Ame intellective, âme cogitative: Jean de Jandun et la duplex forma propria de l'homme

Vivarium ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 318-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Baptiste Brenet

AbstractThe article analyses the idea that according to the averroist Jean de Jandun, Master of Arts in Paris at the beginning of the 14th century, human beings are composed of a «double form» the separated intellect on the one hand, the cogitative soul on the other hand. After recalling several major accounts of the time, we explore Jean's reading of Averroes' major conceptions concerning the problem. Finally, we challenge the idea according to which we observe in his writings the radical thesis of a sometimes cogitating sometimes thinking «double human being» that makes of the homo intelligens a punctual and exclusive new being, which is accidentally produced while the thinking takes place.

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg W. Bertram

AbstractThe concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Derry Ahmad Rizal

This paper aims to do a study of the concept of a perfect human being by taking two corners of the field of characters, Friedrich Williams Nietzsche and Ibn ‘Arabi. In this case the two figures convey their thoughts on how to become perfect human beings. Nietzsche who gives a view about humans must be able, strong and be themselves in facing all their problems. Making humans superior in Netzsche's view. On the other hand Ibn Arabi who explained about the nature of being a perfect human being, and humans themselves are a reflection of the formation of a real God on earth. The level in achieving goals as a perfect human being. The categorization of macrocosm and microcosm in looking at differences in "humans".


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 54-71
Author(s):  
Raquel Borges Blázquez

Artificial intelligence has countless advantages in our lives. On the one hand, computer’s capacity to store and connect data is far superior to human capacity. On the other hand, its “intelligence” also involves deep ethical problems that the law must respond to. I say “intelligence” because nowadays machines are not intelligent. Machines only use the data that a human being has previously offered as true. The truth is relative and the data will have the same biases and prejudices as the human who programs the machine. In other words, machines will be racist, sexist and classist if their programmers are. Furthermore, we are facing a new problem: the difficulty to understand the algorithm of those who apply the law.This situation forces us to rethink the criminal process, including artificial intelligence and spinning very thinly indicating how, when, why and under what assumptions we can make use of artificial intelligence and, above all, who is going to program it. At the end of the day, as Silvia Barona indicates, perhaps the question should be: who is going to control global legal thinking?


2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 448-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Pablo Zagal ◽  
Miguel Nussbaum ◽  
Ricardo Rosas

Extensive research has shown that the act of play is extremely important in the lives of human beings. It is thus not surprising that games have a long and continuing history in the development of almost every culture and society. The advent of computers and technology in general has also been akin to the need for entertainment that every human being seeks. However, a curious dichotomy exists in the nature of electronic games: the vast majority of electronic games are individual in nature whereas the nonelectronic ones are collective by nature. On the other hand, recent technological breakthroughs are finally allowing for the implementation of electronic multiplayer games. Because of the limited experience in electronic, multiplayer game design, it becomes necessary to adapt existing expertise in the area of single-player game design to the realm of multiplayer games. This work presents a model to support the initial steps in the design process of multiplayer games. The model is defined in terms of the characteristics that are both inherent and special to multiplayer games but also related to the relevant elements of a game in general. Additionally, the model is used to assist in the design of two multiplayer games. “One of the most difficult tasks people can perform, however much others may despise it, is the invention of good games …”


1991 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 35-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cora Diamond

I want to argue for the importance of the notion human being in ethics. Part I of the paper presents two different sorts of argument against treating that notion as important in ethics.A. Here is an example of the first sort of argument.What makes us human beings is that we have certain properties, but these properties, making us members of a certain biological species, have no moral relevance. If, on the other hand, we define being human in terms which are not tied to biological classification, if (for example) we treat as the properties which make us human the capacities for reasoning or for self-consciousness, then indeed those capacities may be morally relevant, but if they are morally significant at all, they are significant whether they are the properties of a being who is a member of our species or not. And so it would be better to use a word like ‘person’ to mean a being that has these properties, to bring out the fact that not all human beings have them and that non-human beings conceivably might have them.


2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 617-642
Author(s):  
Antonio Di Chiro

In this essay we will try to analyze the thought of the philosopher Giorgio Agamben on the pandemic. The aim of the work is twofold. On the one hand, we will try to demonstrate that Agamben’s positions on the pandemic are not to be understood as mere extemporaneous statements, but as integral parts of his philosophy. On the other hand, we will try to show how these positions are based on a deeply paranoid and anti-scientific vision, since Agamben believes that the effects of the epidemic have been exaggerated by the centers of power in order to create a “state of exception” that allows to crumble social life and to use the fear of poverty as a tool to dominate society. We will try to demonstrate that it is precisely starting from the critique of Agamben’s positions that it is possible to rethink a philosophy and a politic to come and a new reorganization of social and intimate relations between human beings.


Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 238-260
Author(s):  
Franco Manni ◽  

From the ideas of Aristotle, De Saussure and Wittgenstein, philosopher Herbert McCabe elaborated an original anthropology. 'Meaning' means: the role played by a part towards the whole. Senses are bodily organs and sensations allow an animal to get fragments of the external world which become 'meaningful' for the behaviour of the whole animal Besides sensations, humans are ‘linguistic animals’ because through words they are able to 'communicate', that is, to share a peculiar kind of meanings: concepts. Whereas, sense-images are stored physically in our brain and cannot be shared, even though we can relate to sense-images by words (speech coincides with thought). However, concepts do not belong to the individual human being qua individual, but to an interpersonal entity: the language system. Therefore, on the one hand, to store images is a sense-power and an operation of the brain, whereas the brain (quite paradoxically!) is not in itself the organ of thought. On the other hand, concepts do not exist on their own.


After having briefly but exhaustively recalled the main lines of Freudian psychoanalytic thought, we have discussed a possible psychoanalytic theoretical model for human symbolic function mainly centred on the action of a set of primary psychic mechanisms rejoined around the negative, in its widest sense according to the works of André Green. A chief aspect of this pattern has turned out to be an underlying, irreducible dialecticity that reflects on the one hand, the typical feature of human symbolic function, and, on the other hand, the main outcome of the unavoidable presence of a basic dichotomy formalized the so-called phallic logic, that is, that primordial, ancestral and irreducible logical nucleus inevitably present in the deepest meanders of human psyche as an inborn structure phylogenetically preformed and ontogenetically re-established during the psychic evolution of any human being.


Author(s):  
Leo-Paul Bordeleau

Can sport claim to be an educative means, and what becomes of Greek paideia in the world of sport? The author intends to answer these questions through the use of a semantic and historical clarification of the notions of sport and education. Indeed, on the one hand, sport appears like a social practice not much propitious to education; on the other hand, modern education seems to have deviated from the Greek paideia’s trajectory. Therefore, to take into account this deviation and, by doing so, to make precise the idea of education, and then demonstrate that sport carries all characteristics of modern rationality which has produced it, will allow the author to conclude that sport could be considered one of the preferential means of human beings’ formation. Nevertheless its educative function more likely belongs to the nature of "poïèsis" than to the nature of "praxis."


1862 ◽  
Vol 7 (40) ◽  
pp. 461-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Maudsley

As it has ever been the custom of man to act as if he were eternal, and lavishly to scatter the limited force which he embodies as though the supply were inexhaustible, it produces no unaccustomed surprise to witness the useless expenditure of force which is so frequently made at the present time. It may even, perhaps, be deemed a token of some modesty, that the being, who since his first formation has been continually occupied in metaphysical regions with the investigation of the origin of all things, should be content for a while to amuse himself with physical theories concerning his own origin. That which is to be regretted in the new and comparatively praiseworthy occupation is the old evil of hasty theorizing on the one hand, and on the other hand, the evil, scarcely less ancient, of an impetuous eagerness to demolish any theory, however plausible, which comes athwart a favourite prejudice. What though the anatomist does discover a very close resemblance and very slight differences between the structure of a gorilla and the structure of a human being; there is no need, on that account, that mankind in a feeling of injured dignity should angrily rouse up and disclaim the undesired relationship. Whatever may be said or written, it is quite plain after all that a man is not a gorilla, and that a gorilla is not a man; it is furthermore manifest that gorillas do not breed men now-a-days, and that we have not the shadow of any evidence to guide us in forming; an opinion as to what they may have clone in times past. The negative testimony of Du Chaillu, who says that he searched in vain in the gorilla region for any intermediate race or link between it and man, scarcely adds anything to the conviction of the non-existence of any such link, which has long been universally entertained.*


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