features of studying of empires legacy role in policy of the leading powers in the countries of the third world through a prism of asymmetric conflicts historical modeling. The author pays special attention to the role of Great Britain and the USA foreign policy course defining after World War II during Cold War in the second half of the 20th century and Global War on Terror at the beginning of the 21st century. The author pays attention to methodological traps (such as the probability of the research problem on the given variable and terminological confusion) as well as to research opportunities which are opened by such approach in the field of the historical and political analysis (for example, evolution of the international relations theory and practice in the conditions of the world order transformation after World War II). Special attention is given to the value of such methodological reception as asymmetric conflicts historical modeling in expert estimates of the leading powers foreign policy. The paper also deals with the role of expert community and academic expertize as an important component of that analytical operation which is carried out within historical simulation of the asymmetrical conflicts.


Worldview ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Donald Brandon

For a generation now, America has played a significant role in world affairs. Until Pearl Harbor a reluctant belligerent in World War II, this country was also slow to respond to the challenge of the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of that gigantic conflict. But for almost twenty-five years American Presidents have been more or less guided by the policy of “containment.” Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson all introduced variations on the multiple themes of the policy adopted by Harry Truman. Yet each concluded that the world situation allowed no reasonable alternative to an activist American foreign policy in most areas of the globe.


1980 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Thompson

The theologian Reinhold Neibuhr oftentimes warned that moralists who entered the foreign policy sphere were likely to be more destructive of a nation's ideals than were cynical realists. Evidently he feared that those who lacked a sense of the limits of foreign policy would proceed as if the values and goods which were attainable in the more intimate communities of the family, the locality and the nation were attainable in the international community as well. Whatever Neibuhr's quarrels and debates with classical Greek thought, he was at one with Plato and Aristotle and their present day followers in believing that justice could be more effectively pursued by the smaller communities, such as the city states. He insisted on a recognition of the differences between such communities and the major present day world powers. From World War II until his death, he wrote more about foreign policy than any other aspect of public policy. He wrote scores of articles, some published in less prominent journals, about American foreign policy and its moral basis.


1996 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-468
Author(s):  
Wilson D. Miscamble

This article uses the relationship between George Kennan and Dean Acheson as a lens to track a classic debate over the main lines of postwar American foreign policy, especially in regard to Europe and over such related issues as negotiations with the Soviets, German unification, and the size of and necessity for American conventional and nuclear forces. It clarifies that Kennan did not play the role of powerful architect whose planning provided the blueprint and instructions for building the structure of U.S. policy in Europe. Dean Acheson proved the essential builder of the structures which provided the framework for American foreign policy for four decades. In the process, this article clarifies the nature of the personal and professional dealings of the two men over the period from the end of World War II until Acheson's death in 1971.


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