The Prosecution of International Crimes in Uruguay

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 601-618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Galain Palermo

AbstractThis article discusses the criminal trials carried out in Uruguay against civilian, military, and political functionaries who committed crimes, including crimes against humanity, during the period of civilian-military dictatorship lasting from 1973 to 1985. These criminal proceedings are analyzed in the contexts of transitional justice and international criminal law. Therefore, the first part of this article addresses the diverse phases of transitional justice in Uruguay while the second part analyzes fundamental aspects of criminal trials against 'state terrorists'.

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 788-821
Author(s):  
Talita de Souza Dias

The principle of fair labelling has informed the creation of international crimes and other concepts of international criminal law since the modern inception of this discipline. In particular, it was the symbolic and condemnatory import of international labels such as genocide and crimes against humanity that partly motivated their introduction as offences separate from domestic ordinary crimes. Paradoxically, fair labelling has received marginal attention in legal scholarship and practice. Moreover, frequent instances of relabelling known as ‘recharacterisation of crimes’ may not be entirely consistent with that principle, inviting further analysis thereof. In this context, the purpose of this article is to provide a more systematic and comprehensive analysis of the principle of fair labelling in international criminal law, particularly in light of the phenomenon of recharacterisation of crimes. Its central claim is that fair labelling is as a fair trial right which precludes recourse to recharacterisation in certain circumstances.


Author(s):  
Schwöbel-Patel Christine

The ‘core’ crimes set out in the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute - the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression - are overwhelmingly assumed to be the most important international crimes. In this chapter, I unsettle the assumption of their inherent importance by revealing and problematising the civilizational, political-economic, and aesthetical biases behind designating these crimes as ‘core’. This is done by shedding light on discontinuities in the history of the core crimes, and unsettling the progress narrative ‘from Nuremberg to Rome’. More specifically, crimes associated with drug control are placed in conversation with the accepted history of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to exemplify a systematic editing of the dominant narrative of international criminal law.


Author(s):  
Beth van Schaack

Crimes against humanity have both a colloquial and a legal existence. In daily parlance, the term is employed to condemn any number of atrocities that violate international human rights. As a legal construct, crimes against humanity encompass a constellation of acts made criminal under international law when they are committed within the context of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. In the domain of international criminal law, crimes against humanity are an increasingly useful component of any international prosecutor’s toolbox, because they can be charged in connection with acts of violence that do not implicate other international criminal prohibitions, such as the prohibitions against war crimes (which require a nexus to an armed conflict) and genocide (which protects only certain human groups and requires proof of a specific intent to destroy such a group). Although the concept of crimes against humanity has deep roots, crimes against humanity were first adjudicated—albeit with some controversy—in the criminal proceedings following the World War II period. The central challenge to defining crimes against humanity under international criminal law since then has been to come up with a formulation of the offense that reconciles the principle of sovereignty—which envisions an exclusive territorial domain in which states are free from outside scrutiny—with the idea that international law can, and indeed should, regulate certain acts committed entirely within the borders of a single state. Because many enumerated crimes against humanity are also crimes under domestic law (e.g., murder, assault, and rape), it was necessary to define crimes against humanity in a way that did not elevate every domestic crime to the status of an international crime, subject to international jurisdiction. Over the years, legal drafters have experimented with various elements in an effort to arrive at a workable penal definition. The definitional confusion plaguing the crime over its life span generated a considerable amount of legal scholarship. It was not until the UN Security Council promulgated the statutes of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals—the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda—that a modern definition of the crime emerged. These definitions were further refined by the case law of the two tribunals and their progeny, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone. All these doctrinal developments were codified, with some additional modifications, in a consensus definition in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It is now clear that the offense constitutes three essential elements: (1) the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and (2) the intentional commission of an enumerated act (such as an act of murder or torture) (3) by an individual with knowledge that his or her act would contribute to the larger attack. A renewed effort is now afoot to promulgate a multilateral treaty devoted to crimes against humanity based on the ICC definition and these central elements. Through this dynamic process of codification and interpretation, many—but not all—definitional issues left open in the postwar period have finally been resolved. Although their origins were somewhat shaky, crimes against humanity now have a firm place in the canon of international criminal law.


Author(s):  
Ian Freckelton ◽  
Magda Karagiannakis

This chapter analyses the international criminal law jurisprudence on fitness to stand trial. It examines the mental and physical disorders that have been asserted in international criminal proceedings for defendants accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It exposes the processes by which fitness is determined and distils the legal standards that international courts have utilised and the consequences of unfitness by international courts. The chapter canvasses the introduction of more nuanced and psychiatrically informed criteria for fitness determinations. It also proposes the introduction of adequately resourced secure facilities for the confinement of persons found unfit to stand trial in order to reduce the incentives for the assertion of questionable unfitness claims, and encourages consideration of the introduction of special hearings for those found unfit in order to advance the overall aims of international criminal justice.


Author(s):  
Melanie O’Brien

China was active in the drafting of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but has not become a state party, and the Chinese relationship with international criminal law is not strong. Given this, an examination of China’s own abilities and actions with regard to accountability for international crimes is warranted. China does not have any legislation proscribing violations of international humanitarian law, or war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. This article will examine some of the options under current Chinese Criminal Law of 1997 that could be used to prosecute international crimes in lieu of express provisions. The second part of the article undertakes an international criminal law and human rights analysis of the Gang of Four trial, as the only trial of leaders linked to the mass crimes of the Cultural Revolution and thus the only real example of an attempt at accountability for mass crimes in modern China. These two parts of the article combine together to provide an analysis of China’s ability to enact and attempts at accountability for international crimes committed in China.


2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 509-534
Author(s):  
Maria Ereza Rocha de Assis Moura ◽  
Fabíola Girão Monteconrado ◽  
Marcos Zilli

AbstractIn the Brazilian legal system there is no tradition in recognising the applicability of international criminal law over domestic law. In two cases judged by the STF, the Haximu Massacre and Siegfried Ellwanger, only tangential questions were addressed. In the first, the arguments concentrated on examining the legal definition of the crime of genocide and its distinction from homicide. In the second, the questions revolved around the social, historical, and political interpretation of the word "race" in the judgment of a defendant who had published anti-Semitic and "revisionist" books and articles about the Holocaust. Brazil has also demonstrated itself to be somewhat refractory in incorporating the principles of international criminal law when examining the Justice of Transition. In a recent decision, the STF affirmed the constitutionality of Law No. 6,683/79, which granted amnesty to the perpetrators of political crimes and the public agents responsible for torture and the forced disappearance of people during the military dictatorship. In summary, the Justices recognised as valid the political agreement that led to the promulgation of the Amnesty Law in such a way that any alteration of its terms could only be made by the National Congress.


2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-311
Author(s):  
Eki Yemisi Omorogbe

Abstract This article considers the African Union’s (AU) proposal for a regional court for international crimes under the Malabo Protocol 2014 (Protocol). It places that within the AU’s rejection of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrants for African Heads of States that are not party to the Rome Statute and a more general protection of incumbents. It argues that the enthusiasm for establishing a regional criminal court, which lacks jurisdiction to prosecute incumbents, has not been sustained and African states remain committed to the ICC. It shows that nevertheless the Protocol’s provisions on genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, although imperfect, better address the specific character of armed conflicts in Africa than current international law, including the Rome Statute of the ICC. It concludes that the regional court for international crimes is unlikely to be established unless the ICC takes further action against incumbent leaders but that the Protocol’s provisions could be used in the development of a more Africa-centric international law.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruben Reike

On September 9, 2013, diplomats and civil society activists gathered in a ballroom in New York to welcome Jennifer Welsh as the UN Secretary-General's new Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). In her first public appearance in that role, Special Adviser Welsh explained that one of her top priorities would be “to take prevention seriously and to make it meaningful in practice.” “In the context of RtoP,” Welsh added during the discussion, “we are talking about crimes, and crimes have implications in terms of how we deal with them. You'll hear me say that a lot.” Welsh's approach of treating RtoP as a principle that is primarily concerned with prevention and is firmly linked to international crimes neatly captures the evolution of RtoP since its formal acceptance by states at the 2005 UN World Summit. Paragraphs 138 to 140 of the World Summit's Outcome Document not only elevated the element of prevention to a prominent place within the principle of RtoP but also restricted the scope of RtoP to four specific crimes under international law: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The crime and prevention–focused version of RtoP has subsequently been defended and promoted by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and by UN member states. This article seeks to systematically explore some of the implications of linking RtoP to the concept of international crimes, with a particular focus on the preventive dimension of RtoP, the so-called responsibility to prevent. What, then, are the consequences of approaching the responsibility to prevent as the prevention of international crimes?In order to systematically examine this question, this article turns to literature from criminology. While the criminological perspective has so far been neglected in debates on RtoP, the prominent criminologists John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond argue vehemently that “criminology is crucially positioned to contribute understanding and direction to what the United Nations has mandated as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ groups that are threatened with mass atrocities.” For the purpose of this article, the label “criminology” comprises domestic criminology, supranational criminology, and international criminal law. While insights from supranational criminology and international criminal law are directly applicable to international crimes, translating knowledge generated in relation to crimes at the domestic level to atrocity crimes at the international level is, of course, not without challenges. Reasoning by analogy is an important method in this regard, though given the anarchical nature of international society some analogies will inevitably be imperfect. The benefits of such an approach, if carefully employed, however, outweigh the risks.


2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nolwenn Guibert ◽  
Tilman Blumenstock

AbstractOn 29 June 2007, the Special Court for Sierra Leone – a criminal tribunal created by an agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone – rendered its first judgement. The three accused, all senior members of a military junta which had ousted the elected government, were amongst other things found guilty of "new" international crimes, such as using child soldiers and collectively punishing the civilian population. This note critically analyses the achievements and shortcomings of what can be seen as a landmark ruling in international criminal law. It discusses the court's rejection of a separate crime of "forced marriages" as well as the application of "effective control" in terms of responsibility of a superior in the context of an "African conflict". Finally, this note examines the treatment of defective pleadings in the indictment in relation to particulars, crimes committed by the accused in person, and the existence of a joint criminal enterprise. It will be demonstrated that the judgement is of significance not only for assessing the success of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, but also for future criminal trials dealing with similar charges.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-176
Author(s):  
Kirsten J. Fisher

AbstractDue to the distinct nature of international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity originating out of and contributing to the pervasive collective character of mass atrocity, the appropriate mens rea for individual commission of these crimes is difficult to pin down. The mens rea for these international crimes has been deliberated, disputed and inconsistently applied, leaving what it means for individuals to intend to commit crimes of mass atrocity mired in confusion. This paper explores the meaning of intentional commission of collective crime, and demonstrates that from both philosophical and legal perspectives, acting intentionally in the context of mass atrocity can be interpreted in different ways, resulting in a condition of international criminal law which is at risk of unpredictability and expressive uncertainty. The paper endorses purpose-based, rather than knowledge-based, intent as the appropriate standard in the context of international crimes by arguing that mere knowledge of outcomes is insufficient.


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