scholarly journals Whence the Expected Free Energy?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Beren Millidge ◽  
Alexander Tschantz ◽  
Christopher L. Buckley

The expected free energy (EFE) is a central quantity in the theory of active inference. It is the quantity that all active inference agents are mandated to minimize through action, and its decomposition into extrinsic and intrinsic value terms is key to the balance of exploration and exploitation that active inference agents evince. Despite its importance, the mathematical origins of this quantity and its relation to the variational free energy (VFE) remain unclear. In this letter, we investigate the origins of the EFE in detail and show that it is not simply ”the free energy in the future.” We present a functional that we argue is the natural extension of the VFE but actively discourages exploratory behavior, thus demonstrating that exploration does not directly follow from free energy minimization into the future. We then develop a novel objective, the free energy of the expected future (FEEF), which possesses both the epistemic component of the EFE and an intuitive mathematical grounding as the divergence between predicted and desired futures.

2014 ◽  
Vol 369 (1655) ◽  
pp. 20130481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Friston ◽  
Philipp Schwartenbeck ◽  
Thomas FitzGerald ◽  
Michael Moutoussis ◽  
Timothy Behrens ◽  
...  

This paper considers goal-directed decision-making in terms of embodied or active inference. We associate bounded rationality with approximate Bayesian inference that optimizes a free energy bound on model evidence. Several constructs such as expected utility, exploration or novelty bonuses, softmax choice rules and optimism bias emerge as natural consequences of free energy minimization. Previous accounts of active inference have focused on predictive coding . In this paper, we consider variational Bayes as a scheme that the brain might use for approximate Bayesian inference. This scheme provides formal constraints on the computational anatomy of inference and action, which appear to be remarkably consistent with neuroanatomy. Active inference contextualizes optimal decision theory within embodied inference, where goals become prior beliefs. For example, expected utility theory emerges as a special case of free energy minimization, where the sensitivity or inverse temperature (associated with softmax functions and quantal response equilibria) has a unique and Bayes-optimal solution. Crucially, this sensitivity corresponds to the precision of beliefs about behaviour. The changes in precision during variational updates are remarkably reminiscent of empirical dopaminergic responses—and they may provide a new perspective on the role of dopamine in assimilating reward prediction errors to optimize decision-making.


1990 ◽  
Vol 55 (5) ◽  
pp. 1143-1148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Kloubek

Results presented for the aliphatic hydrocarbon-water interface show that the recent hypothesis of the free energy minimization called interfacial interaction rule, which was suggested as a theoretical base of the Antonow rule, cannot be generally valid.


2018 ◽  
Vol 455 ◽  
pp. 161-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jelle Bruineberg ◽  
Erik Rietveld ◽  
Thomas Parr ◽  
Leendert van Maanen ◽  
Karl J Friston

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