A Most Special Relationship: The Origins of Anglo-American Nuclear Strike Planning

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Young

This article examines a hitherto unexplored aspect of the Anglo-American “special relationship,” the development of arrangements to coordinate U.S. and British forces in a joint nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. During the early Cold War, British political leaders and military officers struggled for a closer relationship with the U.S. Air Force in the hope of gaining greater insight into U.S. war plans, predicated as they were on nuclear strikes launched from bases in England. U.S. willingness to supply nuclear (and later thermo-nuclear) bombs for delivery by British bombers prompted bilateral talks from 1956 about their deployment in a joint air offensive. This prospective partnership raised difficult issues for the UK Air Staff, which was committed to the maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent and countervalue rather than counterforce targeting. Nevertheless, the advantages of joint strike planning were such that by 1962 Bomber Command's planning had become fully integrated with that of Strategic Air Command.

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodric Braithwaite

Sir Rodric Braithwaite was educated at Christ’s College, University of Cambridge, from where he went to serve in HM Diplomatic Service, having worked in Jakarta, Moscow, Washington, Warsaw, Rome, and Brussels, where he was a member of the British delegation to the European Community. From 1988 to 1992, Sir Rodric served as HM Ambassador in the Soviet Union during the decisive years of the Perestroika and the first British ambassador in Russia. Subsequently, he was appointed foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister in the second John Major ministry and chaired the UK Joint Intelligence Committee between 1992 and 1993. He was appointed Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George (GCMG) in 1994. As a career diplomat, Sir Rodric gained decades of insight into the troubled relations between Russia and West, having taken part in numerous negotiations on arms control. His affinity with the decision-making circles in both Russia and Britain alongside with the mastery of the Russian language allow him to skillfully dissect the underlying causes of ups-and-downs in Moscow’s relationship with the West, employing the works of both English- and Russian-speaking analysts. Among his recent books are Across the Moscow River (2002), Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War (2006), Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 (2012), Armageddon and Paranoia: The Nuclear Confrontation (2017). In this essay, Sir Rodric reminisces of the years spent as a diplomat and provides his view on the usefulness and applicability of historical lessons while devising a foreign policy course.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-702
Author(s):  
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet

In 1946, the entertainer and activist Paul Robeson pondered America's intentions in Iran. In what was to become one of the first major crises of the Cold War, Iran was fighting a Soviet aggressor that did not want to leave. Robeson posed the question, “Is our State Department concerned with protecting the rights of Iran and the welfare of the Iranian people, or is it concerned with protecting Anglo-American oil in that country and the Middle East in general?” This was a loaded question. The US was pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops after its occupation of the country during World War II. Robeson wondered why America cared so much about Soviet forces in Iranian territory, when it made no mention of Anglo-American troops “in countries far removed from the United States or Great Britain.” An editorial writer for a Black journal in St. Louis posed a different variant of the question: Why did the American secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, concern himself with elections in Iran, Arabia or Azerbaijan and yet not “interfere in his home state, South Carolina, which has not had a free election since Reconstruction?”


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (21) ◽  
pp. 9-28
Author(s):  
Kristo Karvinen

The 1939 invasion of Finland by the Soviet Union attracted more than just journalists to the frigid north. Thousands of volunteers around the world rallied under the Finnish flag, willing to risk their lives for a foreign country. Over ten thousand arrived before the end of the war, with more on their way, coming from Hungary and Estonia, Canada and the USA, Sweden and the UK. Were they all ardent anticommunists or did they have other motives? This article seeks to answer that question, utilising Finnish and British archives as well as contemporary research into war volunteering. The origins and motives of the volunteers are examined, revealing that their motives ran a wide gamut, including such reasons as anti-communism, linguistic fraternity and spirit of adventure, to name a few.


Author(s):  
K. V. Shlykov

The article explores the significance of Mikhail Gorbachev's first journey to the UK in December 1984 for the East-West relations. The visit was initiated by Margaret Thatcher who wanted to get acquainted with the potential Soviet leader as she hoped to become a trusted intermediary between Moscow and Washington. The revitalization of contacts with the USSR was a part of Britain's resurgence as a major world player after the Falklands victory. The discussions in London focused on the issue of strategic stability, though they could only serve to give the parties a better understanding of each other's position, as no political agreement could be reached due to the nature of the visit and the fact that any agreement on the subject had to be between the Soviet Union and the United States. The bilateral relations issues being discussed included mostly economic cooperation and such problems as human rights in the USSR and Soviet assistance to the British miners' strike. Gorbachev's speech on "new political thinking" and "a common European home", expressions first used during the visit to Uk, rang hollow to London, however Thatcher had the impression that she could deal with the Soviet politician in future. The British public opinion also saw Mikhail Gorbachev and his wife favourably. Later statements of Lady Thatcher and Gorbachev's critics on the meeting being defining for the foreign policy of the perestroika era should be seen as exaggerated, as the demise of the Communist system and the USSR were not foreseen by anyone in 1984, either in London or in Moscow.


Author(s):  
Sally-Ann Treharne

The US-led invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada at the alleged behest of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) on 25 October 1983 had a profound negative impact upon the development of the Special Relationship under Reagan and Thatcher. The dubious legality of the intervention was widely criticised by the international community, most notably the UK. And yet, it was the Thatcher government that bore the scars of considerable domestic criticism regarding the unlawful US involvement in the internal affairs of a member of the British Commonwealth. The US invasion of Grenada, or operation ‘Urgent Fury’ as it is otherwise known, raised important questions regarding the limits of British credibility and importance within the Anglo-American alliance.


Author(s):  
Paul Robinson ◽  
Mikhail Antonov

This chapter shows that the Russian philosophical and legal traditions regarding war have advanced along a number of different tracks. In Imperial Russia, some thinkers adopted pacifist positions; others regarded war as a necessary evil. A similar bifurcation of thought can be seen in the Soviet era. The Soviets expounded a belief in the principles of non-interference and peaceful coexistence. At the same time, they also sometimes portrayed war in a positive light. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian scholars and political leaders have generally supported state sovereignty and rejected attempts to justify humanitarian interventions, regime change, and preventive war (on these Western strategies, see Geis/Wagner, Stohl, and Jahn in this volume). Nevertheless, they have on occasion resorted to very similar language themselves. Russian narratives thus oscillate between favouring pacifism and sovereignty as means of preserving the status quo and, as an exception, supporting military interventions when these are required by the transient goals of Russian foreign policy.


1987 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-214
Author(s):  
Michael Bruchis

Soviet scholars basing themselves on the assertion in the Program of the CPSU that “peaceful coexistence of states with different social regimes does not means a diminution of the ideological struggle,” severely criticize those Western authors who in their works throw light upon the shadowy aspects of theory and practice of the ruling party in the USSR. Utterances of Western scholars which express doubt about the veracity of data contained in documents of the CPSU and the accuracy of theses and positions based on these data are rejected as totally unfounded inventions. Scholars of countries with the same social regime as in the Soviet Union are subject to no less severe attacks if they contest in their works, directly or indirectly, the theses and positions worked out by Soviet authors. While the Western scholars concerned are termed bourgeois falsifiers, the unfavored scholars (and political leaders of the socialist countries) are categorised as revisionists, a no less pejorative term in Soviet parlance: thus, for example, “the powers of international imperialism,… leaning on services of revisionists of various strains”; or “to expose contemporary bourgeois and other falsifiers of history.”


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