Refusal to Save Lives: A Perspective from International Criminal Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 627-663
Author(s):  
Josh Scheinert

This article examines whether or not the refusal to accept life-saving humanitarian aid can qualify as a crime against humanity in international criminal law. By looking at the refusal to accept a certain HIV/AIDS drug in South Africa, and humanitarian aid in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in Burma, this article seeks to test the limits of the current understanding and conception of what a crime against humanity is. After a thorough review of the jurisprudence the article turns to apply the law to what transpired in South Africa and to Burma, and concludes that those situations do comport with the crime against humanity of ‘other inhumane acts’.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim C. Savelsberg

With the expansion of international criminal law, the causation and exercise of mass violence is increasingly criminalized. However, the fields of humanitarian aid and diplomacy generate representations completely different from what criminal law suggests. A comparative analysis of eight countries reveals variable susceptibilities for these competing narratives. The empirical evidence is based on a content analysis of more than 3,000 newspaper articles on violence in Darfur and on interviews with African correspondents and specialists in non-governmental organizations and foreign ministries of the eight countries. The analysis suggests differentiations in argumentation concerning field theory as well as theories of globalization.


2001 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 87-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Christoph Nemitz

‘Sentencing is an art and not a science’. This statement of Lord Lane expresses, with all due respect, what sentencing should not be. Although it cannot be denied that the process of determining a sentence is far from being a mathematical exercise, the result of which can be verified or falsified by reference to some unquestionable law of nature, both the legislator and the judiciary must strive for the development of a law of sentencing which is based on a comprehensive set of statutory provisions. The very term ‘lawof sentencing’ indicates that the meting out of a sentence is more than the exercise of a skill that only judges are vested with. The use of the term ‘art’, conversely, to describe sentencing gives the impression that the act of sentencing is beyond objective understanding and control. When we speak of art, we acknowledge that while views on the outcome can be manifold, objective criteria for a ‘correct’ assessment are few: there's no accounting for taste. This is unacceptable when looking at the significance of the law of sentencing for the pursuit of various sentencing purposes. To base the determination of the sentence on legal grounds enhances the review possibilities with regard to sentencing judgments. This contributes to an even sentencing practice, which in turn leads to just and comprehensible sentencing judgments. Such a practice is necessary in order to achieve public acceptance of the criminal justice system in general and of sentencing verdicts in particular. Such acceptance is imperative for the achievement of several sentencing purposes, especially that of affirmative (or positive) general prevention.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 695-716 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peg Birmingham

My argument in this article is that Hannah Arendt has a coherent and well-developed, although not systematic, philosophy of law which she brings to the Eichmann trial specifically and to international criminal law generally. In Part One of the article, I lay out Arendt’s philosophy of law, focusing on her account of the difference between the Greek and Roman conceptions of the law, the status of the consensus iuris, and the status of legal principles. Part Two offers a comparison of Arendt’s and Dworkin’s legal and political principles that animate the law. Part Three takes up Arendt’s approach to international criminal law through an analysis of her report of the Eichmann trial, specifically her account of the unprecedented nature of crimes against humanity, the new type of criminal who commits administrative massacres, and the difference between the criminal and the political trial at the international level.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Theofanis

AbstractRes judicata is well-settled as a general principle of international law. But the rules of res judicata in international criminal procedure are undeveloped. Recent cases from the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have added to the understanding of res judicata in international law - demonstrating the risk that new rules of res judicata will implicitly incorporate either a common-law or civil-law definition of what the "law" is. Analysis of issues considered in recent Tribunal jurisprudence - particularly the questions of review and reconsideration - locates potential hazards in the development of the law and provides guidance for the application of the ICC statute.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 231-246
Author(s):  
Emily Crawford

In this article, Emily Crawford explores one set of key institutional and legal responses to, and consequences of, the Rwanda genocide – the ictr and the revival of icl that the ictr and the icty heralded. Tracing the development of the concept and institutions of icl, Crawford observes how the case law of the [ad hoc] tribunals, and the ictr in particular, were pivotal in progressively developing the international law of genocide, and the law of non-international armed conflict’.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-873 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLAUS KRESS

AbstractAt the beginning of the renaissance of international criminal law in the 1990s, the law on crimes against humanity was in a fragile state. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) decisively contributed to the consolidation of customary international law on crimes against humanity and paved the way for its first comprehensive codification in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). At the same time, the ICTY in its early decisions already showed a certain inclination to broaden the scope of the application of the crime by downgrading its contextual requirement. More recently, this tendency culminated in the complete abandonment of the policy requirement. While this ‘progressive’ facet of the ICTY's jurisprudence largely took the form of obiter dicta, the Situation in the Republic of Kenya has confronted the ICC with the need to ‘get serious’ about the present state of the law. This has led to a controversy in Pre-Trial Chamber II about the concept of organization in Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute. While the majority essentially follows the path of the more recent case law of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone and supports a liberal interpretation, Judge Kaul prefers to confine the term to state-like organizations and generally calls for caution against too hasty an expansion of the realm of international criminal law stricto sensu. This comment agrees with the main thrust of the Dissenting Opinion and hopes that it will provoke a thorough debate.


2005 ◽  
Vol 57 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 31-57
Author(s):  
Dragan Jovasevic

After a long historical development, the second half of the 20th century has inaugurated the new, latest branch of the punitive law - international criminal law. By its legal nature and characteristics it is somewhere between the national criminal law and international public law, maintaining its peculiarity and independence. The basic and most important notion and institute of this branch of law is certainly the international criminal act. In the theory of law (domestic and foreign), there are several views on the notion and contents of the international criminal act. However, it can be concluded that this notion implies a socially dangerous, illegal act committed by the perpetrator and defined as a criminal act whose perpetrator is to be punished as prescribed by the law. Such a defined notion of the international criminal act includes its basic elements, and these are as follows: 1) the act of a man (including the act of an adult person that can be committed in three forms: acting, non-acting, failure to provide proper supervision, effect and casualty; 2) social danger; 3) unlawfulness; 4) definition of an act by rules, and 5) guilt of the perpetrator. There are two kinds of international criminal acts: international criminal acts in a narrow sense and international criminal acts in a broad sense. The most significant are certainly the international criminal acts in a narrow sense that are directed towards violation or endangering of the universal, general civilisation values - international law and humanity - what is actually the subject of protection from these criminal acts. Apart from the international criminal act, the theory of law also includes a foreign criminal act (any criminal act with a foreign element). By all this, these two notions coincide largely, but are also considerably different from each other. Apart from the general notion of the international criminal act, the theory of law also includes a special being or a special notion of the international criminal act by whose characteristics and specific forms and shapes of manifestation some international criminal acts or responsibility of their perpetrators actually differ from each other. As a matter of fact, all international legal documents in this field (and then national criminal legislation as well) deal with the whole system of various incriminations punished by various kinds and sorts of penalties (as basic sorts of criminal sanctions). The following documents deal with some international criminal acts in their specific forms and shapes of manifestation: The Statute of the International Military Tribunal (that served to reach the Nuremberg and then the Tokyo verdicts), the Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany, the Statute of the Hague Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as well as the statutes of some other ad hoc tribunals such as: Tribunals for Rwanda, Eastern Timor and Sierra Leone, then the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal and finally the Permanent International Criminal Court Statute (the so-called Rome Statute).


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