The ‘Revolving Door’ of Direct Participation in Hostilities

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 410-446
Author(s):  
Alessandro Silvestri
Keyword(s):  
Urban Areas ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Physical Nature ◽  
Revolving Door ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Direct Participation ◽  
Aid Decision ◽  
Direct Attack

Abstract Contemporary trends of warfare have witnessed a so-called ‘civilian footprint’ in support of military operations while battlefields have increasingly shifted towards urban areas. International humanitarian law established a framework through which civilians are protected from direct attack ‘unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities’. Three key areas have traditionally been associated with the analysis of direct participation in hostilities (‘dph’): civilian legal status, what behaviour amounts to dph, and what modalities govern this loss of protection. This article will focus on the latter and attempt to create a feasible and practical framework capable of harnessing the temporal scope of dph and limit the so-called ‘revolving door phenomenon’. The framework developed in this article will account for criteria that could and should aid decision-making on the battlefield, most notably causal associations between individuals and dph acts and the physical or non-physical nature of dph acts’ deployments.

scholarly journals The International Humanitarian Law Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities – A Review of The ICRC Interpretive Guide and Subsequent Debate

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 1046
Author(s):  
Dr Shannon Bosch
Keyword(s):  
Revolving Door ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Direct Participation ◽  
New Concepts ◽  
Interpretive Guide ◽  
War Effort ◽  
Direct Targeting ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Civilian Immunity

The phrase "direct participation in hostilities" has a very specific meaning in international humanitarian law (IHL). Those individuals who are clothed with combatant status are authorised to participate directly in hostilities without fear of prosecution, while civilians lose their civilian immunity against direct targeting whilst they participate directly in hostilities. Any civilian activity which amounts to "direct participation in hostilities" temporarily suspends their presumptive civilian protection and exposes them to both direct targeting as a legitimate military target and prosecution for their unauthorised participation in hostilities. Since existing treaty sources of IHL do not provide a definition of what activities amount to "direct participation in hostilities", the ICRC in 2009 released an Interpretive Guide on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities - in the hope of providing a neutral, impartial and balanced interpretation of the longstanding IHL principle of direct participation in hostilities. While not without criticism, the Interpretive Guide aims to respect the customary IHL distinction between "direct participation in hostilities" and mere involvement in the general war effort. The Guide proposes a three-pronged test which establishes a threshold of harm, and requires direct causation together with a belligerent nexus. Collectively, these criteria limit overly-broad targeting policies, while distinguishing occasions of legitimate military targeting from common, criminal activities. Together with these three criteria, the Guide introduces the notion of the revolving door of protection, together with the concept of a "continuous combat function". Both these new concepts have been the subject of criticism, as too the idea that a presumption of non-participation status should apply in cases of doubt. Nevertheless "nothing indicates that the ICRC's interpretive guidance is substantively inaccurate, unbalanced, or otherwise inappropriate, or that its recommendations cannot be realistically translated into operational practice"[1] in a way which will ensure that the fundamental principles of distinction and civilian immunity upon which all of IHL is built are observed.*     [1]    Melzer 2010 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 915.

Section IX of the ICRC Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities: The End of Jus in Bello Proportionality as We Know It?

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jann K Kleffner
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Direct Participation ◽  
Direct Attack

Section IX of the ICRC Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities asserts: ‘In addition to the restraints imposed by international humanitarian law on specific means and methods of warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions that may arise under other applicable branches of international law, the kind and degree of force which is permissible against persons not entitled to protection against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances’. The present article scrutinises arguments that have been, or can be, advanced in favour of and against a ‘least harmful means’ requirement for the use of force in situations of armed conflict as suggested in Section IX. The principal aim of the article is to examine the question whether such an additional proportionality requirement forms part of the applicable international lex lata.

Precautions against the effects of attacks in urban areas

2016 ◽  
Vol 98 (901) ◽  
pp. 147-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Talbot Jensen
Keyword(s):  
Urban Areas ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Modern Technology ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Advanced Technology ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Geneva Conventions ◽  
Urban Conflict

AbstractThe conduct of hostilities in urban areas is inherently difficult, particularly with respect to the protection of civilians. International humanitarian law places restraints on both attackers and defenders. While much is written about the obligations of attackers with respect to protecting civilians, much less attention has been paid to the defender's obligations. These obligations are routinely referred to as “passive precautions” or “precautions against the effects of attacks” and are codified in Article 58 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Article 58 requires parties, “to the maximum extent feasible”, to remove civilians and civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives, to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas, and to take other necessary precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects from the dangers resulting from military operations.Even though they are limited by only requiring those actions which are feasible, the obligations placed on the defender are far from trivial and, if applied in good faith, would certainly provide much needed protections to civilians in armed conflict, particularly in times of urban conflict. However, this ever-increasing urbanization is creating significant pressure on the doctrine of precautions in defence, stretching the “feasibility” standard beyond its capacity to adequately protect civilians. On the other hand, the emergence of advanced technology provides a mechanism for defenders to more easily and more fully comply with their obligations to segregate or protect the civilian population.For the customary obligation of “precautions against the effects of attacks” to maintain its effectiveness, particularly in urban areas of conflict, the understanding of feasibility and what is “practicable” in current urbanized armed conflicts will have to expand, increasing the practical responsibilities on the defender, including through the use of modern technology. Moreover, imposing criminal responsibility when appropriate and feasible precautions are not taken will rectify the perceived imbalance between the responsibilities of the attacker and those of the defender.

Protecting civilians in urban areas: A military perspective on the application of international humanitarian law

2016 ◽  
Vol 98 (901) ◽  
pp. 177-199
Author(s):  
Nathalie Durhin
Keyword(s):  
Urban Areas ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Collateral Damage ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Precautionary Measures ◽  
Military Perspective ◽  
Real Challenge

AbstractImplementing the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) represents a real challenge if the protection of civilians in today's urban armed conflicts remains a priority for armed forces. The application of the principle of distinction comes up against the difficulties of obtaining intelligence, in particular in the absence of troops on the ground. The minimalization of collateral damage requires putting in place very precise targeting procedures, and even the adoption of tactics designed to draw out traditional combat from cities. In terms of precautionary measures in attack or against the effects of an attack, these must be adapted to the context of urban combat. Nevertheless, IHL remains an essential instrument that must be analyzed and translated into action in a practical manner in order to conduct military operations that are at the same time effective and legally permissible.

Taking Care Against the Computer

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Simon McKenzie ◽  
Eve Massingham
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Electromagnetic Spectrum ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Modern Life ◽  
Military Installations ◽  
Digital Infrastructure ◽  
The Status ◽  
Taking Care

Abstract The obligations of international humanitarian law are not limited to the attacker; the defender is also required to take steps to protect civilians from harm. The requirement to take precautions against the effects of attack requires the defender to minimize the risk that civilians and civilian objects will be harmed by enemy military operations. At its most basic, it obliges defenders to locate military installations away from civilians. Furthermore, where appropriate, the status of objects should be clearly marked. It is – somewhat counterintuitively – about making it easier for the attacker to select lawful targets by making visible the distinction between civilian objects and military objectives. The increasing importance of digital infrastructure to modern life may make complying with these precautionary obligations more complicated. Maintaining separation between military and civilian networks is challenging as both operate using at least some of the same infrastructure, relying on the same cables, systems, and electromagnetic spectrum. In addition, the speed at which operations against digital infrastructure can occur increases the difficulty of complying with the obligation – particularly if such operations involve a degree of automation or the use of artificial intelligence (ai). This paper sets out the source and extent of the obligation to take precautions against hostile military operations and considers how they might apply to digital infrastructure. As well as clarifying the extent of the obligation, it applies the obligation to take precautions against hostile military operations to digital infrastructure, giving examples of where systems designers are taking these obligations into account, and other examples of where they must.

scholarly journals Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects under International Humanitarian Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák
Keyword(s):  
Customary Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Computer Data ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Military Objective ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Teleological Interpretation

This article presents the case for a progressive interpretation of the notion of military objectives in international humanitarian law (IHL), bringing computer data within the scope of this concept. The advent of cyber military operations has presented a dilemma as to the proper understanding of data in IHL. The emerging orthodoxy, represented by the 2013Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, advances the argument that the intangible nature of data renders it ineligible to be an object for the purposes of the rules on targeting in IHL. This article, on the contrary, argues that because of its susceptibility to alteration and destruction, the better view is that data is an object within the meaning of this term under IHL and thus it may qualify as a military objective. The article supports this conclusion by means of a textual, systematic and teleological interpretation of the definition of military objectives found in treaty and customary law. The upshot of the analysis presented here is that data that does not meet the criteria for qualification as a military objective must be considered a civilian object, with profound implications for the protection of civilian datasets in times of armed conflict.

Who Are Protected by the Fundamental Guarantees under International Humanitarian Law? Part 2: Breaking with the Control Requirement in Light of the icc Case Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-58
Author(s):  
Raphaël van Steenberghe
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Case Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
General Control ◽  
Geneva Conventions ◽  
The Status ◽  
Control Requirement ◽  
Specific Paper

Abstract International humanitarian law provides for fundamental guarantees, the content of which is similar irrespective of the nature of the armed conflict and which apply to individuals even if they do not fall into the categories of specifically protected persons under the Geneva Conventions. Those guarantees, all of which derive from the general requirement of human treatment, include prohibitions of specific conduct against persons, such as murder, cruel treatment, torture, sexual violence, or against property, such as pillaging. However, it is traditionally held that the entitlement to those guarantees depends upon two requirements: the ‘status requirement’, which basically means that the concerned persons must not or no longer take a direct part in hostilities, and the ‘control requirement’, which basically means that the concerned persons or properties must be under the control of a party to the armed conflict. This study argues in favour of breaking with these two requirements in light of the existing icc case law. That study is divided into two parts, with each part devoted to one requirement and made the object of a specific paper. The two papers follow the same structure. They start with general observations on the requirement concerned, examine the relevant icc case law and put forward several arguments in favour of an extensive approach to the personal scope of the fundamental guarantees. The first paper, which was published in the previous issue of this journal, dealt with the status requirement. It especially delved into the icc decisions in the Ntaganda case with respect to the issue of protection against intra-party violence. It advocated the applicability of the fundamental guarantees in such a context by rejecting the requirement of a legal status, on the basis of several arguments. Those arguments relied on ihl provisions protecting specific persons as well as on the potential for humanizing ihl on the matter and also on the approach making the status requirement relevant only when the fundamental guarantees apply in the conduct of hostilities. The second paper, which is published here, deals with the control requirement. It examines several icc cases in detail, including the Katanga and Ntaganda cases, in relation to the issue of the applicability of the fundamental guarantees in the conduct of hostilities. It is argued that the entitlement to those guarantees is not dependent upon any general control requirement, and that, as a result, some of these guarantees may apply in the conduct of hostilities. This concerns mainly those guarantees whose application or constitutive elements do not imply any physical control over the concerned persons or properties.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document