scholarly journals R2P and Prevention: The International Community and Its Role in the Determinants of Mass Atrocity

Author(s):  
Alexandra Bohm ◽  
Garrett Wallace Brown

There has been increased focus on atrocity prevention and the preventative elements associated with Pillar ii of the Responsibility to Protect. Policymakers and academics have offered a range of short-term preventative measures available so that the international community can better fulfil its Pillar ii responsibilities. This article challenges this current R2P thinking by arguing that its short-termism insufficiently focuses on de-escalation of risk within already present cycles of violence while dealing superficially with long-term causes and the ways in which the international community is a contributing factor in underwriting systemic and structural determinants of violence which erode state resilience against mass atrocity. As an alternative, this article examines a number of ways in which key actors of the international community contribute to determinants of mass violence and further offer recommendations for how they could better discharge their long-term preventative responsibilities by first reforming their own practices.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarwar J. Minar

The recent Rohingya crisis has drawn intense research attention worldwide lately, but the Tatmadaw’s perspective in the crackdown has not received much attention. Thus, this article analyses Tatmadaw’s perspective on its crackdown decision on the Rohingyas. The article avails SWOT framework (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, and Threat) for the analysis. The article argues that the Tatmadaw is militarily successful in achieving its goal. However, even though Tatmadaw is successful in the short-term, sustaining it in the long-term or converting military success into political success will be challenging, especiallyif international community comes into the stage with robust action.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-130
Author(s):  
Natasja Steenkamp ◽  
Shaun Steenkamp

Purpose This paper aims to investigate if the more stringent requirements of AASB 138, effective 1 January 2005, regarding capitalising research and development (R&D) spending could have been a catalyst for changes in managerial decisions that consequently resulted in reduced R&D spending in Australian companies. Design/methodology/approach Financial data of 31 Australian listed firms for financial years from 2001 to 2010 were used. Companies were classified as either capitalisers or non-capitalisers. A regression model was used to ascertain whether managers reduced R&D spending to manage earnings to attain short-term goals. Also, the research intensity ratios were calculated to determine trends in R&D spending of the two groups. Findings The pursuit of choosing short-term earnings targets to the detriment of long-term returns is referred to as short-termism. This study found a marked increase in the significance of short-termism in explaining changes in R&D of capitalisers before 2005. Furthermore, the median research intensity ratio of capitalisers declined almost three times that of non-capitalisers after the introduction of AASB 138. These findings suggest that AASB 138 could have been a catalyst for changes in managerial decisions in pursuit of short-termism, resulting in reduced R&D spending as a means to manage earnings. Originality/value This study is useful to standard setters and board of directors as it alerts them about the potential adverse effect AASB 138 might have on the survivability and competitiveness of Australian companies and hence the Australian economy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2020 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Bainbridge

In an important recent contribution to the short-termism debate, Professors Michal Barzuza and Eric Talley challenge what they call an “emerging consensus in certain legal, business, and scholarly communities . . . that corporate managers are pressured unduly into chasing short-term gains at the expense of superior long-term prospects.” See Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 104. Instead, Barzuza and Talley contend that “corporate managers often fall prey to long-term bias—excessive optimism about their own long-term projects.” This article is an invited comment on Barzuza and Talley’s article. Subject to various quibbles raised herein, I broadly concur with Barzuza and Talley’s argument that corporate directors and officers can be biased towards long-term projects and, accordingly, may reject short-term projects offering higher returns. But what law reforms follow logically from their conclusion, if any? With respect to judicial review, I want to differ with Barzuza and Talley on three points. First, I believe Barzuza and Talley overstate the risk of judicial intervention. Second, they fail adequately to distinguish between directors and managers, even though that distinction is central to the application of Delaware law. Third, I believe their analysis implies that judges should retain the deference to director decisionmaking inherent in doctrines such as the business judgment rule and intermediate review. With respect to encouraging shareholder activism, I argue that the responsibility for policing managerial hyperopia (or myopia, for that matter) should be assigned to the board of directors, not the shareholders. Heterogenous shareholders lack the proper incentives and knowledge to properly police management.


Author(s):  
A. Ya. Nikitin ◽  
E. I. Andaev ◽  
A. K. Noskov ◽  
N. D. Pakskina ◽  
E. V. Yatsmenko ◽  
...  

Abstract. Despite the decreasing TBE incidence trend in Russia, the disease is considered an ongoing challenge for the state’s public health and economics. Objective of our study was to describe the algorithm of short-term incidence forecast of TBE, to evaluate the conformity of these data to factual incidence and the results of annual strategic seasonal monitoring which takes place across all the entities of Russia. In the paper, we described the procedure for providing short-term extrapolation of TBE incidence forecast onto the Russian territories, depending on the absence or presence of incidence change trends.Materials and methods. Utilized were the State statistics, “The data on infectious and parasitic diseases” (Form No 2), as well as the information on strategic monitoring for a period of 2007–2018. In order to determine the multi-year trend of epidemic process development, regression analysis was applied. If the trend was identified, predictions were made on its basis, if not – through calculating the long-term annual average. In all the cases, 95 % confidence interval for incidence trend deviation was considered. Comparative analysis of actual morbidity rates and predicted ones and the data on strategic monitoring was conducted by Student’s criterion.The commutations were performed using Excel software tools.Results and discussion. The study has demonstrated that the expected rates of TBE incidence are not statistically different from the actual incidence or the data from strategic monitoring. The underestimation of the epidemiological risk is found only in 4 out of 49 entities (8,2 %), and it is of note that in 3 of them it was less than 16 %. The data from operational monitoring are downward biased by reference to actual incidence, which is probably due to inclusion of TBE cases confirmed and/or manifested upon termination of incubation period after expiration of terms of weekly observations. The unified and simple approach that we proposed to TBE-incidence forecasting within the territory of Russia provides for correct information on expected epidemiological risk assessment and timely planning of required preventative measures. 


Author(s):  
K. Voronov

The author examines the global crisis that began in 2008 as a debt one, then transformed into a financial one. Now it is often regarded as a world financial and reproduction (macroeconomic) crisis and causes the most serious concerns. In contrast to the more comprehensive long-term forecasts on fundamental or sub-regional developments, this article presents an attempt to analyze key trends and issues facing the international community in the short term period.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Hackbarth ◽  
Alejandro Rivera ◽  
Tak-Yuen Wong

This paper develops a dynamic contracting (multitasking) model of a levered firm. In particular, the manager selects long-term and short-term efforts, and shareholders choose optimal debt and default policies. Excessive short-termism ex post is optimal for shareholders because debt has an asymmetric effect: shareholders receive all gains from short-term effort but share gains from long-term effort. We find that grim growth prospects and shareholder impatience imply higher optimal levels of short-termism. Also, an incentive cost effect and a real option effect create nontrivial patterns for the endogenous default threshold. Finally, we quantify agency costs of excessive short-termism, which underscore the economic significance of our results. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.


Significance Displacement has shot up drastically since early 2019, thanks to insecurity in the north and east of the country, especially. Besides the serious short-term impacts on the economy and the November 22 presidential and legislative elections, the displacement crisis threatens to have long-term negative impacts on social cohesion. Impacts Mass disenfranchisement would undermine the elections and the winner’s legitimacy, increasing protest and coup risks. Curbed cross-border movements due to domestic and neighbouring states' insecurity will raise economic and social difficulties for citizens. Even if broad swathes of voters are disenfranchised, the international community will likely accept the results.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Crouzet ◽  
Ian Dew-Becker ◽  
Charles G Nathanson

Abstract We study the effects of policies proposed to address “short-termism” in financial markets. We examine a noisy rational expectations model in which investors’ exposures and information about fundamentals endogenously vary across horizons. In this environment, taxing or outlawing short-term investment doesn’t negatively affect the information in prices about long-term fundamentals. However, such a policy reduces short- and long-term investors’ profits and utility. Changing policies about the release of short-term information can help long-term investors—an objective of some policy makers—at the expense of short-term investors. Doing so also makes prices less informative and increases costs of speculation. Received June 24, 2018; editorial decision February 19, 2019 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-223
Author(s):  
Juan Wang

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of long horizon institutional ownership on CEO career concerns to meet the short-term earnings benchmark. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 10,565 firm-year observations in the USA, the paper examines the extent to which long horizon institutional investors mitigate the positive relation between CEO turnover and missing the quarterly consensus analyst forecast. Findings After controlling for the general performance-turnover relation, this paper finds that long horizon institutional investors mitigate the positive relation between CEO turnover and missing the quarterly consensus analyst forecast. This finding is stronger when CEOs focus on long-term value creation and do not sacrifice long-term value to boost current earnings and is stronger when the monitoring intensity by long horizon institutional investors is greater. Research limitations/implications The results suggest that long horizon institutional investors serve a monitoring role in alleviating CEO career concerns to meet the short-term earnings benchmark. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature on the relation between long horizon institutional ownership and attenuated managerial short-termism. The literature is silent about why long horizon institutional investors alleviate managerial short-termism. This paper fills this void in the literature by documenting that long horizon institutional investors mitigate CEO career concerns for managerial short-termism. Moreover, this paper contributes to the literature on the monitoring role of institutional investors by documenting the incremental effect of institutional ownership on CEO career concerns to meet the short-term earnings benchmark.


Author(s):  
Mark J. Roe

In this chapter I examine whether short-termism in stock markets justifies using corporate law to further shield managers and boards from shareholder influence, to allow boards and managers to pursue their view of sensible long-term strategies in their investment and management policies even more freely. First, the evidence that on stock market short-termism is mixed and inconclusive, with managerial mechanisms under-rated sources of short-term distortions, including managerial compensation packages whose duration often is shorter than that of institutional stockholding; further insulating boards from markets would exacerbate these managerial short-term-favoring mechanisms. Nor are courts well positioned to make this kind of basic economic policy, which if serious is better addressed with policy tools unavailable to courts.


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