Negotiations on Arms Control: Is There a Future?

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-68
Author(s):  
P. Terrence Hopmann

Abstract The global arms control regime that began with the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) appears to be collapsing rapidly, with many agreements now abandoned or barely enforced. This article analyzes some of the challenges to new negotiations on arms control based on developments in negotiation theory over the past 60 years. It focuses on the management of multilateral rather than bilateral negotiations, the need to focus on absolute rather than relative gains, the use of problem-solving techniques rather than traditional bargaining, the management of domestic opposition to arms control, the need for national leaders to become active proponents of new negotiations, and the need to focus on norms of cooperative security rather than engaging in arms races. It concludes that a necessary, if not sufficient, condition to save and rebuild the arms control regime is the adoption of more constructive approaches to negotiation on these vital issues.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix M. Schneider ◽  
Petr Kolínský ◽  
Götz Bokelmann

<p>We study finite-frequency effects that arise in cavity detection. The task comes along with the Onsite-Inspection part for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), where the remnants of a potential nuclear test need to be identified. In such nuclear tests, there is preexisting knowledge about the depths at which nuclear tests may take place, and also about sizes that such cavities can attain. The task of cavity detection has consistently been a difficult one in the past, which is surprising, since a cavity represents one of the strongest seismic anomalies one can ever have in the subsurface. A conclusion of this study is that considering finite-frequency effects are rather promising for cavity detection, and that it is worthwhile to take them into account. We utilize an analytical approach for the forward problem of the a seismic wave interacting with a underground cavity in order to develop an inversion routine that finds and detects an underground cavity utilizing the transmitted wave-field.</p><p> </p>


Author(s):  
Matthias Bieri ◽  
Christian Nünlist

The Ukraine crisis serves as a tragic reminder of how fragile European security still is—twenty-five years after the cold war ended. As the only inclusive European security organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) once more demonstrates how useful cooperative security instruments can be to de-escalate international tensions. This chapter focuses on the OSCE’s contribution to cooperative security in Europe after 1990, in particular in the field of conventional arms control and the building of confidence and security between European armed forces. It reviews the arms-control regime in Europe and explains why military transparency as achieved with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Vienna Document, and the Treaty on Open Skies is again needed in a post-2014 security environment. The chapter also highlights that, while the Ukraine crisis underscored its need for reform, adapting the arms-control regime in Europe has become even more difficult.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen Wunderlich ◽  
Harald Müller ◽  
Una Jakob

The regimes for the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are essential ingredients of the global order. Yet this order is currently in transition: the bipolarity of the Cold War has given way to a more complex, multipolar world order characterized by conflicts of interest and great power competition rather than cooperative security. This competition brings with it rising strategic uncertainties which endanger stability and have far reaching implications for WMD-related agreements. To better understand the implications of this changing global context for WMD arms control and disarmament measures this report looks at the past, present and future prospects for WMD-related treaties. The report begins by outlining four broad yet interlinked approaches to arms control and disarmament before considering how these have been applied to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the past and how these measures could be applied in the future.


2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei Zagorski

AbstractRussia and the US have significantly reduced their tactical nuclear weapons over the past twenty years. The remaining weapons have been moved from active service and stored separate from their delivery systems. However, both still keep tactical nuclear weapons available for eventual deployment, and Moscow maintains not only a larger but also a much more diverse stockpile of such weapons than the US. The prospects for designing an arms control regime covering TNW are complicated by a series of factors. Technically, verifying any limitations or reductions of non-deployed weapons is an extremely sensitive and challenging task as it would require opening nuclear depots for inspection. Politically, the two countries differ in the assessment of a future role of nuclear arms. While the US anticipates that further development of its advanced conventional capabilities would lead to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons, it is exactly the weakness of its conventional forces which causes the Russian defence establishment to project a growing role for nuclear weapons. These two distinct trajectories largely explain the differences in the two countries' approaches to the TNW arms control and make any agreement less likely to materialize any time soon. They also explain why Moscow has become increasingly sceptical with regard to including TNW within an arms control regime.


1989 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-220
Author(s):  
Mackubin Thomas Owens

2019 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 342-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW J. COE ◽  
JANE VAYNMAN

Arming is puzzling for the same reason war is: it produces outcomes that could instead be realized through negotiation, without the costly diversion of resources arming entails. Despite this, arms control is exceedingly rare historically, so that arming is ubiquitous and its costs to humanity are large. We develop and test a theory that explains why arming is so common and its control so rare. The main impediment to arms control is the need for monitoring that renders a state’s arming transparent enough to assure its compliance but not so much as to threaten its security. We present evidence that this trade-off has undermined arms control in three diverse contexts: Iraq’s weapons programs after the Gulf War, great power competition in arms in the interwar period, and superpower military rivalry during the Cold War. These arms races account for almost 40% of all global arming in the past two centuries.


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