The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union

2001 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Tsebelis ◽  
Geoffrey Garrett
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Agenda Setter ◽  
European Court ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Single European Act ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
Institutional Foundations ◽  
Supranational Institutions

We present a unified model of the politics of the European Union (EU). We focus on the effects of the EU's changing treaty base (from the Rome to Amsterdam Treaties) on the relations among its three supranational institutions—the Commission of the European Communities, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament—and between these actors and the intergovernmental Council of Ministers. We analyze these institutional interactions in terms of the interrelationships among the three core functions of the modern state: to legislate and formulate policy (legislative branch), to administer and implement policy (executive branch), and to interpret policy and adjudicate disputes (judicial branch). Our analysis demonstrates that the evolution of the EU's political system has not always been linear. For example, we explain why the Court's influence was greatest before the passage of the Single European Act and declined in the following decade, and why we expect it to increase again in the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty. We also explain why the Commission became a powerful legislative agenda setter after the Single European Act and why its power today stems more from administrative discretion than from influence over legislation.

2. The Union institutions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Roles And Responsibilities ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
Committee Of The Regions

This chapter focuses on the institutions responsible for executing the different tasks of the European Union (EU). The main seven institutions are complemented by two advisory bodies, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), which are responsible for gathering inputs for use in decision-making. The initial institutions of the Commission, Council, European Parliament, and Court of Justice were expanded to five to include the European Council, Court of Auditors, and the European Central Bank in 2009 with the entry into force of the Maastricht and the Lisbon Treaties. This chapter also describes the roles and responsibilities of the institutions, including the Council of Ministers of the European Union, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice (CoJ).

Unintended Consequences: Institutional Autonomy and Executive Discretion in the European Union

2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
DIONYSSIS G. DIMITRAKOPOULOS
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Institutional Autonomy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Autonomous Action ◽  
European Court ◽  
Free Movement Of Workers ◽  
Executive Discretion ◽  
Supranational Institutions

Institutions are more than mere agents of their creators. They produce unintended consequences by means of their autonomous action. In the context of the European Union (EU), supranational institutions, such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Commission produce such consequences, even in areas where no direct or overt transfer of powers has taken place, while performing the roles assigned to them by their creators. Using a case study regarding the protection of the free movement of workers, this article demonstrates that supranational institutions circumscribe the use of executive discretion by national governements by blurring the line between ‘safe’ and other issues, that is, the line that distinguishes between the ‘two faces of power’.

Implementation of Good Governance Principles on the European Level

2019 ◽  
pp. 243-262
Author(s):  
Henk Addink
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Right To Good Administration ◽  
Administrative Proceedings ◽  
The Right ◽  
Council Of Ministers

In this chapter the focus is on the implementation of the principles of good governance by the European Union administrative institutions and the controlling institutions like the European Court of Justice and the European Ombudsman. The Treaty of Lisbon contains rules and obligations in respect of the implementation of these principles. The principle of transparency has found its expression in article 1 paragraph 2 TFEU. The principles of political participation are embodied in article 11 TEU. The right of access to documents of the Union’s institutions is a fundamental rule in article 15 TFEU. Furthermore, according to article 16 paragraph 8 TEU, the European Council of ministers must meet in public when acting as a legislator. These Treaty principles are complemented by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which has entered into force with the final ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and its chapter on citizen’s rights like the right to good administration in article 41. In search for a better quality of administrative proceedings, a code on good administrative practise, a soft law instrument based on the logic of best practise has ultimately been adopted.

2. The Union institutions

2020 ◽  
pp. 36-66
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Roles And Responsibilities ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
Committee Of The Regions

This chapter focuses on the institutions responsible for executing the different tasks of the European Union (EU). The main seven institutions are complemented by two advisory bodies, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), which are responsible for gathering inputs for use in decision-making. The initial institutions of the Commission, Council, European Parliament, and Court of Justice of the EU were expanded to seven to include the European Council, Court of Auditors, and the European Central Bank in 2009 with the entry into force of the Maastricht and the Lisbon Treaties. This chapter also describes the roles and responsibilities of the institutions, including the Council of Ministers of the European Union, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice (CJEU).

Fighting for Authority: Strategic Actions of National High Courts in the European Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-2019) ◽  
pp. 419-433
Author(s):  
Stefanie Vedder
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Strategic Actions ◽  
High Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Lower Courts

National high courts in the European Union (EU) are constantly challenged: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) claims the authority to declare national standing interpretations invalid should it find them incompatible with its views on EU law. This principle noticeably impairs the formerly undisputed sovereignty of national high courts. In addition, preliminary references empower lower courts to question interpretations established by their national ‘superiors’. Assuming that courts want to protect their own interests, the article presumes that national high courts develop strategies to elude the breach of their standing interpretations. Building on principal-agent theory, the article proposes that national high courts can use the level of (im-) precision in the wording of the ECJ’s judgements to continue applying their own interpretations. The article develops theoretical strategies for national high courts in their struggle for authority.

The European Union and Diplomatic Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Butler
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
External Action ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Second World War ◽  
First Century ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Nation States ◽  
Supranational Institutions ◽  
Second World ◽  
The Eu

Not long after the establishment of supranational institutions in the aftermath of the Second World War, the early incarnations of the European Union (EU) began conducting diplomacy. Today, EU Delegations (EUDs) exist throughout the world, operating similar to full-scale diplomatic missions. The Treaty of Lisbon established the legal underpinnings for the European External Action Service (EEAS) as the diplomatic arm of the EU. Yet within the international legal framework, EUDs remain second-class to the missions of nation States. The EU thus has to use alternative legal means to form diplomatic missions. This chapter explores the legal framework of EU diplomatic relations, but also asks whether traditional missions to which the VCDR regime applies, can still be said to serve the needs of diplomacy in the twenty-first century, when States are no longer the ultimate holders of sovereignty, or the only actors in international relations.

The Role of National Constitutional Courts in European Democracy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Economic Liberalization ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
European Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
European Court ◽  
European Democracy ◽  
And Function

This chapter examines the role of national constitutional courts in European democracy. It first provides an overview of national constitutional courts in Europe, focusing on the requirements that they impose on national institutions and the consequences of those requirements at the treaty level—i.e., transferring national powers to the European Union and regulating how these powers are exercised; at the level of the EU’s exercise of these powers; and at the level of implementing European law within national legal systems. The chapter also discusses how the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence enabled the European treaties to function as a constitution; the non-political mechanism of EU decisions and how it promotes economic liberalization; and how the design and function of European primary law undermine democracy. The chapter suggests that the democratic legitimacy imparted to the EU’s decisions by its citizens can only develop within the framework of the European Parliament’s powers.

Foreign Affairs Federalism in the European Union

2019 ◽  
pp. 331-351
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Court ◽  
Treaty Of Rome ◽  
Formed Part ◽  
Mixed Agreements

The European Union was born as an international organization. The 1957 Treaty of Rome formed part of international law, although the European Court of Justice was eager to emphasize that the Union constitutes “a new legal order” of international law. With time, this new legal order has indeed evolved into a true “federation of States.” Yet how would the foreign affairs powers of this new supranational entity be divided? Would the European Union gradually replace the member states, or would it preserve their distinct and diverse foreign affairs voices? In the past sixty years, the Union has indeed significantly sharpened its foreign affairs powers. While still based on the idea that it has no plenary power, the Union’s external competences have expanded dramatically, and today it is hard to identify a nucleus of exclusive foreign affairs powers reserved for the member states. And in contrast to a classic international law perspective, the Union’s member states only enjoy limited treaty-making powers under European law. Their foreign affairs powers are limited by the exclusive powers of the Union, and they may be preempted through European legislation. There are, however, moments when both the Union and its states enjoy overlapping foreign affairs powers. For these situations, the Union legal order has devised a number of cooperative mechanisms to safeguard a degree of “unity” in the external actions of the Union. Mixed agreements constitute an international mechanism that brings the Union and the member states to the same negotiating table. The second constitutional device is internal to the Union legal order: the duty of cooperation.

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