By All Means, Intervene! (The Security Council and the Use of Force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in Iraq (to protect the Kurds), in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti)

1997 ◽  
Vol 66 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 241-271 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractIn recent years the UN Security Council has on numerous occasions handled situations involving gross human rights violations. In order to be able to take the action considered necessary the Security Council has applied the notion of ``threat to the peace'' in Article 39 of the UN Charter to situations which do not necessarily constitute such threats. This article examines the cases of use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in Iraq (to protect the Kurds), Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti. Drawing upon these experiences, the author argues that a reconstruction of the notion of ``threat to the peace'' is needed. It is suggested that gross violations of human rights should be considered as threatening peace by definition and that in particularly serious situations the Security Council is justified in taking action under Chapter VII even if a threat to international peace cannot be determined.

Author(s):  
Nizam Safaraz

Abstract             Every human being has the rights to be protected from discrimination by any party, especially the act of gross human rights violations. In order to prevent this, the Security Council has a function to secure international peace and security from threats to international peace. One of the case that is becoming an international concern is the human rights violations on Rohingya by Myanmar Military. In its implementation, the UN Security Council can intervene a country known to violate human rights of its people, however the Security Council's intervention caused a controversy that questioned the validity of the intervention by Security Council. Thus, the purpose of this research is to find out whether the situation in Myanmar is valid for the UN Security Council to carry out humanitarian interventions. Accordingly, this research also analyzes legal measures by the UN Security Council in dealing with human rights violations in Myanmar. Keyword: Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, Rohingya, UN Security Council


2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geir Ulfstein ◽  
Hege Føsund Christiansen

AbstractOn 17 March 2011 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 authorizing member states to take forceful measures to protect Libyan civilians. Clearly NATO actions to protect civilians were within the mandate. But the authors claim that operations aiming at overthrowing the Qaddafi regime were illegal use of force. The overstepping of the mandate may have a negative effect on the credibility of the responsibility to protect in future gross human rights violations.


2019 ◽  
pp. 346-374
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

This chapter looks at the use of force and collective security. Today, the United Nations Charter embodies the indispensable principles of international law on the use of force. These include the prohibition on the unilateral use of force found in Article 2(4), and the recognition of the inherent right of all States to use force in self-defence found in Article 51. Finally, under Chapter VII, a collective security system centred upon the Security Council was established for the maintenance of international peace and security. A key debate over the scope of Article 2(4) is whether a new exception has been recognized which would allow the use of force motivated by humanitarian considerations. It is argued that these ‘humanitarian interventions’ would allow a State to use force to protect people in another State from gross and systematic human rights violations when the target State is unwilling or unable to act.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana Kearney

Fed up with the decades-old violence plaguing the DRC, the UN Security Council broke new ground by granting peacekeepers an offensive mandate to pursue rebels rather than waiting to react in self-defence. This transformation in UN military operations alarmed several States, concerned over a perceived loss of sovereignty and a weakening of the principle of non-intervention. To allay these fears, Resolution 2098’s drafters incorporated a provision expressly assuring Member States that offensive peacekeeping tactics in the DRC would not generate precedent for future UN action. However, examining past UN practice and ‘slippery slope’ theory alike reveals that explicit disavowal of precedent cannot guarantee that offensive peacekeeping will not be used as a template for future UN action. In fact, the incorporation of such language may foster the generation of a slippery slope in UN peacekeeping, ultimately paving the way for increased scope of UN intervention in situations of gross human rights violations. The article concludes by proposing a framework for how actors can manipulate slopes to generate or slow precedent for future UN action.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (8) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Abdolsamad Doulah ◽  
Mirshahbiz Shafee

The UN Security Council is primarily in charge of maintaining international peace and security. There has been raised various debates on how the Security Council manage international crises in the world, particularly severe violations of international human rights law. On the one hand, the traditional view to international peace has altered and the Security Council is also in charge of observing the standards of the international human rights. On the other hand, the international community has faced inconsistencies in the use of the veto by its permanent members on the international human rights violations. However, many analysts believe that the Security Council could take timely action to prevent violations of international human rights law. At that time, they fell into the trap of politics and proved insufficient. This article is in response to this important issue, indicating that the management of the Security Council has been fair in the case of international human rights violations. This study also aims to investigate whether the Security Council has been successful in adopting a procedure independent from the interests of its permanent members.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 495
Author(s):  
Petra Perisic

In 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty introduced a new doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)”, which signified an obligation of each state to protect its population from mass atrocities occurring in that state, as well as an obligation on the part of international community to offer such protection if the state in question fails to fulfill its duty. The doctrine of RtoP was subsequently endorsed by states in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, though it was formulated more restrictively in comparison to the 2001 Report. In 2011 a conflict broke out in Libya between its ruler Muammar Gaddafi and the protesters against his rule. Government forces were brutal in their attempt to quell the protests and it was not long before different international bodies started to report mass violations of human rights. Surprisingly, the UN Security Council was not deadlocked by veto and passed the Resolution 1973, which invoked the RtoP principle and authorized the use of force. Supporters of RtoP hailed such an application of the principle and believed that the case of Libya was just a beginning of a successful bringing RtoP to life. Such predictions turned out to be premature. Not long after the Libyan conflict, the one in Syria began. Although Syrian people was faced with the same humanitarian disaster as Libyan did, the Security Council could not agree on passing of the resolution which would authorize the use of force to halt human rights violations. Two crises are being analyzed, as well as reasons behind such a disparate reaction of the Security Council in very similar circumstances.


Author(s):  
Nigel D. White

This chapter examines the division of competence between the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly concerning matters of international peace and security but placed within the context of the prohibition on the use of force. Although the Security Council can authorize the use of force by states, what is not clear is whether the General Assembly can recommend that states take military action. The chapter considers the conundrum faced by the United Nations with respect to an imminent and catastrophic use of force or act of egregious violence, when the UN Security Council is deadlocked because of the lack of agreement between the permanent members. It discusses the debate over the legality of the (in)famous Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 within the context of the emerging principle of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as well as within existing principles of international law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Hans Corell

The point of departure in the present article is that the UN Security Council must be reformed. But this reform should not focus on extending the membership of the Council, which seems to be the main issue in the discussion at present. It is imperative that the Council is maintained as an executive organ since this is a precondition for its effective functioning. Too many members would destroy this requirement completely, in particular if additional members are granted veto power. Already 15 members may be past the limit for an executive organ. Additional members will endanger the Council’s ability to fulfil its obligations under Art. 24 of the UN Charter: the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Instead, the reform should focus on resolving the real problem with the Council, namely the manner in which the permanent members sometimes behave. The exercise of the veto power must be in conformity with the UN Charter, which now must be viewed against the background of the development of international law since the UN was established more than 70 years ago. The manner in which some permanent members exercise their veto power is simply not in conformity with the Charter. Against this background it is absolutely necessary that the five permanent members engage in a profound discussion about their performance and the manner in which the veto power is exercised. Here, there is need for statesmanship. The members of the Security Council, and in particular the permanent members, must lead by example. What the Council must focus on is conflict prevention. This requires determination and consequence. The focus must be on the challenges that humankind is facing and will face ever more in the future and the threats to international peace and security that these challenges are causing. The need for the rule of law and protection of human rights are obvious elements in this analysis. Furthermore, the growth of the world population in combination with climate change simply must be addressed in an effective manner. The Council must focus attentively on these ‘conflict multipliers’. The discussion must also focus on peacekeeping and responsibility to protect. With respect to responsibility to protect there is great need for improvement. We cannot accept in the 21st century that fundamental human rights are violated and that crimes against international humanitarian law are being committed on a large scale without consequences. Another important element in this context is empowerment of women. In addressing these questions there is need for close cooperation with regional organizations. This cooperation already exists, but the question is how it can be developed and what lessons can be learnt from the past. Since the five permanent members are also recognized as nuclear-weapon States under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, they must confirm their obligations under this treaty and make serious their obligation to work for a nuclear-weapon free world. A reform along the lines discussed in the present article can be made without amending the UN Charter.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 135-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Richardson

Larry Johnson’s essay on the UN General Assembly’s Uniting for Peace resolution (UFP) is a useful general analysis of issues arising from UN Security Council Permanent Member veto-paralysis. His essay, which focuses on the text of the original Resolution, is directed at asking whether the UFP retains a current “useful purpose.” Relying on a text-centric interpretation of the presence or absence of subsequent invocations of the UFP, he concludes that no “useful purpose” remains, in part because evolved General Assembly authority has displaced the need to specifically invoke the UFP to make recommendations on certain issues of international peace and security. Johnson then asks whether, under the original UFP or subsequently, the Assembly may recommend to Member States “enforcement” uses of force, notwithstanding the prohibitions of Article 2(4) of the Charter. He finds Article 2(4) to be an absolute barrier to Assembly authority to recommend those measures, but not for “innovative and inventive non-use-of force measures.”


2017 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lise Morjé Howard ◽  
Anjali Kaushlesh Dayal

AbstractUN peacekeeping was not designed to wield force, and the UN's permanent five (P-5), veto-wielding Security Council members do not want the UN to develop a military capacity. However, since 1999, the UN Security Council has authorized all UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use force. The mandates do not serve to achieve the council's stated goal of maintaining international peace, nevertheless, the council repeats these mandates in every multidimensional peacekeeping resolution. Neither constructivist accounts of normative change, nor the rational pursuit of stated goals, nor organizational processes can explain the repetition of force mandates. Instead, we draw on insights from small-group psychology to advance a novel theoretical proposition: the repetition of force mandates is the result of “group-preserving” dynamics. The P-5 members strive to maintain their individual and collective status and legitimacy by issuing decisions on the use of force. Once members achieve a decision, the agreement is applied in future rounds of negotiations, even when the solution does not fit the new context and may appear suboptimal, illogical, or even pathological. Privileging the achievement and reproduction of agreement over its content is the essence of group preserving. We present an original data set of all peacekeeping mandates, alongside evidence from dozens of interviews with peacekeeping officials, including representatives of all of the Security Council's permanent members. We assess this original data using expected causal process observations derived from rationalist, constructivist, organizational, and psychological logics.


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