Tibet and Chinese-British-American Relations in the Early 1950s

2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Zhai
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Symbolic Meaning ◽  
High Confidence ◽  
Coercive Diplomacy ◽  
Chinese Civil War ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
At Home

The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who seized power in Beijing in 1949 viewed Tibet as Chinese territory. In this respect, they were no different from previous rulers of China. The chairman of the CCP, Mao Zedong, carefully devised a plan to re-annex Tibet, which had been effectively independent of China since 1911. The CCP's recent victory in the Chinese civil war gave Mao high confidence that he could reclaim Tibet without provoking outside intervention. Such a move not only would bring international political benefits but would also carry a symbolic meaning at home and thereby legitimize the rule of the CCP. Although Mao sent troops to Tibet, he also planned to rely on negotiations and coercive diplomacy. This article highlights the complicated relationships that emerged on the international scene as a result of China's actions in the early 1950s.

scholarly journals Lost Chance for Peace: The 1945 CCP-Kuomintang Peace Talks Revisited

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-114
Author(s):  
Sergey Radchenko
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Turning Point ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
The Road ◽  
Chinese Civil War ◽  
On The Road ◽  
North And South ◽  
Lost Opportunity

This article reconsiders the 1945 Chongqing peace talks between the Kuo-mintang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a key turning point on the road to the Chinese civil war. The article shows that the talks represented a lost opportunity to avert the slide into fratricidal warfare. The CCP leader, Mao Zedong, under pressure from Iosif Stalin, was prepared to compromise with his rival Chiang Kai-shek on the basis of dividing China into two separately administered territories (roughly, north and south). Chiang was unwilling to consider such a step, which from his perspective was unpatriotic. His resistance to the division of China doomed the talks and precipitated the outbreak of war.

The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan

1987 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 256-275
Author(s):  
Jon W. Huebner
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The United States ◽  
People’S Republic Of China ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Final Phase ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

On 1 October 1949 the People's Republic of China was formally established in Beijing. On 7 December Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), who had earlier moved to Taiwan to secure a final base of resistance in the civil war, ordered the Kuomintang (KMT) regime to withdraw to the island from Chengdu, Sichuan, its last seat on the mainland. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared its commitment to the goal of unifying the nation under the People's Republic, and thus called for the “liberation” of Taiwan. Although Taiwan represented the final phase of the still unfinished civil war, it was the strategic significance of the island that became of paramount concern to the CCP, the KMT and the United States.

Mao, Tibet, and the Korean War

2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael M. Sheng
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Korean War ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Chinese Leader ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Korean War ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

In October 1950 the Chinese leader Mao Zedong embarked on a two-front war. He sent troops to Korea and invaded Tibet at a time when the People's Republic of China was burdened with many domestic problems. The logic behind Mao's risky policy has baffled historians ever since. By drawing on newly available Chinese and Western documents and memoirs, this article explains what happened in October 1950 and why Mao acted as he did. The release of key documents such as telegrams between Mao and his subordinates enables scholars to understand Chinese policymaking vis-à-vis Tibet much more fully than in the past. The article shows that Mao skillfully used the conflicts for his own purposes and consolidated his hold over the Chinese Communist Party.

The Struggle Between The Kuomintang And The Chinese Communist Party On Campus During The War Of Resistance, 1937–45

1989 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 300-323
Author(s):  
Hu Kuo–tai
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Colleges And Universities ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
War Of Resistance ◽  
The Revolution

Between 1937 and 1945 higher education was one of the main arenas of struggle between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Both sides regarded it as an important area to be controlled. The Bureau of Investigation's 1951 report suggested that KMT support from youth in schools was “the key to success or failure.” The Chinese Communist Party also regarded the work of winning over intellectuals as vital for the Party's future. In 1939 Mao Zedong said that “without the participation of intellectuals victory in the revolution is impossible.” Thus, the two parties competed both overtly and covertly in colleges and universities to win the support of both staff and students.

The Last Battle: Mao and the Internationalists’ fight for the Liberation Daily

1990 ◽  
Vol 123 ◽  
pp. 521-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Stranahan
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Close Reading ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Source Materials ◽  
Party Congress

Although scholars have examined the struggle between Mao Zedong and the Internationalists associated with Wang Ming and Bo Gu for control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in some detail, they have ignored the final battle between the two groups. That confrontation did not take place in the Central Committee or at the Seventh Party Congress in 1945. Rather, new source materials from the People's Republic and a close reading of the newspaper itself show that it took place in the Party's primary propaganda organ, the Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao).

China's Internationalization in the Early People's Republic: Dreams of a Socialist World Economy

2006 ◽  
Vol 188 ◽  
pp. 870-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
William C. Kirby
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
World Economy ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
East European ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The World ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Formative Years

The People's Republic of China, like the Chinese Communist Party that ruled it, was from its conception internationalist in premise and in promise. The PRC in its formative years would be Moscow's most faithful and self-sacrificing ally, a distinction earned in blood in Korea and by the fact that, unlike the East European “people's democracies,” the PRC's allegiance was not bought at gunpoint. This article researches one of the most ambitious international undertakings of that era: the effort to plan the development of half the world and to create a socialist world economy stretching from Berlin to Canton. What was China's role in this undertaking, and how did it shape the early PRC? How did this socialist world economy work (or not work)? How successfully internationalist was a project negotiated by sovereign (and Stalinist) states? Why did Mao Zedong ultimately destroy it, and with it, the dream of communist internationalism?

The Sixth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP: Look Back in Anger?

1981 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 518-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. G. Goodman
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
People’S Republic Of China ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
Look Back ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

The Sixth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) met in Beijing from 27 to 29 June 1981. On its agenda were two items: changes in the highest-level leadership of the CCP, and the “ Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People's Republic of China.” ‘ Though the Plenum's decisions to a large extent confirmed and made official trends and policies that had become apparent during most of the previous year, they were nonetheless remarkable. The western press has, not unsurprisingly, focused on the replacement of Hua Guofeng by Hu Yaobang as Chairman of the CCP's Central Committee. However, the Plenum's reassessment of the Party's history since 1949; of the roles of Mao Zedong, Hua Guofeng and other CCP leaders; and of the nature of Mao Zedong Thought, are undoubtedly of greater significance in terms of the development of the People's Republic of China (PRC): as indeed is the fact of Hua Guofeng's demotion rather than his outright dismissal or “ purge.”

The Chinese Revolution and the Colonial Areas: The View form Yenan, 1937–41

1978 ◽  
Vol 75 ◽  
pp. 594-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven M. Goldstein
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Formative Period ◽  
The Political ◽  
Military Strategy ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
Chinese Revolution ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

The years 1937 to 1941 constitute the formative period in the Maoist leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), when Mao and his colleagues developed much of the political and military strategy that was to guide the Party through the anti-Japanese war and into the civil war period. This package of revolutionary prescriptions – loosely labelled the Yenan experience – is generally recognized to have had a powerful, lingering hold on the Party leadership.

Wang Jiaxiang, Mao Zedong and the ‘Triumph of Mao Zedong-Thought’ (1935–1945)

1989 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 705-727
Author(s):  
Thomas Kampen
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Power Struggles ◽  
Communist Movement ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Tremendous Impact ◽  
Party Congress

While Mao Zedong might still be China's most famous communist, only scholars of the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have heard of Wang Jiaxiang and even they have never studied his career in detail. But recent Chinese publications show that there were very few CCP leaders who had such a tremendous impact on the Chinese communist movement in general and Mao Zedong's career in particular. This article will show that Wang not only supported Mao during the power struggles of the 1930s and helped convince Stalin that Mao should be acknowledged as the CCP's leader, but that Wang also played a decisive role in establishing Mao Zedong-Thought as the Party's guiding ideology. The release of numerous Party documents in the last five years also throws some light upon the relations and conflicts between Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders such as Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao and Liu Shaoqi in the decade between the Long March and the Seventh Party Congress of 1945.

The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party

1988 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 29-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Garver
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
The Subject ◽  
United Front ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

The role of the Comintern in the formation of the second Chinese Communist Party-Kuomintang (CCP-KMT) united front has long been the subject of debate. Scholars have long recognized that an understanding of Moscow's role during the pivotal year and a half prior to the Xian Incident, and especially of possible conflict between the Comintern and Mao Zedong over the issue of a united front with Chiang Kai-shek, was essential to an evaluation of subsequent CCP-Soviet relations. This article is a contribution to our understanding of this important problem.

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